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FOREWORD 
If uncertainty is a keynote of our time, then it must have been par-
ticularly true for agriculture in the winter of 1967-68 when this seminar 
was held. It is the keynote of the opening remarks by an excellent Iowa 
farmer, who sympathetically expresses the disillusionment of those who 
had expected a quick return to the "good old days" of agriculture. 
His reply follows here as a series of papers by informed men, seek-
ing acceptable ways to reduce this uncertainty. Their experience qualifies 
them to explore and look ahead, whether a few years or a few decades. 
Their search takes. them to new farm policy alternatives and new combina-
tions of alternatives, ranging from the possible oligopoly of a few great 
farms to the possible consensus of many farmers agreeing about how to 
rely on their own bargaining power. 
Some of the papers suggest that the choice of alternatives will need 
to be based on recognition of a new identity for agriculture and a clear 
concept of its purpose. All suggest a certain urgency about the situation, 
a need for ~greement as to what kind of agriculture we will have. They 
make it clear that associated with each choice are costs as well as benefits, 
whether in dollars or in freedom of action. Yet to deny that the choices 
exist, and that they should be made soon, will also cost something in 
dollars and in freedom -- perhaps more than agriculture can afford. 
R. L. Reeder, Editor 
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FARM UNEASINESS--A FARMER'S VIEW 
Robert K. Buck* 
Some of you men who have been off the farm for a good many years 
may forget how inconsistent a farmer appears to the casual observer. 
He is a basic optimist with a great deal of stick-to-it-iveness or he 
wouldn't be a farmer in the first place. He is also somewhat of a 
chronic pessimist and worrier. For this he should be forgiven because 
he has a lot to worry and complain about, being one of the last pri-
vate enterprisers in our modern world of big corporate business and 
big labor unions. His planning is always being upset by weather and 
by unpredictable market ·behavior. 
At the end of 19 67 the mood of many commercial farmers in the 
Midwest is one of unrest, uneasiness and downright disgust. You 
may say, "Why should commercial farmers be uneasy? They never 
had it so good as in 1966." Granted 1966 was one of the best years 
income-wise for commercial farmers, it is clear that net incomes are 
sharply lower in 19 6 7. The eight test farms owned by the Iowa State 
University Foundation, all but one livestock-share operations 1 show 
about a third less net income in 1967 than in 1966. I suspect this is 
a fair projection of the result for all farmers in Iowa. 
This drop in income alone accounts for considerable uneasiness 
among farmers and farm suppliers. But we have always had sharp 
changes in farm income from year to year. The uneasiness we are 
discussing today is more involved. It has its roots in economic 
matters 1 of course, but it is partly a matter of emotions -- feelings 
of fear of the future 1 a sense of unfairness in farm as related to 
nonfarm earnings 1 and fear of being by-pas sed 1 forgotten 1 and even 
exploited by the new urban political power structure. 
I see two major causes of sources of midwest farm uneasiness. 
The first is a corrosive and gnawing sort of reaction to change --
change that is no longer gradual but head-long. The second cause 
of current farm uneasines.s is the sudden awakening late in 1966 from 
the fantasy 1 fostered by so many responsible leaders 1 that a new era 
had arrived when U.S. farmers must feed the world. There are other 
sources of this uneasiness which I will discuss later but let's take 
a look at these two major causes. 
*Farmer 1 Waukee 1 Iowa. 
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Change is the Game 
In the last 20 years change has been the watchword in U.S. agri-
culture. Change is regarded by many as synonymous with progress and 
growth. A significant portion of industry is involved in developing, 
producing and selling new machines, new fertilizer, new additives, new 
products of all kinds to farmers. They hire many college-trained men to 
sell these goods to farmers and especially to change customers from this 
to that. Our researchers and educators, public and private, are stoking 
the engines to turn out and disseminate new technology at an accelerating 
rate. The demand for new funds for these purposes, both public and pri-
vate, seems insatiable. 
It appears to some rural people that our society regards technology 
and change as ends in themselves, that farmers and rural institutions 
are expendable in our quest for change and economic growth. This may 
put the situation too strongly, but I suggest that the personal and social 
costs of change and growth, and the fear of a future which promises 
accelerated change, account for some of the uneasiness among farm 
people. 
Educational programs have been carried out to help rural people 
understand and adjust to change. But the hard reality is that the impact 
of these changes in rural areas is to make a great many farmers and rural 
institutions redundant and even obsolete. 
The statistics are well known. Those who are squeezed off every 
year are uneasy, to say the least. Some are bitter, frustrated and 
depressed. Of course 1 some of these dropouts adjust well and are better 
off economically in a few years. But 1 for those with problems of age or 
lack of training 1 who find opportunities for employment quite limited 1 the 
results of change or economic growth are frustration and loss of self-
confidence. I won't dwell on this more dramatic fallout from the changes 
we all promote in U.S. agriculture. We usually tip our hats to this by-
passed segment of U.S. agriculture as a problem that someone ought to 
study. 
There is another facet of the growth problem 1 less dramatic than the 
dropout 1 but affecting many more families. We might call it feat of failure 
or fear' of the unknown. This is shared by many commercial farmers who 
are solvent and capable operators. They have ceen adjusting almost fran-
tically to the rapid successsion of changes of recent years -- reducing 
labor 1 increasing capital inputs drastically; enlarging units 1 expanding 
debt and adopting the new technology as it is poured out. 
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Progress and change, innovation and efficiency all rate high in our 
system of ag_ricultural values. I suggest that a by-product of recent 
trends and of the numerous dramatic projections for the decades ahead 
is the current uneasiness and unrest among many younger and middle-
aged farmers. It is a feeling of being economically vulnerable in 
carrying a higher and higher overhead of semi-fixed costs in land, larger 
power units, combines, feeding systems, etc. Those younger farmers 
who have bought farms in recent years on contract at high prices, on top 
of large short-term debts, feel the most vulnerable of all. But many other 
farmers have an uneasy feeling when they examine their net worth and 
ponder the extent of inflated values in their assets. 
For a number of years it was generally believed by farmers and 
economists, too, that the well-organized family farm of moderate size --
say 320 acres -- was near optimum or at least not at any significant 
disadvantage in economy of operation. With the increase in recent years 
of the very large· tractors, plow, planters and combines, I believe many 
farmers in this middle group, always before confident of staying competi-
tive, are now having misgivings. They wonder, "Can I keep up with this 
accelerating treadmill? How much debt can I stand? Am I wading into 
deeper and deeper water where it will finally get over my head? " 
The impact of drastic change on man's behavior might well receive 
more attention by social scientists. I was interested in some of the 
insights of Eric Hoffer in the 11 0rdeal of Change. 11 
11 It is my impression that no one really likes the new. 
We are afraid of it • • • • Even in slight things the 
experience of the new is rarely without some stirring 
of foreboding • 
"We can never be really prepared for that which is wholly 
new. We have to adjust ourselves, and every radical 
adjustment is a crisis in self-esteem: we undergo a test, 
we have to prove ourselves. It needs inordinate self-
confidence to face drastic chapge without inner trembling. 
Drastic change, under certain conditions, creates a proclivity 
for fanatical attitudes, united action, and spectacular mani-
festations of flouting and defiance." (Harper and Row, Publishers, 
Inc. 1963.) 
Feed the World Fantasy 
The other major factor contributing heavily to the current unrest among 
farmers is the shattering of the illusion built up a year ago that U.S. agriculture 
had entered a new era. A combination of leaders contributed to a sort of 
fantasy or dream world in which U.S. farmers must "feed the world. " 
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Surpluses were a thing of the past. World famine was imminent unless 
we waged a war on hunger. Farm policies should be reversed, old pro-
grams dumped, even new programs were needed to plow up the land held 
in reserve. 
This was heady stuff. Even though invoked in the name of humani-
tarianism, many stood to gain economically by the increased volume of 
production and had a clear vested interest in the "war on hunger" idea. 
I am referring to those who manufacture and sell inputs of all kinds to 
farmers and those who process, transport, handle or store farm products, 
even those who develop and disseminate new technology. 
This "brother's keeper" idea of feeding the world was appealing to 
farmers, too. We are as human as anyone in wanting to feed the hungry. 
But the idea was appealing, too, because it inflated our ego. We were 
the ones to "save the world from famine." And even though we find it 
difficult to admit, the idea appealed because it would help get farm 
surpluses off our back. As Lauren Soth pointed out, "We help ourselves 
financially and feel virtuous while doing it. What better farm policy 
could you want ? " 
Those rosy projections for sharply increased demand and the 
exhortations to "unleash the American farmer" came at a time when many 
farm prices were good by any standards. Hog prices were the highest 
in 1966 for any year I have farmed. Cattle prices were good. Corn 
jumped to $1. 25 locally at harvest and beans got to $3. 00. In the 
fantasy we built, many farmers and businessmen were in a "bull" frame 
of mind for the future. 
This kind of way-out projection is a serious matter because it builds 
false expectations. It contributes to unwise and costly economic decisions. 
It results in an over-investment of capital in U.S. agriculture at all levels. 
Quite a number of farmers held on to their 1966 corn in view of the 
bullish forecasts. Some are still holding it. They were shocked by the 
quick turn around in the feed grain supply situation. The public and private 
statements in the winter a year ago were that reserves were getting uncom-
fortably low. Therefore, the farm program should be loosened up and farmers 
encouraged to expand production. Now, a short year later the public and 
private information farmers are getting is that supplies are burdensome again 
and, unless farmers demonstrate heroic restraint in feeding this grain to 
livestock, disaster will be upon us. 
A notion had been built up over a period of years that prices and incomes 
would automatically rise if surplus stocks were eliminated and we got the 
CCC out of the market. Farmers are puzzled, to say the least, that prices 
did not go up as expected, now that CCC is virtually out. When we come 
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back to economic reality ~bruptly as we did this year, farmers, the same 
as any other group, tend to look for a scapegoat or a devil. In this 
connection it strikes me as incorrect to make the USDA the culprit 
in assigning all the blame for the mischief caused by the "feed the world" 
fantasy of 1966. They must share responsibility, but many leaders con-
tributed. They were in private industry, farm organizations, the land-
grant colleges, and the farm press as well as the USDA. 
There are other factors which contribute to current uneasiness among 
farmers. Like most other citizens, they are concerned about the Vietnam 
War, and especially the possibility that it may be escalated into a major 
war. 
Farmers are uneasy about inflation of prices. Nearly every week 
there are news stories of fat pay raises in private industry and in govern- · 
ment, strikes going on and strikes threatened. These constant wage 
increases in U.S. industry reach the farmer in a short time in higher costs. 
With his costs going up and his prices down, why wouldn't he be uneasy? 
In fact that puts the matter too mildly. He is getting "fed up. " In addi-
tion, if he hires any labor, wage costs are higher every year. His local 
property taxes continue to soar. 
A word about the so-called "cheap food" policy. I believe well-
informed farmers understand that our national agricultural policies are of 
long standing and carry through several administrations -- under both 
parties. Our basic policy for the last 30 years, whatever the party in 
power, has been one of aggressive development and expansion of our farm 
plant. A very major policy, in terms of personnel and budget, focuses on 
programs (1) to develop and disseminate new technology, (2) to bring new 
land into production by irrigation, reclamation, drainage, clearing, etc. 
(3) to increase productivity by cost-sharing incentives in liming, fertilizing, 
terracing, fencing, etc. (4) to increase investment in new tractors, machines 
and equipment by tax incentives, (5) to make credit available, both short-
term and long, on favorable terms. 
The other part of the policy has been programs to protect farm income 
when the stimulated production out-ran markets as it did most of the time. 
·These programs are quite familiar -- price supports, storage, surplus dis-
posal and foreign aid. 
What frustrates farmers is that the numerous programs designed to 
stimulate output are regarded as good and entirely consistent with the 
American system. Yet programs to protect farm income are regarded by many 
as bad and "socialistic." Some of the people supporting the programs to in-
crease output oppose vigorously the programs to deal with the economic 
consequences of over-production. 
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Another matter that "bugs" farmers in recent years is what is widely 
regarded as a "breakdown" in the crop and livestock estimates. A surpri-
singly large number of farmers are coming to believe that these outlook 
reports do more harm than good because they are inaccurate and lead farmers 
to make bad plans. 
I hope economists do not dismiss this matter entirely. We need to 
take a hard look at the adequacy of the basic counting and estimating 
procedures. We need to emphasize over and over that these are estimates 
and indicate clearly the range of error possible. We need more manpower 
on the research and analytical end of the job relative to the number of 
people interpreting 1 reporting 1 and predicting. It is appalling to think 
about the number of "information" people in radio 1 TV 1 farm magazines 1 
trade journals 1 newspapers 1 farm organizations 1 and land-grant colleges I 
who take these rough estimates established by a very few persons in the 
USDA and flood farmers with pithy 1 precise price and prediction 1 do's and 
don'ts on buying 1 selling 1 etc. The sad thing is that some farmers take 
this stuff seriously. 
We spoke of the "feed the world" fantasy that was built up a year 
ago and burst so violently this year. I'm beginning to wonder if we are 
building a similar fantasy this year in the "bargaining power" fad. My 
guess is that far more is being promised and suggested than can be 
delivered. No one is talking much about realistic price goals 1 for 
example. In view of the powerful forces expanding output we may do 
quite well indeed if corn can be kept from going below $1.00 per bushel 
at harvest time in most years. Eric Hoffer in the "Ordeal of Change" 
said 1 "For when we fail in attaining the possible the blame is solely 
ours, but when we fail in attaining the impossible we are justified 
in attributing it to the magnitude of the task." 
Summary 
To summarize, I have tried to explain the current uneasiness and 
unrest among farmers in tenns of: 
1. The feelings of fear and foreboding by many farmers as they 
consider the accelerating changes taking place in agriculture~ 
2. The feelings of shock and dismay as the "feed the world" 
fantasy of 19 66 fell apart and in 19 67 we faced the same old 
problems of production outrunning markets, soft prices, etc. 
3. The frustrations growing out of the Vietnam War. 
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4. The increasing anger over the chronic inflation of wages and 
costs. 
5. The growing concern over the inaccuracies in livestock and 
crop estimates. 
6. The mixed reactions of hope and skepticism over the current 
rash of talk about bargaining power for farmers. 

FARM UNCERTAINTY--AN ANALYSIS OF THE ISSUES 
Leo V. Mayer* 
For the fourth time in as many decades, the rural areas of the United 
States are once again experiencing doubt and frustration over the outlook 
for the farm economy. For those farm families who remained on the farm 
through the first three, and there are many in view of the high age struc-
ture, this latest turndown in farm prospects must seem particularly frus-
trating. 
The agricultural industry was facing a severe depression of income 
when the government first made a major attempt to legislate hope for families 
in 1933, hope which slowly diminished with the large crops and declining 
prices of the latter years of that decade. To compensate for not maintaining 
prices in depression, farm prices for major crops were left uncontrolled 
during World War II and hope was raised during the 1940's for both improved 
farm conditions and world peace, hope which again disappeared with grow-
ing grain stocks and the chilled winds of the Cold War late in that decade. 
The early 1950's also brought hope that farm conditions were on a path to 
improvement, but that path was clearly uphill for the last half of the decade. 
And to the dismay of many, farm conditions have reversed their upward trend 
in the decade of the 19 60' s • 
The first half of the 1960's brought expanding demand, declining grain 
stocks and improving price levels. These conditions resulted in improved 
income levels as the number of farms declined. But the farm picture again 
clouded with the drop in foreign demand after 19 65-6 6. In. addition the 
"miscalculation" of 19 67 crop production has shown that the basic over-
capacity has grown relative to domestic markets. And the prospects are 
good that our ability to produce will continue to grow for the next decade. 
But others will look in greater detail at our capacity to produce so I 
shall not pursue it further. But events. in 19 67 should have underscored 
the importance of our policy makers and administrators having a clear 
understanding of the magnitude of our production potential. The over-re-
laxation of production restraints in 1967 suggests a lack of appreciation 
of the true potential of our farm plant. A better understanding of the 
changing magnitude of variables affecting the level of total output would 
have provided a keener understanding of the atomistic nature of our tech-
nologically advanced farm industry. 
*Assistant Professor of Economics, Iowa State University. The comments 
and suggestions of William G. Stucky, Gene Futrell and Howard Madsen 
are gratefully acknowledged. 
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Figure 1 • Trends of prices received for all crops, all livestock, and all 
commodities, 1964-67. 
350 COMMODITIES a SERVICES, INTEREST, 
TAXES a FARM WAGE RATES 
ITEMS USED FOR FAMILY LIVING 
275 
FOR PRODUCTION 
1 I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I ~ANAPRtlgfJ~Y OCT.I JANAFjglk~ OCT.I JA~~LY octt JAN.faU'f'ULY oc"f1 
Y~AR AND MONffi 
Figure 2. Trends of prices paid by farmers for items used in production and 
family living, 1964-67. 
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Farm Uncertainty and Farm Issues 
There are many issues creating uncertainty among farm people today. 
A majority of these issues revolve around (a) the economic outcomes 
farmers will derive in an urban society, (b) the relationships which will 
exist between farmers, the government, and the urban society, and (c) 
the role, if any, that farmers will fill in the U.S. relationship to a 
food-needy world. Some of these issues are more immediate in nature and 
others bother those persons who are looking past 1970. A look first at 
some issues which are causing near-term pessimism. 
Farm prices 
Above and beyond all other issues in order of immediate importance 
is the lower level of farm prices received recently for grain commodities. 
These prices are lower on average than any since 1960 when crop prices 
received averaged 222 on the 1910-14 base. After 1960 crop prices rose, 
averaging 227 in 1961, 232 in 1962, 239 in 1963, 239 in 1964, 234 in 1965 
and 235 in 1966. As is evident crop prices reached a peak in 1964, an 
election year, and maintained a slightly lower level to 1967. Based on 
present prospects, 1967 crop prices received by farmers should average 
about 224 percent of the 1910-14 base period (figure 1). 
The lower crop prices received in 1967 are somewhat more difficult 
to explain than simply saying that a larger output is available for the 
market. The quantity available for sale is increased but carryover stocks 
will be lower at the marketing year's end than in most years since 1961. 
Probably more important, excess capacity in grain production has been 
shown to exist. Only 12 months ago, much of the grain trade and even 
many well trained agriculturalists hypothesized that our overcapacity to 
produce was gone and demand would soon outstrip supply. You heard 
statements that our 55 million acres retired were simply "turn-arounds" 
and "rock-hills" which farmers would not farm even if restrictions were 
removed. The events of 1967 clearly removed these doubts and, even 
though carryovers will increase only slightly (with most of the increase 
remaining insulated from the market in government bins), farm prices are 
lower than in recent years. This outcome suggests that whereas in 1966 
there was doubt that output could be increased, there is now doubt that 
the overcapacity can be controlled. One objective of this meeting should 
be to allay that fear. 
The uncertainty over farm prices is not solely one of crop prices 
however. Of additional importance is the relationship between crop 
prices and livestock prices. As is evident from Figure 1, this ratio has 
widened since 1964 when crop and livestock prices averaged about the 
same relationship to each other as in 1910-14. Of course livestock 
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prices in 1964 were depressed and a more stable relationship would 
appear to be one where 1 on the basis used in these indices 1 live-
stock prices are 20 to 30 index points higher than crop prices. But 
during 1967 this margin widened to between 45 and 60 points. Thus 
when comparing the alternatives of selling corn for cash or storing corn 
for livestock feeding 1 the latter course may appear more favorable un-
less producers take adequate care to project livestock prices into the 
future. Should future livestock prices fall -- a sure response if live-
stock production is greatly expanded -- these two alternatives will be 
more nearly equal by the time livestock is ready for market. The USDA 
is projecting feed grain tonnage for feeding purposes to rise from 12 6 
million tons in the 1966-67 feed year to 133 million tons in the 1967-68 
feed year 1 suggesting USDA believes livestock producers will increase 
production of livestock. And these are the signals which many pro-
ducers are concerned about -- signals which are raising a great deal 
of concern in rural areas. 
Prices paid 
A second major area of immediate concern is with prices paid for 
items used on the farm. As Figure 2 shows 1 these costs have been in-
creasing since 1964. Between 1955 and 1964 1 prices for production items 
increased by 3/4 of one percent per year 1 but in the 3 year period between 
1964 and 1967 these prices rose 7. 0 percent 1 or over 2 percent annually. 
While output per unit of input has increased over the period 1 {table 1) it 
offsets only part of the increase in prices of inputs 1 and does not cover 
the additional quantity of inputs used or the decrease in crop prices re-
ceived. The result is a tightening of the cost-returns vice in which many 
farmers find themselves. A major uncertainty for the future lies in what 
will happen to the costs of production even if crop prices return to their 
1964 level. 
Inflation 
Farmers 1 both traditionally and at present I are least able to protect 
themselves against increases in costs of operating their firm. In the re-
mainder of the economy 1 probably a majority of wage earners now have 
built-in cost of living escalator clauses in labor contracts. Many businesses 1 
as the steel industry shows 1 are also able to adjust prices to cover higher 
costs or increase profit. Farmers 1 however 1 must face the impact of 
higher prices and wait until market prices increase. With the present mag-
nitude of unused capacity for crop production 1 inflationary pressures in 
the remainder of the economy are not affecting agricultural prices to any 
significant degree. 
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Table 1. Index numbers of farm output 1 inputs 1 and productivity for the 
u.S, 1 1955-66. 
Production 
Year Farm Output Inputs Productivity.!/ 
1955 96 102 94 
1956 97 101 96 
1957 95 99 96 
1958 102 99 103 
1959 103 102 101 
1960 106 101 105 
1961 107 101 106 
1962 108 101 107 
1963 112 102 110 
1964 112 103 109 
1965y 115 103 112 
196sY 113 105 108 
.!/Output per unit of input. 
Ysased on revised basic data from the 1964 Census of Agriculture and other 
data 1 therefore not completely comparable with 19 64 and other years. Data 
for 19 6 6 are preliminary • 
Farmers are in a significantly different position with respect to the 
present war-initiated price increases than was true during both World War 
II and the Korean conflict. Their costs are increasing but the traditional 
effect of war on farm prices has not occurred and will not likely occur with 
the existence of excess capacity. The result is that farmers today are in 
a position where inflation has a sharply negative short-run effect on farm 
incomes. This is a sharp reversal of past decades when war and other 
demand-increasing activities created· inflationary pressures which raised 
both farm and nonfarm prices. At present 1 only nonfarm prices are showing 
any substantial upward effect and these prices are costs of farmers. Should 
prices of production items continue their recent upward trend without 
offsetting farm price increases 1 the squeeze on net returns will continue. 
Program payment 
A third short term problem area is farm program payments. The termina-
tion of government payments for land retirement programs in 1967 on all 
farms except those classified as small farms has reduced the proportion of 
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Table 2. Net farm income and payments under government programs (in 
millions of dollars) and proportion of net farm income coming 
from various types of programs for the years, 1963-66. 
All GovernmyJt Land Price 
Diversion 21 Su,e,eorts£1 Pro9:rams-
Percent of Percent of Percent of 
Year Net Farm Total Net Farm Total Net Farm Total Net Farm 
Income Payments Income Payments Income Payments Income 
1966 $12,015 $3,266 27.2 738 6.1 1,235 10.2 
1964 12,914 2,452 19.0 994 7.7 922 7.1 
1964 13,138 21 169 16.5 911 6.9 690 5.3 
1963 13,115 1, 686 12.9 621 4.7 436 3.3 
Source: USDA, Economic Research Service. Farm Income: State Estimates. 
1949-66. August, 1967. 
l/Includes payments for conservation programs 1 the sugar act 1 milk indem-
nities, the Soil Bank 1 Great Plains Conservation 1 cotton 1 wheat and feed 
grain programs. 
£/Includes payments for wheat and feed grains programs. 
total farm income from this source. Government payments for all purposes 
made up 2 7. 2 percent and price support programs 10. 3 percent (table 2). 
In 19 6 7 the reduction of land retirement programs immediately reduced farm 
income by 5 to 6 percent and this reduction has a considerable effect 
when combined with lower crop prices. In this instance, however I there 
is room for some amount of optimism. Payments for land retirement pro-
grams will be reinstituted and enlarged in 19 68. The 15 million acres re-
turned to production in 1967 will likely again be retired in 1968. Govern-
ment payments will increase as a result. 
Associated closely with the reduced land retirement payments are the 
smaller proportion of farmers who are eligible for price support payments 
because fewer farmers participated in production control programs. Thus 
more farmers find themselves without the protection of a price floor for 
grain commodities. About their only immediate hope is that those who do 
qualify for price supports will place their grain under loan and remove it 
from the market place. Such action should help to buoy the price of major 
grains. However 1 in both cases -- for those who must store grain because 
price supports are not available and for those who must store to gain price 
supports -- a substantial amount of grain storage is required. 
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Table 3. Average levels of government payments and the percentage of 
gross farm income from these payments for various farm sales 
classes in 1964. 
Size of Farm Number of Percentage Government Percentage of 
in Sales Farms in of Farms Payments Income From 
Thousands Per Farm Government 
$20,000 or more 384 10.7 $2,391 18.5 
10,000 to 19,999 594 16.6 670 8.8 
5,000 to 9,999 609 17.0 350 6.4 
21 500 to 41 999 463 13.0 173 3.9 
Less than $2, 500 1,523 42.6 51 1.2 
All Farms 3,573 100.0 472 8.8 
Source:· Earl 0. Heady. Food, Agriculture and Public Policy. Random House. 
1967. p. 16. 
There is one other facet of this reduced level of government payments 
which may be of importance. Data on the distribution of these payments 
in previous years suggest that larger farms are helped most by these pay-
ments. As data in Table 3 show, a higher proportion of gross income comes 
from government payments on farms with larger scales of farm products. The 
implication from these data is that larger farmers, those which are probably 
both more vocal and more listened to when their incomes are reduced, may 
have lost most from the reduction in government payments. This may explain 
part of the generally increased awareness of the decline in farm incomes. 
On the other hand, if the smaller sales class farms do not participate because 
their resources are already underemployed, then the possibility exists that 
these farmers were even further discouraged from participation by the expec-
tation of higher prices in 19 67; if so they now face lower prices on increased 
production without the support of government programs. If this latter situa-
tion is true, and given the small capital reserve of many of these farms, a 
sharp reduction may occur in numbers of farms with smaller sales. 
Imports 
The last short run issue I shall raise is the continuing issue of what 
level of imports should be allowed entry into the United States. This is a 
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complex problem. While freer trade does bring over-all gains to the con-
suming public as well as to some individual growers, these gains are not 
without some offsetting losses. A major part of the import problem stems 
from the fact that different gro'..lps generally reap the gains 1d losses 
from freer trade policies. It does little good to point out to cattle feeders 
that increased imports of beef from Australia allow greater exports of feed 
grains to England which in turn sells manufactured goods to Australia. The 
gains and losses do not fall on the same farm operator since most cattle 
feeders use their supply of feed grains in their own operation and sell 
little in the export market. 
But there is room for improvement in the level of understanding of why 
we import farm commodities and what effects imports of farm commodities 
actually have on farm prices. The U 0 S. imports commodities it either 
does not produce, wants greater variety than is produced domestically 
(a result of an affluent society), or producers are temporarily supplying 
relatively smaller quantity to the market and prices increase. This was 
Lne case in 19 62 and 19 63 when cow herds were being enlarged and a 
reduced supply of lower grade beef was moving to market 0 Prices rose 
and imports increased substantially for low grade beef equivalent to our 
cow beef. But the relationship of imported beef to domestic steer beef 
was not well understood and as a result the nation later raised trade 
barriers to slow the entry of foreign beef -- trade barriers which the U.S. 
was at the same time encouraging other contries to lower. As the USDA 
pointed outll, each 10 percent increase in low grade beef either from 
domestic cow production or from imports reduced prices of Choice steers 
by 3 percent. By contrast, a 10 percent increase in domestic steer-
heifer beef production reduced Utility cow prices by 23 percent and steer-
heifer beef prices by 13 percent. These results clearly suggest that by 
far the most important variable in cattle prices was domestic fed beef 
production. Increases in imports of beef, due to the particular kind of 
beef included, did not affect price to nearly the degree that it did increases in 
domestic production of fed beef. Had these relationships been better 
understood, perhaps our trade policies could have been more consistent. 
Were they better understood today, perhaps imports would not be used 
as a whipping post for many other agricultural problems. 
These are the major short run issues as I interpret the uncertainty 
currently affecting farm people. Many farmers are uncertain over how 
farm prices and support programs will fare in an increasingly urban-
oriented society. The question over whether excess capacity can be 
controlled also raises similar questions. Most of the uncertainty re-
sults from the increasing concern that farmers are becoming a minority 
ll USDA, Economic Research Service. Livestock and Meat Situation. 
November, 1963. 
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group both in numbers and in political power. This leads to great un-
certainty over what route the government will follow in its relation-
ship with agriculture. It leads to uncertainty over what government 
will do to support prices and incomes of farmers. It also leads to a 
number of longer run issues I want to discuss. 
Longer Term Issues 
For many a farm operator and especially one who expects to remain 
on the farm into the 1970's, the problem of agriculture is not simply 
what will happen in 1968 but what is even further ahead. His concerns 
are over such matters as the consumer orientation of the federal govern-
ment while the slice of farm voters continues to narrow. He is worrying 
also about the undependability of the export market, and is particularly 
concerned that he has no obvious means to affect the quantity of farm 
products which move into the foreign markets. He is unconvinced that 
either the government or private enterprise is pushing hard enough to 
expand our foreign trade and would like to use his own muscle in this 
area, but simply feels dwarfed by the very large farm organizations 
(those that have the power to do something) and insignificant as a part 
of a small organization·. Finally, and probably the most important long-
run issue in the minds of many small and medium size farmers at least, 
is the continuing trend toward larger and larger farms. Many farmers 
today see themselves in the road of our rush to ever enlarge the size 
of farm plants. They now suspect as they did not 15 years ago when 
their small neighbor gave up farming, that the headlong rush toward larger 
farms may not have an equilibrium point short of the King ranch or the Kern 
County land company. The result is that many are concerned that even the 
medium size operator is now on the road to extinction. 
Need for production controls 
These are some of the longer term issues which are confronting farmers 
along with their recent problem of reduced farm incomes. Many of the · 
issues may only represent the tendency of farmers to worry when it rains 
that it won't stop and when it isn't raining that it won't start. But certainly 
some of these issues are of real importance to both farmers and nonfarm 
people. For example, the large production levels achieved in 1967 make 
it fairly clear that production control programs are going to remain of great 
importance to farmers. For those control programs to continue will require 
facilitating legislation and rather large appropriations to back up these pro-
grams. For these programs to pass Congress requires a majority of Congress-
men to vote in favor. But farm areas can no longer produce a favorable 
majority on farm bills. Thus to pass these bills requires that urban congress-
men join in voting funds for farm programs which compete directly with urban 
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programs for limited tax funds -- farm programs which benefit large 
producers most. While most farmers are not directly aware of the 
skewed distribution of government payments (pointed up in table 3), 
they have a sense of foreboding that dependence upon any type of 
direct government payments cannot continue indefinitely. This was 
shown by a question from a farmer at a recent farm meeting. He asked 
"how can farmers expect favorable farm programs to continue when they 
make up less than 6 percent of the population?" While a far larger pro-
portion of the population have a stake in government programs he now is 
a member of a minority group since "one man-one vote" became law. 
Farmers recognize that Congress is in a rebellious mood. Also, 
having now seen the publication of names of large government payment 
receivers, they recognize that social pressures are being generated and 
that political pressures may result from these large transfer payments. 
They are uncertain what course payments will take as a result. In the 
past the argument has been made that we are trying to buy only production 
control and are not concerned with which size farm firm we deal with. It 
seems unlikely that this argument will continue to bring forth favorable 
votes from urban Congressmen. The inverted welfare effect which occurs 
is clearly contrary to most concepts of equity. Furthermore, these funds 
may represent a major source of funds with which firms purchase additional 
cropland for expansion of their firm. Firms with larger payments may be 
able to gain control of additional cropland while smaller firms, those which 
need to expand to take advantage of larger size machinery and modern tech-
nology, are less able to compete effectively in the land market. If true, 
these programs may be affecting the structure of agriculture, encouraging 
the larger farms to expand to sizes a greater than scale economies might 
suggest. Recent purchases of larqe acreages of farm land in the Great 
Plains by corporations suggestthat land ownership is a way to tap the 
government treasury. If the skewed distribution of payments does result 
in this type of outcome, it may well mean that farmers' fears of eventual 
domination by farm monopolies are justified. It may also mean that farm 
numbers are even further from equilibrium than generally thought and will 
remain so if government payments do encourage larger firms to expand into 
larger and larger firms while small and intermediate firms decline in number. 
No increase in medium level farms 
- --
Certainly, there are many unknowns with regard to present farm pro-
grams. But one fact does emerge from the maze of unmeasured effects of 
present farm programs: there has been no tendency after 35 years of pro-
grams for farm numbers to increase around any medium level of output. 
As Figure 3 suggests, farm numbers are as heavily skewed to the left as 
are government payments skewed to the right. Interestingly enough, the 
only two economic classes of farms which increased in number between 1959 
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and 1964 were the $20,000 to $40,000 group and the above $40,000 group. 
If farm numbers are to stabilize at around $40,000 sales per farm, then with 
a reduction of 250,000 commercial farms per 5-year period like 1959-64, 
we are at least 2 0 years away from stabilizing commercial farm numbers. 
In all likelihood, if such a large amount of capital can be brought together 
by the average farmer, the average size will be even larger. Whether the 
gain in economic efficiency, as firm size increases past most scale economies, 
offsets the loss in Jeffersonian-democratic ideals is open to debate. Inter-
mediate size farm operators who would likely have to leave farming clearly 
speak out against these ongoing changes. It remains to be seen if society 
will make a choice, or by default accept the present trends. 
In the debate over much larger average size farms, farmers often express 
the view that corporation-type monopolies in agriculture would eventually 
be able to raise food prices to much higher levels. This view is probably 
unjustified. Even if the required small number of managers could gain con-
trol over the large acreages and vast expanse of space which U.S. farms 
cover, it is unlikely that societal restrictions would allow such a monop-
oly. The nation and the government, to the consternation of many farmers, 
is becoming more consumer oriented. Farmers point out many signs to 
support this contention -- from the reduced purchases of pork by the de-
fense department in 1966 to the overly large increase in farm output in 1967. 
The recent passage of meat inspection legislation, while possibly even 
beneficial to farmers, also suggests a shifting of power from rural areas 
to urban areas. 
What the shifts in political power really mean remains to be explored 
in this seminar and in the political bouts which will be fought in upcoming 
elections. But farmers are probably correct that prospects for higher farm 
prices from farm programs are not bright. The relative importance of con-
sumers and farmers suggests that price levels may hold the line but in-
creases will likely be small. Under these conditions the importance 
attached to changes in farm costs can be easily seen. 
The mistrust of government and government power from which much of 
the farm concern originates is not new. But it is true probably that political 
facts provide more basis for such concern today than 15 years ago. A 
Minnesota farmer recently suggested to me that little incentive exists for 
the government to expand exports of farm commodities. He pointed out 
that, in recent years, the costly nature of storage programs provided a 
substantial political incentive to move all possible grain into world markets. 
His fears were that as we approach more nearly optimum levels of carry-
overs, it could feasibly become good politics to stabilize exports and produc-
tion at moderate levels, thus not risking the variability of quantities, prices, 
and political fortunes which could result if exports are maximized. While 
private firms handle much of the grain trade, they too may face a declining 
incentive if the demand curve they face for gains is less than perfectly 
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elastic. As of yet, no other group is apparently waging an extensive 
campaign to increase farm exports. Thus this farmer was quite concerned 
and asked what could be done. If others also become more concerned, 
the result could be increased emphasis on self-initiated programs of de-
mand expansion. How successful these programs might be remains to be 
seen. The federal government does seem to be encouraging do-it-yourself 
programs these days -- primarily in the area of farm bargaining. It may 
be that other areas could prove more productive. 
Finally, a major source of pessimism which is currently running through 
farm areas may be due to the lack of having received any substantial re-
assurance that farm conditions are going to improve. The nation and its 
leaders are so tied up in matters of national security that no one seems to 
have time to come to the farm areas and reassure rural people that their 
interests are being cared for. One reason is of course that there are fewer 
national leaders from these areas. Another is that there are fewer votes in 
these areas than in urban and suburban areas. One can see the effect when 
he listens to Senator Dirksen tell of spending his days in Washington, his 
nights in Chicago, and sleeping on the plane between. Not often does he 
mention visiting rural down-state Illinois. Maybe it's only that farmers 
do not pay as well. 
Conclusions 
Uncertainty and uneasiness are causing people in rural areas to raise 
questions about the outlook for the agricultural industry. These questions 
deal almost entirely with the set of interrelationships between the farmer 
and the outside world. The concern is over prices of commodities sold to 
the urban market, prices paid for inputs purchased from the agri-business 
complex, their dependence on the federal government for adequate income 
and their general economic position with regard to the remainder of the 
economy. 
The discussion and protest originating in the rural areas suggest that 
the farmer's economic position has wor~ened in recent months. Many are 
comparing the past year to 1966 which is undoubtedly an unfair comparison. 
The higher prices paid for food by consumers in 19 66 and the resulting con-
sumer discontent probably preclude holding farm incomes at that level. It 
is in large part an outcome of the shifting reaction of the government toward 
agriculture. Also, the increased interest in self-help programs both among 
farmers and administrators is an open admission that past programs have 
not satisfied either side completely. How successful self-initiated market-
ing programs will be remains to be seen. 
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The relevant question to pose at this time is whether ways can be 
found. by which farmers can proceed in the remaining part of the 20th 
Century to balance an industry which has never long known balance and 
stability. Should stability be achieved 1 the industry will be in an improved 
position relative to the remainder of the economy. It will 1 as a result 1 
be better able to share in the rewards which the U.S. economy is capable 
of producing but which have generally eluded the farm sector over the last 
four decades. If ways to balance the industry are not found 1 farmers likely 
have more decades ahead when economic fortunes will fluctuate far more 
than most farm families would prefer. The task remaining is not small. 
GRAIN PRODUCTION: NEAR-TERM CAPACITIES 
IN FEED GRAINS AND WHEAT 
C. B. Baker* 
In a larger context, over-capacity has been generated in U.S. 
agriculture by (1) price relations: price support on the product side 
and favorable prices (in real terms) for many yield-sensitive inputs; 
(2) scale economics from improvements in machinery and equipment; 
and (3) organizational changes within agriculture and between agri-
cultural and non-agricultural sectors. In the following pages we con-
fine our remarks on production capacities to grain production and, in 
this, "near-term." 
It is difficult to distinguish "near-term" from "long-term" capa-
cities in terms of predictors that have been found reliable. I am in-
formed that in calendar time, "near-term" will be taken to mean from 
one to three years. Next year's production will differ from this year's 
from such influences as weather, participation rates in farm programs 
that affect planted acres, selectivity in quality of land withdrawn from 
production, inter-crop substitutions, and rates at which yield-sensitive 
inputs are applied. When one reviews such factors as these he imme-
diately is aware that much of what we know of "production capacities" 
relates to "long-term" changes and is subsumed under the ill-defined 
term "technological change. " Whatever the content of this term, it 
applies to "near-term" as well as "long-term," and likely with a higher 
degree of reliability. 
One further prefacing comment might be made. A part of past changes 
in productivity that are ascribed to technological change should, in all 
likelihood, be ascribed to organizational change. Technological inno-
vators who are both early and successful not only lead a procession of 
following innovators toward higher yields. They also acquire control 
of added resources. Thus the use of land tended with less advanced tech-
nology is transferred to operators applying more advanced technology. 
Organizational change as a source of increased productivity is favored 
more by some types of technology (especially mechanical) than by others 
(for example, biological and chemical). Skills in financial management 
also are important in the rate of organizational change as well as some 
types of technological innovation. 
*Professor of Agricultural Economics, University of Illinois. 
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Table 1. Wheat production for U.S.: 1945-1967. 
Acres (000) 
Year Seeded Harvested 
1945 69,130 65,120 
1946 71,510 67,210 
1947 78,169 74,389 
1948 771749 71,904 
1949 621013 551129 
1950 521887 431816 
1951 78,048 611492 
1952 771447 701585 
1953 781789 671661 
1954 611971 531712 
1955 58,241 471285 
1956 601747 491817 
1957 491852 431806 
1958 561431 531577 
1959 571722 521665 
1960 551 633 521643 
1961 551664 511551 
1962 491084 43,545 
1963 521989 451209 
1964 551065 491121 
196~ 561942 491313 
196 1 541500 49,843 
1967y 591950 
Acres harvested 
as percent of 
acres seeded 
94 
94 
95 
92 
89 
83 
79 
91 
86 
87 
81 
82 
88 
95 
91 
95 
93 
89 
85 
89 
87 
92 
Source: Agricultural Statistics. USDA • 
Output 
(000 bu.) 
1,108,224 
1,155,715 
1,367,186 
112881406 
8951101 
7501666 
9801810 
11291,447 
111691484 
9691781 
9341731 
9971207 
9501662 
114621218 
1,1261682 
113631443 
11234,743 
1,0911787 
11142,013 
112901650 
11326,747 
1 1310 t 642 
115431073 
Yield per acre 
harvested 
17.0 
17.2 
18.4 
17.9 
16.2 
17.1 
16.0 
18.3 
17.3 
18.1 
19.8 
20.0 
21.7 
27.3 
21.4 
25.9 
24.0 
25.1 
25.3 
26.3 
26.9 
26.3 
25.7 
..!/Crop Production 1 19 6 6 Annual Summary. SRS 1 USDA. December 2 0 1 1966 
21 Crop Production. Monthly Summaries. SRS 1 USDA. 1967. 
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Historical Output 
Since 1920 the percent of harvested crop acreage devoted to wheat 
has declined from 17. 7 to 16. 0; feed grains, from 40. 7 to 3 2. 2. Corn 
alone has declined from 25.3 to 18. 6 percent of harvested crop acres . ..!/ 
Much of the decline in corn acreage has been replaced with soybeans. 
This is an important consideration, since much of the nation's corn out-
put is produced in areas where soybeans and corn compete for land re-
sources and are susceptible to "near-term" shifts on the basis of rela-
tive prices. Con) Belt land in feed grains declined by 12 percent between 
1940 and 1965.Y On the other hand, corn production has become more 
concentrated in the Corn Belt. In 1930, 3 5 percent of corn acreage was 
found in the Corn Belt; in 19 65, 55 percent. In contrast, the concentra-
tion of wheat production in the Plains states remains nearly un<?_h?nged: 
about 60 percent of total wheat acreage in both 1930 and 1965.Y 
Wheat 
We summarize in Table 1-4 annual U.S. statistics for wheat, corn, 
oats, barley, and grain sorghum since World War II. We note that 
acreage· seeded to wheat has varied considerably since 1945. The years 
immediately following World War II were extraordinarily favorable in 
terms of weather. An abnormally high percentage of acres seeded to 
wheat were harvested in the four years, 1945-48, a percentage not to be 
matched until 1958-61. The high percentage of harvested acres might be 
accounted for by use of less marginal land for wheat. However, the 
record does not suggest any acceleration in either period in the decline 
of acres seeded to wheat. An interesting feature appears to be a relia-
ble upward trend in yield per harvested acre over the whole period, in-
cluding years of small acreage (1950-51 and 1955-57). Heady and Mayer 
report that as much as 70 percent of ~h~ variance in wheat yield per acre 
can be accounted for by trend alone .Y Harvested acres of wheat have in-
creased steadily since 1961 • 
..!/Heady, Earl 0. Trends and Potentials in Use of Land Resources. 
National Academy of Sciences. 1967. 
Yibid. 
3/Ibid. 
4/ Heady, Earl 0. and L. V. Mayer. Food Needs and U.S. Agriculture in 
1980, Vol. 1. National Advisory Commission on Foods and Fiber. 
August, 1967. p. 116. 
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Table 2. Corn and grain sorghum production: U.S., 1945-1967. 
Acres harvested (000) Output (000 bu.) 
Year Corn 
1945 88,079 
1946 88,718 
1947 83,932 
1948 85,439 
1949 87,029 
1950 83,302 
1951 80,736 
1952 81,359 
1953 80,608 
1954 79,875 
1955 79,530 
1956 75,950 
1957 .72,616 
1958 73,470 
1959 83,529 
1960 82 ,117 
1961 58,449 
1962 56,843 
1963 60,549 
1964 57,291 
19651/ 57,049 
1966- 56,888 
1967v 63,319 
Grain 
Sorghum 
6,324 
6,669 
5,480 
7,317 
6,602 
10,346 
8,544 
5,326 
6,295 
11,718 
12,891 
9,209 
19,682 
16,524 
15,402 
15,592 
10,957 
11,53 6 
13,582 
11,977 
13,323 
12,837 
15,130 
Corn 
2,880,933 
3,287,927 
2,383,970 
3,650,548 
3,379,436 
3,131,009 
2,899,169 
3,306,735 
3,192,491 
2,964,639 
3,229,743 
3,451,292 
3,422,331 
3,799,844 
4,281,316 
4,352,668 
3,625,530 
3,643,615 
4,091,685 
3,583,780 
4,171,100 
4,103,323 
4,696,315 
Source: Agricultural Statistics. USDA • 
..!/Crop Production, 19 6 6 Annual Summary. 
Y' Crop Production. Monthly Summaries. 
Grain 
Sorghum 
96,063 
106,025 
93,217 
131,384 
148,494 
233,536 
162,863 
90,741 
115,719 
235,575 
242,638 
204,881 
567,506 
581,012 
555,211 
619,867 
479,751 
509,685 
587,909 
491,884 
666,062 
720,415 
774,598 
SRS, USDA. 
1967. 
Yield per acre 
harvested 
Corn 
32.7 
37.1 
28.4 
42.7 
38.8 
37.6 
35.9 
40.6 
39.6 
37.1 
40.6 
45.4 
47.1 
51.7 
51.3 
53.0 
62.0 
64.1 
67.6 
62.6 
73.1 
72.1 
74.2 
Grain 
Sorghum 
15.2 
15.9 
17.0 
18.0 
22.5 
22.6 
19.1 
17.0 
18.4 
20.1 
18.8 
22.2 
28.8 
35.2 
3 6.1 
39.8 
43.8 
44.2 
43.3 
41.1 
50.0 
56.1 
51.2 
December20, 1966. 
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Table 3. Oats production for U.S.: 1945-19 67. 
Acres (000) 
Year Seeded Harvested 
1945 45,889 41,933 
1946 47,048 43,648 
1947 42,301 38,451 
1948 44,529 40,191 
1949 44,387 40,440 
1950 46,642 42,027 
1951 41,682 36,525 
1952 42,975 38,643 
1953 43,875 39,217 
1954 47,284 42,151 
1955 47,523 39,243 
1956 44' 648 33,639 
1957 42,577 34,647 
1958 38,430 31,826 
1959 . 35,937 28,368 
1960 32,337 27,091 
1961 32,514 23,994 
1962 30,202 22,934 
1963 28,749 21,683 
1964 26,595 20,432 
196~ 24,865 19,106 
196 1 17,848 
1967 2/ 16,215 
Acres harvested 
as percent of 
acres seeded 
91 
93 
91 
90 
91 
90 
88 
90 
89 
89 
83 
75 
81 
83 
80 
84 
74 
76 
75 
77 
77 
Source: Agricultural Statistics. USDA. 
Output 
(000 bu.) 
1,535,676 
1,509,867 
1,199,422 
1,491,752 
1,329,473 
1,465,134 
1,321,288 
1,268,280 
1,209,458 
1,499,579 
1,503,074 
1,152,652 
1,300,954 
1,422,164 
1,066,370 
1,161,512 
1,011,398 
1,031,743 
979,400 
880,095 
959,192 
798,089 
805,649 
Yield per acre 
harvested 
36.6 
34.6 
31.2 
37.1 
32.9 
34.9 
36.2 
32.8 
30.8 
35.6 
38.3 
34.3 
37.6 
44.7 
37.6 
42.9 
42.2 
45.0 
45.2 
43.1 
50.2 
44.7 
49.7 
1/ Crop Production, 19 6 6 Annual Summary. SRS, USDA. December 20, 1966. 
Y Crop Production. Monthly Summaries. 1967. 
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Table 4. Barley production for U.S.: 1945-1967. 
Acres harvested 
Acres {000} as percent of Output .Yield per acre 
Year Seeded Harvested acres seeded (000 bu.) harvested 
1945 11,718 101465 8'9 '2661833 25.5 
1946 111594 101477 90 2631350 25.1 
1947 121102 111014 91 2811185 25.5 
1948 131295 121046 91 3171037 26.3 
1949 11 1 188 9,857 88 2361737 24.0 
1950 131235 111191 85 3011009 26.9 
1951 10,869 91436 87 2541287 27.0 
1952 91385 81264 88 2271008 27.5 
1953 9,659 8,586 89 2421544 28.3 
1954 141517 121994 90 370,126 28.5 
1955 161335 141564 89 4011225 27.6 
1956 141712 121827 87 3721495 29.0 
1957 161535 141988 91 4371170 29.2 
1958 161268 141876 91 4701449 31.6 
1959 161992 151087 89 4221073 28.0 
1960 151641 131951 89 4231136 30.3 
1961 151773 12,946 82 3951669 30.6 
1962 141701 121443 85 4291495 34.5 
1963 131869 111566 83 4051577 35.1 
1964 121090 10,624 88 4021895 37.9 
1965 10,504 9,478 90 411 1897 43.5 
19661/ 101227 3891557 38.1 
1967y 91370 3731438 39.9 
Source: Agricultural Statistics. USDA. 
1/ Crop Production 1 19 6 6 Annual Summary. SRS 1 USDA. December20 1 1966. 
Y Crop Production. Monthly Summaries. 1967. 
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Corn 
Corn acreage declined but slightly between 1945 and 1960. In this 
period, yield per acre harvested trended upward substantially from a 
variety of causes: technical, weather, and organizational. There 
followed in 19 61, a precipitous drop of 24 million acres seeded: nearly 
12 million in the North Central region alone. The decline is accounted 
for largely by producer participation in the federal feed grain program. 
Participants diverted corn production from less productive soils -- espe-
cially in Corn Belt states. The result was a sharp increase in yield per 
harvested acre. The increase reported in Table 2 was matched by a 
similar increase in Corn Belt yields, as will be shown later. With a 
substantially smaller acreage harvested since 1960, the total output 
level is now virtually restored and a record output is expected in 1967. 
In the wake of this organizational change, there remains a substantial 
reserve that could be shifted into production in any given year. The pro-
ductivity of this reserve, were it to be returned to corn production, is 
highly relevant in quantitative estimates of "near-term" production 
capacity. 
Oats and barley 
Oat acreage, both seeded and harvested, has declined steadily since 
1945 (see table 3). Much of the decline occurred in the North Central 
region. In this area, oats have been replaced by corn and soybeans in 
crop rotations increasingly intensified. It seems most doubtful that oats 
will return, in any substantial degree, to acreages from which they have 
been displaced. Indeed, further decline is more likely. Perhaps a sig-
nificant part of the acreage remaining might be viewed as potential areas 
for expansion in other feed grains, as well as wheat and soybeans. The 
steady decline in acres of oats harvested as a percent of acres of oats 
seeded likely reflects a diversion of the oat acres that remain to areas of 
greater weather uncertainty. If so, the upward trend in yield per harvested 
acre is thus all the more remarkable, given that the crop is likely being 
produced in progressively poorer soil and weather conditions. 
In contrast, no strong trend is evident since 1945 in acres seeded to 
barley (see table 4). Nor is there much change since 1945 in the percent 
of acres seeded that are harvested. As is true with wheat and feed grains 
other than barley, yields per harvested acre have increased steadily and 
substantially. In production, barley competes most directly with wheat. 
However, the difference between barley and wheat in yearly variation in 
harvested acres as a percent of seeded acres suggests that there may be 
significant differences in areas seeded to the two crops. (Compare tables 
1 and 4.) Expansion in acres seeded to barley is doubtless retarded con-
siderably by the price effects of such increases in feed grains as already. 
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have been noted. It is difficult to see much reason to expect a sub-
stantial change in acres seeded to barley in the near future. 
Grain sorghum 
After a flurry of interest in grain sorghum in the 1950's, the crop 
has steadily declined in Corn Belt states, only to experience substan-
tial expansion in Texas, Kansas and Nebraska. The expansion is espe-
cially rapid in western regions and, more recently, under irrigation. 
This change, together with the development of adapted varieties, as well 
as improved fertilizer and tillage practices, has brought about marked 
increases noted in Table 2 in yield per harvested acre .Y There seems 
a high probability that yields and sorghum output will continue to in-
crease in the near-term. 
In summary, all feed grains except for oats have increased sub-
stantially over the past twenty years. For each there appears to be a 
considerable potential for still further increase in the future. This 
certainly is true in the "long-term. " How true is it in the "near-term" ? 
Future Output 
Those who formulate alternatives in farm programs require increas-
ing precision in estimates of output in wheat and feed grains. Response 
to the demand has generated a considerable effort to explain the phenom-
enal yield increases since World War II. Professor Thompson has 
argued that, especially for corn, much of the increase can be ascribed 
to unusually favorable weather conditions. 61 Yet his regressions of 
yield on weather variables leave a S)lbstantial residual variance to be 
assigned to "technology." OthersV are inclined more to the view that 
technological change has been the principal agent, the residual variance 
in yield ascribed to "weather. " Still others have concerned themselves 
with the effects of farm programs on output -- in particular, estimates 
Y Heady and Auer account for 3 6 percent of the yield increase from 193 9 
to 1960 in variety improvement alone. See E. 0. Heady and Ludwig Auer. 
Imputation of Production to Technologies. JFE, Vol. 48, No. 2. May, 
1966. pp. 309-322. 
6/Thompson, L. M. Weather and Technology in the Production of Corn and 
Soybeans. CAED Report 1 7. Iowa State University. 19 63 . 
.zl Shaw, L. H. and B. B. Duro st. The Effect of Weather and Technology on 
Corn Yields in the Corn Belt, 1929-62. Agricultural Economics Report 80. 
ERS, USDA. 1965. 
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of output in the presence of markets without government influence .Y 
Shaw and Durost found corn yields to increase annually due to tech-
nological chang.e by 1. 34 bushels per acre in 1929-62; by 1.46 bushels 
per acre in 1949-62.Y In a recent publication, Heady and Mayer 
suggest for 1980 yields as given in Table 5 • .!.Q.t 
Table 5. Yields for wheat and sele£?d feed grains: 1965 and 1980 
estimates (bu. per acre) ... 8 
Increase 
Crop 1965 1980 Total Per year 
Wheat 26.9 32.3 7.4 0.50 
Corn 73.1 99.4 26.3 1. 7 5 
Oats 50.2 60.0 9.8 0.65 
Barley 43.5 48.9 5.4 0.36 
Sorghum 50.0 61.8 11.8 o .• 79 
The remaining component of output is that of acreage. Little has 
been done to refine predictions of acres harvested in crops included in 
our review. In the absence of more appropriate and reliable projections, 
I have suggested as reasonable the harvested acres· shown in Column 1 
of Table 6. In the case of wheat, barley and grain sorghum, the average 
for the period 1958-67 is used as an expectation for 1968, 1969 and 1970. 
To use a comparable period for corn would ignore the huge drop in acreage 
between 1960 and 1961. So for corn, the average for 1961-67 is used. 
For oats, 1967 acreage is projected as the acres for 1968-70. There 
appears to be a continuing decline in oat acreage. Hence the 1967 acreage 
may over-estimate oat acreage in the next three years. The same may be 
true for barley, inasmuch as the 10-year average includes the record high 
acreage of 1959 and the high years of 1958 and 1960. 
The remaining columns give projected output for the five crops, based 
on acreages as described, and on yield expectations drawn from the 
Y Heady, Earl 0. , and L. V. Mayer. Food Needs and U.S. Agriculture in 
1980, Vol. 1. Technical Papers, National Advisory Commission on 
Foods and Fiber. August, 19 67. 
V Shaw and Durost, op. cit. 
lQ/ Heady and Mayer,; o_p ._ cit. 
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Table 6. Crop acres harvested annually in wheat and selected feed 
grains: 19 68-1970. 
Acres Expect output (000 bu.) using 
harvested Heady-Mayer estimates 
Crop (000) 1968 1969 1970 
Wheat 50,742 114411072 114661444 1,4911815 
Corn 581626 415931347 416951943 417631363 
Oats 161215 8451612 8561152 8661692 
Barley 121056 5371457 5411797 5461137 
Sorghum 131860 7251848 7361798 7471747 
Heady-Mayer projections. We turn next to such factors as can be anti-
cipated that modify these output projections 1 treating each of the crops 
in turn. 
Modifications in Near-Term Projections 
Several have suggested that while yields are affected by technological 
change and by weather conditions 1 the interaction between the two is of 
considerable importance. Modern machinery may convert a short planting 
season into a successful crop year. High yields instead of low have been 
made possible by more advanced machinery to prevent poor soil prepara-
tion and late planting. Similarly 1 a late harvest season is offset at least 
partially today with modern equipment to field-shell and dry corn to 
storable moisture content. These effects are important and suggest that 
weather and technology variables must be taken into account jointly. A 
further influence on yield may be change in organization. One such 
change is the increasing share of land tended by technologically advanced 
farm operators. A further change is found in the geographic shifts in 
production. Thompson 1l!/ Shaw and Durost 1 .!..Y and others have studied 
weather and technology. So also have Heady and Auer 1.!l/ who also 
include geographic changes in production • 
.!.!/Thompson 1 op. cit • 
.!..Y Shaw and Durost 1 op. cit. 
.!l/ Heady and Auer 1 op. cit. 
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Wheat 
However much output may be affected by geographic distribution 1 
it has affected wheat production but little. We already have noted that 
since 1945 there has been little change in the broad regional distribu-
tion of wheat acreage 1 about 60 percent of which is found in the Plains 
states. In these states 1 the response to technological change has been 
less than is expected in other regions and has likely dampened what 
otherwise would have been a stronger upward trend in wheat yields. 
Illinois 1 a Com Belt state 1 also is an important wheat producer. We 
show 1 in the first two columns of Table 7 1 yields for the U.S. and for 
Illinois. However 1 variety improvements in grain sorghums may well 
introduce future changes in geographic distribution that might affect wheat 
yields. The most likely effect would be a substitution of grain sorghum 
for wheat in most favored areas 1 reducing wheat yields in certain west-
ern regions. However 1 the fraction of wheat acreage in eastern states 
might increase 1 restoring or even increasing wheat yields for the U.S. 
as a whole. That an appreciable influence is likely before 1970 may be 
doubtful. Yet even in assessing "near-term" production capacities 1 it 
would seem that geographic distribution of wheat acreage might need to 
be taken into account, along with weather conditions and technological 
change. 
In much of the important corn-producing areas 1 the closest com-
petitor for corn acreage is soybeans. The farmer• s decision between 
com and soybeans is based on ylelds 1 relative costs 1 and relative prices 
of the two crops. Determinants of demand differ rather substantially 
between corn and soybeans; hence the price ratios can and do vary con-
siderably over time. In much of the past twenty years 1 changes in price 
ratios have favored soybeans relative to corn (see table 8) and have 
generated a shift of corn (and wheat) land to soybean production. The 
shift might have been still more marked (and changes in price ratios less 
favorable to soybeans) had not innovati.ons been made so rapidly in 
corn production. This is not to deny rapid gains also in soybeans from 
variety improvement 1 fertilizer response 1 and tillage practices. However 1 
it is our impression that such changes have been still more startling in 
the case of corn. 
After two years of difficult harvest 1 some observers are predicting 
a substantial increase in the rate of producer participation in the feed 
grain program in 19 68. Perhaps the greatest near-term uncertainty in 
corn acres relates to participation in the 1968 feed grain program. Yet 
the heavy investments made in machinery to harvest and condition the 
corn crop may argue against a wholesale program participation -- especially 
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Table 7. U.S. and Illinois yields, 1945-1965: Wheat and corn, per 
harvested acre. 
Wheat yield per Ill. yield Corn yield per Ill. yield 
harvested acre in less U.S. harvested acre in less u.s. 
Year u.s. Illinois yield u.s. Illinois yield 
1945 17.0 18.5 1.5 32.7 46.5 13.8 
1946 17.2 16.0 -0.8 37.1 56.0 18.9 
1947 18.4 21.0 2.6 28.4 39.5 11.1 
1948 17.9 22.5 4.6 42.7 61.0 18.3 
1949 16.2 23.0 6.8 38.8 54.0 15.2 
1950 17.1 19.5 2.4 37.6 51.0 13.4 
1951 16.0 19.0 3.0 35.9 55.0 19.1 
1952 18.3 23.0 4.7 40.6 58.0 17.4 
1953 17.3 28.0 10.7 39.6 54.0 14.4 
1954 18.1 30.0 11.9 37.1 50.5 13.4 
1955 19.8 33.0 13.2 40.6 56.0 15.4 
1956 20.0 37.5 17.5 45.4 68.0 22.6 
1957 21.7 21.0 0.7 47.1 64.0 16.9 
1958 27.3 31.5 4.2 51.7 69.0 17.3 
1959 21.4 26.0 4.6 51.3 67.0 15.7 
1960 25.9 29.0 3.1 53.0 68.0 15.0 
1951 24.0 36.0 12.0 62.0 77.0 15.0 
1962 25.1 32.5 7.4 64.1 82.1 18.0 
1963 25.3 40.0 14.7 67.6 84.4 16.8 
1964 26.3 36.0 9.7 62.6 77.6 15.0 
1965 26.9 35.5 8.6 73.1 91.8 18.7 
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Table 8. Prices received for soybeans and corn: 
1966-67. 
Season average price for 
Crop year Soybeans 1/ CornY 
1944-45 
1945-46 
1946-47 
1947-48 
1948-49 
1949-50 
1950-51 
~:15l.-52 
1952-53 
1953-54 
1954-55 
1955-56 
1956-57 
1957-58 
1958-59 
1959-60 
1960-61 
1961-62 
19 62-63 
1963-64 
1964-65 
1965-66 
1966-67 
$ 2 • 0 5 per bu. 
2.08 
2.56 
3.34 
2.27 
2.17 
2.47 
2.73 
2.72 
2.73 
2.46 
2.22 
2.18 
2.07 
2.00 
1. 96 
2.13 
2.28 
2.34 
2.51 
2.62 
2.54 
2.88 
$1. 15 per bu. 
1.94 
1. 80 
2.33 
1.38 
1. 29 
1. 73 
1. 83 
1. 59 
1. 53 
1.48 
1. 24 
1. 31 
1. 21 
1. 21 
1.17 
1.10 
1.11 
1.19 
1. 20 
1. 26 
1. 27 
1.34 
1944-45 through 
Price of soybeans 
t price of cornY 
1. 78 
1. 07 
1.42 
1.43 
1. 65 
1. 68 
1.43 
1.49 
1. 71 
1. 78 
1. 66 
1. 79 
1.66 
1. 71 
1. 65 
1. 68 
1.94 
2.05 
1. 97 
2.09 
2.08 
2.00 
2.15 
.!/American Soybean Assn. The Soybean Digest, Blue Book Is sue, 
Vol. 27, No. 6. March, 1967. p. 58. 
'.!:../No. 3, Yellow (Chicago). Source: Feed Statistics Through 1966. 
Stat. Bul. 410. ERS, USDA. September, 1967. p. 37. 
Y A linear trend yielded the ratio, r, equal to 1. 73 + 0. 033t, with 
origin, 1955-5 6. 
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in areas of greatest cash corn concentration . .!.!/ There are important 
cost reductions from higher volumes of corn harvested. 
Other feed grains 
The dramatic changes in feed grain outlook are occurring in corn. 
This is likely to be true in the future as well. There seems to be little 
reason to expect large changes in either yields or acreages in barley 
or oats, aside possibly from still further declines in oat acreages. Any 
shift of wheat acres to barley would be dampened by large supplies in 
prospect from other feed grains, especially corn. Research programs 
and trial plots in grain sorghum suggest that important technological 
changes may be near. Yields appear to be susceptible to varietal im-
provement, to fertilizer and other production practices, and, in numerous 
areas, to irrigation as well. I am informed that it now has been found 
that yields can be increased appreciably, and at much lower water costs, 
by off-season irrigation to recharge subsoil moisture • ..!.if 
Concluding Remarks 
In reviewing the Heady-Auer paper, Glen Barton referred to the 
urgent need for research on factors associated with rate of adoption 
by farmers of yield-increasing technologies .l§! In our concluding re-
marks we address ourselves to the yield gap narrowing over time be-
tween early innovators and the average producer. We confine our re-
marks to corn. Time and resources did not permit sufficient attention 
to this crop, to say nothing of the others as well. Moreover, our 
empiric examples are drawn from Illinois data. In defense, we add 
that the area represented is one of three soils areas that, taken to-
gether, account for a significant fraction of Corn Belt and national corn 
production. 
As an aside we note in Table 7 that corn yields for Illinois have 
increased more rapidly than for the U.S. as a whole. Indeed, while 
not reported in Table 7, the gap has continued increasing in the two 
years for which data are now available. This comparison does not bear 
.!.!/It is estimated that perhaps two-thirds of Illinois' corn was picker-
shelled in 1967. 
Wr am indebted to Warren Bailey for this information in a telephone con-
versation in November, 19 67. 
WBarton, Glen. Discussion: Imputation of Production to Technologies. 
JFE, Vol. 48, No. 2. May, 1966. pp. 321-322. 
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directly upon the hypothesis that the y-ield gap is diminishing over time. 
Yet when we combine the comparison in Table 7 with the growing concen-
tration in the Corn Belt, we may suspect the truth of the hypothesis. If 
one assumes a relatively high incidence of early and successful innova-
tors in Illinois, the hypothesis would imply a narrowing rather than a 
widening gap. 
Clearly, hpJV~ver, "Illinois" and "U.S. " are heterogeneous producing 
areas. Sopher.!.Z! studies factors affecting corn yields on Drummer-
Flanagan soils in nine counties of east central Illinois. Yields produced 
by farmers found in the upper range of the distribution of yields were com-
pared with those in other parts of the yield distribution, for the period 
1953-62. 
We used Sopher's data to fit two trends: one to the scatter of observa-
tions representing high-yield producers (yH); the other, all producers in 
the study (yM). The hypothesis that yield-increasing innovations are 
diffusing more rapidly would suggest that the two trend lines would tend 
to converge over time. As can be seen in Figure 1, the trend lines in fact 
diverge over this period. 
Sopher's time period is short and his farms so chosen as to be highly 
homogeneous. We expanded the data to include all cooperators in the 
Farm Bureau Farm Managemen~ ~S~rvice in eight counties of east central 
Illinois for years 1945-1966 • .!.!¥ These are counties in which Drummer-
Flanagan soils are dominant. But possession of Drummer-Flanagan soils 
was not a selection criterion. We sorted from 118 records available 
the 30 ·top-yielding producers in each year. To the time-series of average 
constructed for such producers, we fitted a trend, as we did for all pro-
ducers in the study area. Results are described in Figure 2. Again, the 
trend lines diverge over time, though the divergence is slight in the wider 
range of observations. 
By these unsophisticated "tests" we do not suggest that the hypothesis 
can generally be regarded as refuted. For prediction purposes, it is less 
relevant to use producers as the unit of. observation, for comparison of 
.!.Z/ Sopher, C. D. Productivity of Flanagan Silt Loam and Drummer Silty 
Clay Loam Under Different Management and Weather Conditions. 
Unpublished M.S. Thesis. Department of Agronomy, University of 
Illinois. 19 63. 
WThanks are due to Ron Mayberry for assistance in tabulating the data 
from records of the Illinois Farm Bureau Farm Management Service. 
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innovation rates·, than i:t is to use acreages of corn. As suggested at 
the outset, one suspects an important source of increased production 
to be generated by the shift of land from low-yield producers to high-
yield producers. Yet the "technological" lag in productivity does in-
deed need to be investigated. We reiterate Dr. Barton's plea for re-
search and apologize for having so little to say on so important a com-
ponent of the problem. 
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• 
A 
YH = 73.4+4.98t 
• 
• 
9M = 55.9+3.51t 
• 
• 
50 ~~--~--~--~--~~--~--~--~--------------1953 1955 1957 1959 1961 
Figure 1 Trends in corn yields: producers on Drummer-Flanagan soils 
m East Central Illinois, 1953-1962. 
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• 
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• 9M = 44.1+2.52t 
• 
• 
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40~._~~~~~--~L-~~~-L~~~L-~~~~~~~----
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Figure 2. Trends in com yields: high-yield (Yff} and all producers (yM) on 
Drummer-Flanagan soils in East Central Illinois (data from FBFMS 
records. 
HAY AND PASTURE SITUATION AND BEEF PRODUCTION TRENDS 
John W. Goodwin* 
The pattern by which agricultural policy recommendations and decisions 
are made seems to be first to define the objectives of society, and then to 
define where we are and where we have been in relation to these objectives. 
Finally, the policy-making agency specifies the alternative ways in which 
the objectives may be reached from the current situation, and then selects 
the "best" alternative course of action upon the basis of factors such as 
costs and time involved. 
The livestock industry is an extremely difficult one to handle from a 
policy point of view because, not only are we unable to define where we 
have been and where we currently are, we also are unable to specify with 
any degree of agreement where we want to go. Consumers want low-cost 
but high-quality beef and, with our society. rapidly becoming largely con-
sumer oriented, the desires of consumers are going to be considered. Re-
tailers want the kind of carcasse·i{t-h~i-have high cutting p~rcentages, but 
these carcasses must still be of the grade that consumers demand. Un-
fortunately, high grading beef frequently has large amounts of waste. 
Packers want beef animals that have high dressing percentages. However, 
high dressing percentages aren't usually compatible with the high cutting 
percentages demanded by retailers. Feeders want feeder cattle· that will 
feed out to meet the packer demanct1 but these animals must do so with 
minimum feed volume and no death loss: Feeders also want feeder cattle 
that meet these specifications at prices that will guarantee a feeding pro-
fit. However I the preconditioning that will increase performance and re-
duce feedlot death loss increases costs on the rarich. ·· The rancher is be-
set with an already murderous cost-price squeeze and his. primary objec-
tive is concerned with finding a means for hanging on to hls assets and, 
hopefully, earning a profit. 
The outcome of these conflicting goals is an industry of such fiendish 
complexity that analysis -- even under the best of conditions -- is hazar-
dous • Add to this complexity the inadequacy and the inaccuracy of the 
data and it is surprising that those who attempt to quantitatively analyze 
beef prices at the various levels have done as well as they have. 
During the past year, pastures throughout most of the Western range 
areas have been superb. Record hay crops have been harvested in this 
region, and most on-the-spot observers agree that the traditional range 
*Professor of Economics, Oklahoma State University. 
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areas have gone into the winter with far better than average feed supplies. 
In addition, we have had record crops of both corn and grain sorghums 
during 1967 and, as a result, the costs of fattening rations are relatively 
low. The question that this situation has raised in the minds of some 
analysts and farm policy agencies is whether the presence of abundant 
feedstuffs and relatively low finishing costs will in fact generate a great 
deal of optimism on the part of beef producers, causing managers in the 
cow-calf segment of the beef industry to withhold large numbers of heifers 
this fall for the purpose of enlarging beef cow herds. Since the beef cow 
herds are a major factor in expanding the production of beef -- this is, the 
cow herd represents the basic productive plant -- the size of the cow herd 
is the key to what the future holds for the beef industry. 
Predicting Beef Herd Sizes 
Analyzing what beef producers will do with regard to herd sizes over 
the next year or two is a problem of epic proportions. The published aggre-
gate data series are so poor and so unreliable that we can't say with any 
certainty what these people have done or are doing -- let alone predict 
the actions that are probable in the future. Obviously, the actions taken 
by beef producers are dependent to some degree upon the returns to their 
businesses. Anticipating these actions involves a forecast of prices. 
Beef prices can be forecast only through an analysis of the overall forces 
of demand and supply. 
We know a good bit about the demand for beef. We know, for example, 
that the demand for beef is not necessarily a reversible function, and that 
the apparent price elasticity of demand for beef is greater during a period 
of cyclically declining prices than during a period of cyclically increasing 
prices • .!./ This means that forecasting beef prices at the turning point in 
the cycle is fraught with peril unless accurate production data are available. 
Our current sampling procedures for gleaning beef cattle production 
data are obviously something less than phenomenally successful. The 
reported numbers of cattle on feed in the Corn Belt states have been in 
error by as much as 56 percent during the past two years. Indeed, the 
reported numbers of fed cattle marketed have shown 50 percent errors in 
these same states}/ When the revised figures regarding numbers 
.!./Goodwin, John W. , Reuven Andorn, and James E. Martin. The Irre-
versible Demand Function for Beef. Technical Bulletin, Oklahoma 
Agricultural Experiment Station. Stillwater, Oklahoma. In process. 
Y Cattle on Feed. Statistical Reporting Service, Crop Reporting Board, 
U.s. Department of Agriculture. Washington, D.C. January 17, 1966 
and January 17, 1967. 
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of cattle on feed and fed cattle marketings were released last January, 
the live cattle futures markets showed some sharp price adjustments. 
These adjustments generated some very real anguish and rage at least 
on the part of the Oklahoma beef industry. 
Data problems are by no means restricted to problems of determining 
the total numbers of cattle fed and marketed from feedlots. The inventory 
figures have also undergone some substantial revisions during the past 
year. These revisions were occasioned by the release of the 19 64 Census 
of Agriculture with enumerated some 2. 3 million head of cattle that had 
previously been omitted from the inventory figures. On the surface, the 
2. 3 million head of "ghost cattle" would not appear to be a serious error. 
In terms of all cattle, the revision amounted to about 2 percent. However, 
1. 8 million head of these cattle (or almost 80 percent of the revisions) 
were concentrated in one of the eight categories of cattle .Y The 1. 8 
million head upward revision in the "other cows two years old and older" 
category represented a beef cow herd and hence a calf crop about six 
percent larger than had originally been expected. With an elasticity of 
demand for live cattle of about -0.3, a six percent difference in the ex-
pected quantity of cattle translates to about a 20 percent difference in 
expected prices. When the revisions in livestock inventory figures were 
released last February, the live cattle futures markets moved sharply 
downward a second time, and the pain and rage of cattlemen -- at least 
in Oklahoma -- were awesome to behold. 
These remarks should not be interpreted as an indictment of the 
Statistical Reporting Service. This agency is the only source of livestock 
production data. Since SRS is the only source of data, the SRS data series 
should be as accurate as they possibly can be made. I am sure that the 
SRS failure to label the 1967 revisions as revisions was merely an oversight. 
Besides, it appears that the Statistical Reporting Service presently has other 
problems so far as aggregate livestock data are concerned. 
According to the 19 67 inventory report, there were about 600,000 more 
cattle potentially available for feeding in 1967 than in 1966. However, there 
were 7 0 0, 0 0 0 more cattle being fed at the beg inning of 19 6 7 than at the 
beginning of 1966. Thus, we started the year of 1967 with a net deficit of 
100,000 head in the number of cattle available to be put on feed. 
During the first three quarters of 19 6 7, reported placements of cattle 
on feed numbered 300,000 more than during the comparable period in 1966. 
This increased our deficit to 400,000 head. Further, during October and 
November, the states of Arizona, Cr-lifornia, Colorado, Iowa, Nebraska, 
V Livestock and Poultry Inventory, January 1. Statistical Reporting Service, 
Crop Reporting Board, U.S. Department of Agriculture. Washington, D.C. 
February 11, 1966, and February 13, 1967. 
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and Texas have increased their reported feed lot placements by a net 
3 2 6 1 000 head. The reduced slaughter weights indicate that some of 
these cattle have been picked pretty "green I" and hence that the rate 
of turnover in feed lots seems to have been accelerated. If the place-
ment figures are accurate 1 and if other states are also increasing feedlot 
placements (if Oklahoma is typical 1 states are placing larger numbers of 
cattle on feed) 1 then along about January and February of 19 68 we would 
expect to run very short of feeder cattle and prices would be expected 
to go right out of sight. Along about June 1 supplies of fed beef would 
be expected to be quite short and fat cattle prices would be expected to 
increase sharply. 
If ranchers have in fact begun to hold back yearling heifers for 
p4rposes of herd expansion in 19 68 1 those heifers have already been 
selected and bred. If so 1 the extremely short supply of feeder cattle is 
already upon us. The cash markets for feeder cattle do not indicate this 1 
nor do the summer contracts on the live cattle futures market. The rate 
at which cattle have moved into feedlots does not suggest any major with-
holding of heifers 1 unless another revision of cattle numbers is in the 
making. If the notorious 1967 "ghost herd" was underestimated-- place-
ments 1 prices 1 and slaughter all suggest that it was underestimated --
it is impossible to say what might lie ahead for the livestock industry 
during 1968 and 1969. 
Analysis ~ Sectors 
In my judgment 1 extensive quantitative analysis of the entire beef 
industry is impossible because of the gross inadequacies in the aggregate 
data. However 1 some highly significant qualitative analysis of the various 
sectors can be made on the basis of the data avallable. For example 1 this 
year's abundant pasture and hay crops in the western range states are un-
likely to evoke any wide-spread withholding of heifers 1 because no compe-
tent ranch manager stocks cows on the basis of what he knows to be a 
temporary situation. Most present-day ranchers are highly competent man-
agers 1 since the incompetent have long since ceased to exist. The beef 
industry has never been noted for rewarding managerial inadequacy. Since 
the western stockman knows that this year's lush pastures are unlikely to 
be repeated next year 1 he is farm more likely to utilize any surplus feed by 
holding some steers over until spring and perhaps on into the fall if next 
summer's pastures are better than average. 
At this time 1 the West is not the area we need to watch for changes in 
the livestock industry. The western acreages once used for the grazing of 
horses and mules have long since been diverted to beef cattle. The western 
dairy industry is so small that it utilizes less than ten percent of the total 
forage available. It is unlikely that there will be any rapid decline in 
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western dairying since population growth in the West is increasing local 
needs for fluid milk. Any further growth in the western beef industry 
must of necessity come by way of increased productivity of acreages 
already utilized by beef. Because of limited rainfall, the possibilities 
for any wide-spread or rapid increase in western pasture productivity 
are extremely limited. 
By the same token, a decline in the wes'tern beef industry is also 
quite unlikely. Most of the western range lands currently in beef pro-
duction have almost no alternative form of employment. These acreages, 
by and large, are adapted only for grazing. The return to land is a 
residual after all other costs have been paid. If there is no alternative 
use for the land, -th,~n it will be grazed so long as all other costs of 
production are covered. Th~ residual return above these other costs 
will to a large tiegree define land rental rates. 
Beef occupies the unique position of being both a luxury item and 
a necessity in the American diet. When the consumer wishes to econ-
omize, he eats hamburger. When he wishes to "live it up," he eats 
steak. Both are beef. As American incomes have incr~ased, American 
consumers have "lived it up" more and more. We have more than doubled 
the sale of beef since 1950, and prices at which we have sold it have 
trended upward. This is a growth pattern that is the envy of many 
industries. Very few industries can more than double volume in fifteen 
years without taking some reduction in price. The fact that the beef 
industry has been dble to accomplish this does not necessarily mean 
that the industry has experienced fifteen years of unprecedented profits. 
This sort of growth pattern in an industry that faces an essentially purely 
competitive market has generated some very real problems. 
One of the biggest problems faced by the cattleman in recent years 
is that of increasing land costs and cyclically fluctuating cattle prices. 
Since the return to land is a residual, as cattle prices have trended up-
ward, the increasing value of the beef produced by range land has been 
bid into the most fixed of the productive assets. 
The pattern of beef prices and land prices in the traditional cattle 
areas during the period since World War II appears to be of the sort shown 
in Figure 1. As cattle prices increased cyclically, land prices followed 
this increase. When cattle prices have cyclically tapered off and de-
clined, range land prices have not declined; rather, they have reached 
some sort of plateau and stayed there or have merely increased at a 
slower pace l,lntil cattle prices have cyclically recovered. With the 
cyclical recovery in cattle prices, land prices have resumed their upward 
climb until some subsequent period of cyclically depressed cattle prices. 
The result of this situation has .been that those who were in the cattle 
business during the early part of the period have had .:;orne windfall gains in 
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the increased value of their land and have achieved equity positions 
strong enough to weather some severe financial reverses. Those who 
got into the business near the peak of the cycle in cattle prices, how-
ever, have frequently found themselves in such financ~al straits that 
they have been forced to sell their land for little or no profit, and their 
cattle at a considerable loss. 
Those people who were already in the business could afford to pay 
somewhat higher prices than the cattle price might justify because of 
the scale economies which would result from the larger consolidated 
unit. Further, because of increasing land prices during earlier periods, 
and because of relatively easy credit, their equity positions were 
strong enough that they could get the necessary money for purposes of 
expansion. Thus, there has been a steady consolidation of assets in 
the western range area. The capital requirements in western livestock 
production are such that this business is today largely hereditary. The 
burden that is incumbent upon the heirs when these assets are passed 
from one generation to the next has created some extreme financial 
pressures, some forced sales, and the need for incorporation of ranches. 
These problems are going to be further aggravated in the future since 
the average age of ranch owners in many of these areas is approaching 
sixty years • 
Cattle and Policy 
There can be little question that the aggregate data concerning the 
American cattle industry are subject to rather severe limitations when 
analyzing the impact of alternative agricultural policies. Generally, the 
farm management data that have been formulated in the various state 
agricultural experiment stations can be far more useful not only in de-
fining the problems, but also in defining possible solutions to those 
problems. The region which has shown the most dramatic growth in beef 
production during recent years is the area east of the Indian Meridian and 
south of the Thirty-seventh Parallel {figure 2). This area includes the 
eastern parts of Oklahoma and Texas, and the states south of and includ-
ing Arkansas, Tennessee, and North Carolina. The cattle business in 
this southern region is almost totally different from that in the traditional 
cattle states. The managerial problems are different and more complex • 
. The marketing channels are less well defined. Yet, with all of its 
problems, this region has shown enormous growth. An analysis of some 
budgets for beef production can explain the reason for this growth and 
can suggest whether further growth is feasible. 
Oklahoma is one state that offers an opportunity for comparing the 
cattle business in both the South and West. The eastern half of Oklahoma 
is locally known as "Little Dixie, " and tends to be typically southern with 
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regard to climate, agriculture, social mores, and the like. The western 
side of the state is more typically western. A comparison of the cost 
structures for beef cow operations of comparable size in these two sec-
tions should provide some insight into the differences in southern and 
western livestock production. 
If the return to land is fixed at three percent per annum based on 
current prices, there is actually very little difference -- about a half 
cent per pound -- in the total cost of feeder calf production in native 
range in eastern and western Oklahoma (See appendix tables 1 and 2). 
There is, however, a substantial difference in the variable costs of 
production in these two areas. Variable costs in western Oklahoma are 
only si cents per pound of calf sold, while these same costs are a 
little above 1 oi cents in Little Dixie. The primary reason for this dif-
ference is that the buffalo grass ranges in western Oklahoma retain 
their nutritional value in the winter, while eastern Oklahoma grasses 
do not. As a result, large quantities of hay must be fed during the 
winter in eastern Oklahoma. As would be expected, the low variable 
costs observed in western Oklahoma have been bid into the price of 
range land, and per cow investment requirements are substantially 
greater in this region. 
When the high producing pasture varieties of Bermuda grass were 
developed several years ago, eastern Oklahoma was presented with an 
opportunity that was not available to the semi-arid western part of the 
state. Bermuda pastures will about triple the carrying capacity of many 
eastern Oklahoma ranges, and will increase per acre returns above 
variable cost by as much as 40 percent, even with good-choice steer 
calves selling at 23 cents per pound (figure 3). With cattle prices show-
ing an overall upward trend, and with land prices moving rapidly upward, 
there has been a tremendous incentive for cattlemen in Little Dixie to 
sprig their ranges to Bermuda. More than a million acres of this land 
have gone into Bermuda during the past four years. 
If a typical eastern Oklahoma rancher sprigs only half his land in 
Bermuda, the land necessary for a 1 00-cow operation is cut from 1120 
acres to only 404 acres (appendix table 3). This reduces his initial land 
investment by about half, and converts some of his fixed costs to variable 
costs. This makes borrowing easier, increases the value of the land, and 
gives him an investment in land that will still appreciate in value. Further, 
there is essentially no alternative use for the land, and with the past 
twenty years of increasing beef and land prices, the owners of such land 
have every incentive to adopt pasture improving practices. 
A survey of the available experiment station publications gives some 
rather interesting comparisons of the cash costs of producing feeder cattle 
in the various regions (figure 4). It will be noted that traditional cattle 
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Figure 3. Comparison of fixed-variable cost rations for 100-beef cow 
operations in Eastern and Western Oklahoma, by type of pasture 
with land return fixed at three percent. 
Indian Meridian 
Cost Per Pound of Calf Sold 
South Western Oklahoma 
Native Range: 
Fix. 
.1462 
Var. 
.0522 
South Eastern Oklahoma 
Native Range: 
Half Bermuda: 
All Bermuda: 
Fix. 
.0648 
.0648 
.0570 
Var. 
.1065 
.1719 
.1886 
Per Acre Returns Above Variable Cost 
South Western Oklahoma 
Native Range: $4.33 
South Eastern Oklahoma 
Native Range: 
Half Bermuda: 
All Bermuda: 
$3.54 
$4.29 
$4.83 
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areas have the lowest cash costs 1 and the areas that have provided 
much of the increase in feeder cattle production have the higher cash 
costs. However 1 the opportunities for the western range areas to in-
crease production are limited by rainfall. Therefore 1 the most rapid 
growth has occurred in the areas that can feasibly adapt and fertilize 
the tame pasture grasses -- specifically 1 eastern Oklahoma 1 east 
Texas, Arkansas 1 Louisiana 1 Mississippi 1 and Alabama. 
Precisely what role do the returns to owned resources play in this 
puzzle? We can see how the fixed costs per pound are reduced and 
how the variable costs per pound are increased as a result of the pas-
ture improvement. Frequently 1 variable costs are increased by more 
than fixed costs are reduced, hence increasing total costs. How 1 then, 
can the South afford to expand feeder cattle production via this route? 
The key to this problem may be found in five sets of relationships: 
1. The trends in land and cattle prices. 
2. Per acre returns above cash costs. 
3 •. Alternative production opportunities. 
4. The managerial planning horizon. 
5. Capital limitations. 
The prices for both land and cattle have trended upward over the past 
twenty years. Thus, investments in land and cattle have been both 
safe and lucrative for those who used judicl.ous timing with respect 
to the cattle cycle. It is true that the returns above cash costs per 
pound of calf sold are frequently reduced by the cost of sprigging and 
maintaining Bermuda grass. However, the per acre profitability of 
pasture land is increased by about 40 percent. 
About the only alternative for much southern land that has gone into 
improved pasture is pine trees. While it is true that pine trees do com-
pete with cattle for this land, at least fifteen years are required before 
any return is realized from an investment in pine trees. Also 1 the capital 
requirements for this enterprise are not inconsiderable. This is beyond 
the planning horizon for most of these managers. Further, the manager 
has a living to earn during the fifteen-year interim, and jobs in much 
of the rural South are hard to come by. Because of these considerations 1 
cattle frequently meet the needs of the southern landowner more satis-
factorily than do pine trees. 
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It should be pointed out that from a variable cost standpoint, the 
Corn Belt can compete quite favorably with the Southeast in the produc-
tion of beef cattle, but the alternative uses for these resources are 
considerably broader. Opportunity costs would probably preclude any 
widespread conversion of Corn Belt land into beef production, unless 
cattle prices should increase precipitously. 
Summary 
The policy questions with regard to the beef industry are unique 
when compared with the rest of agriculture. Beef is one of the few 
agricultural products for which the growth in demand has outstripped 
the growth in production. As a result, the beef industry is selling 
increasing quantities of product at increasing prices. 
Defining policy alternatives for the beef cattle industry on the 
basis of published aggregate data is hazardous because of the inaccu-
racy and inadequacy of such data. The budgets that have been formu-
lated by the various state agricultural experiment stations suggest that 
the traditional range areas have a comparative advantage for beef cattle 
production. However, since the demand for beef has increased faster 
than the western range area has been able to increase production, the 
upward trend in beef prices has encouraged the marginal beef produc-
tion areas in the Southeast to improve pastw-es and increase beef pro-
duction. The relatively high variable costs per pound and the low fixed 
cost structure for the beef industry in this southeastern region will 
force the southeastern cattleman to make more rapid adjustments to 
changing prices than will his western counterpart. 
The western range areas will likely remain in beef production so 
long as feeder calf prices average more than 10-12 cents per pound. 
Southeastern livestock producers, on the other hand, will be forced to 
make adjustments when calf prices decline to the 18-20 cents per 
pound level. 
On a cash cost basis, the Corn Belt can compete favorably with the 
Southeast for increased beef cattle production. However, opportunity 
costs have apparently prevented Corn Belt landowners from exercising 
this advantage to any large degree. Most of the growth in Corn Belt 
feeder calf production to date has occurred at the expense of the dairy 
industry. 
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Appendix Table 1 
Estimated production requirements and income for beef cow herd (1 00-
cow unit) on native range; spring calving; non-creep fed; calves born 
February 5; winter ration 1 cotton seed cake and range; selling good-
choice feeder calves 1 September 10 1 western Oklahoma. 
Est. 
Value Total 
Capital Items Unit No. Per Unit Value Per Cow 
Land acre 1344 $ 90 $1201960 $11209.60 
Non-Land Investment 
Capital: 
Hay Storage 1 etc. herd 1 242 242 
Brood Cows each 100 160 161000 
Bulls each 4 300 1,200 
Replacement Heifers each 16 125 21000 
Total Non-Land Investment Capital $191542 195.42 
1/2 Annual Operating Capital 900 9.00 
Total Non-Land Capital Required 201442 204.42 
Total Capital $1401502 $11405.02 
Price Value Total 
Annual Sales No. Weight /lb. Each Value 
Cull Cows 12 987 13.5 133.24 $11598.88 
Heifer Calves 28 460 21.0 96.60 21704.80 
Steer Calves 44 485 23.0 111.55 41908.20 
Total Sales $91211.88 $ 92.12 
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Appendix Table 1 (continued). 
No. Non-Land 
Annual Inputs Unit Units Price/Unit Total Cost Per Cow 
Native Range acre 1,344 $ 
Hay (Oat) ton 2.8 $20.00 56.00 
Cotton Seed Cake cwt. 245.28 3.80 932.08 
Minerals lb. 3,360.00 .03 100.80 
Vet and Med. An. Unit 112 3.00 336.00 
Bull Depreciation each 4 35.00 140.00 
Hauling & Mktg. cwt. 4 60. 64 .so 230.32 
Misc. herd 1 3 69. 60 
Interest on Non-
Land Capital $/yr. 20,442 .06 1,279.98 
Total Specified Costs $3,384.78 $ 33.85 
Returns to Land, Labor, 
Risk and Management $5,827.10 $ 58.27 
Labor, (Hr.) 1,100 l. 25 1,375.00 13.75 
Returns to Land, Risk 
and Management $4,452.10 $ 44.52 
Land, ($ invested) $120,960 .03 3,628.80 36.29 
Returns to Risk and Management $ 823.30 $ 8.23 
Source: Goodwin, John W., James S. Plaxico and Wm. F. Lagrone. Resource 
Requirements, Costs, and Expected Returns; Aternative Crop and 
Livestock Enterprises: Clay Soils of the Rolling Plains of South-
western Oklahoma. Oklahoma Agricultural Experiment Station and 
FERD, ARS, USDA. Processed Series P-357. September, 1960. 
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Appendix Table 2 
Estimated production requirements and income for beef cow herd (1 00-cow 
unit) on native range; spring calves; non-creep fed; calves born March 1; 
winter ration, cotton seed cake, hay and range; selling good-choice calves 
October 1 0; terrace soils, eastern Oklahoma. 
Est. 
Value Total 
Capital Items Unit No. Per Unit Value Per Cow 
Land acre ll20 $ 65 $72,800 $728.00 
Non-Land Investment 
Capital: 
Hay Storage, etc. herd 1 4,935 4,935 
Brood Cows each 100 160 161 000 
Bulls each 4 300 1,200 
Replacement Heifers each 16 125 2,000 
Total Non-Land Investment Capital $24,135 $241.35 
1/2 Annual Operating Capital 2L338 23.38 
Total Non-Land Capital Requirement $26,473 $ 26.47 
Total Capital $99,273 $992.73 
Price Value Total 
Annual Sales No. Weight /lb. Each Value 
Cull Cows 12 987 13.5 133.24 $1,598.88 
Heifer Calves 28 460 21.0 96.60 2,704.80 
Steer Calves 44 485 23.0 lll. 55 4,908.20 
Total Sales $9,211.88 $ 92.12 
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Appendix Table 2 (continued). 
No. Non-Land 
Annual Inputs Unit Units Price/Land Total Cost Per Cow 
Native Range acre 1,120 $ 
Hay ton 71 $20.00 1,420.00 
Cotton Seed Cake cwt. 201.6 3.80 766.08 
Minerals lb. 3,360 .03 100.80 
Vet and Med. ·An. Unit 112 2.00 224.00 
Bull Depreciation each 4 35.00 160.00 
Hauling and Mktg. cwt. 460.64 .so 230.32 
Misc. herd 754.66 
Interest on Non-
Land Capital $/yr. 26,473 .06 1,588.38 
Total Specified Cost $5,243.24 $ 52.43 
Returns to Land, Labor 
Risk and Management $3,968.64 $ 39.69 
Labor, (Hr.) 1,139 1.00 1,139.00 11.39 
Returns to Land, Risk 
and Management $2,829.64 $ 28.30 
Land, ($ invested) $72,800 .03 2,184.00 21.84 
Returns to Risk and Management $ 645.64 $ 6.45 
Source: Schneeberger, Kenneth C. , Herman E. Workman, Waymon Halbrook 
and Odell L. Walker. Resource Requirements, Costs, and Expected 
Returns; Beef Cattle and Improved Pasture Alternatives; East Central 
and South Central Oklahoma. Oklahoma Agricultural Experiment Sta-
tion and USDA. Processed Series P-544. August, 1966. 
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Appendix Table 3 
Estimated production requirements and income for beef cow herd (1 00-
cow unit) on half Bermuda-Vetch 1 half native pasture; spring calves; 
non-creep fed; calves born March 1; winter ration 1 cotton seed cake 1 
hay and pasture; selling good-choice feeder calves October 10; east 
central and south central Oklahoma. 
Est. 
Value Total 
Capital Items Unit No. Per Unit Value Per Cow 
Land acre 404 $ 65 $261260 $262.60 
Non-Land Investment 
Capital: 
Hay Storage I etc. herd 41935 
Brood Cows each 100 160 161000 
Bulls each 4 300 11200 
Replacement Heifers each 16 125 21000 
Total Non-Land Investment Capital $241135 $241.35 
1/2 Annual Operating Capital 21338 23.38 
Total Non-Land Capital Requirement $261473 $264.73 
Total Capital $521733 $527.33 
Price Value Total 
Annual Sales No. Weight /lb. Each Value 
Cull Cows 12 987 13. 5 133.24 $11598.88 
Heifer Calves 28 460 21.0 96.60 21704.80 
Steer Calves 44 485 23.0 111. 55 41908.20 
Total Sales $91211.88 $ 92.12 
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Appendix Table 3 (continued). 
No. 
Annual Inputs Unit Units 
Native Range acre 202 
Improve Pasture acre 202 
Hay (Bermuda-Vetch) ton 71 
Cotton Seed Cake cwt. 201.6 
Minerals lb. 31360.0 
Vet and Med. An. Unit 112 
Bull Depreciation each 4 
Hauling and Mktg. cwt. 460.64 
Misc. herd 
Interest on Non-
Land Capital $/yr. 261473 
Total Specified Cost 
Returns to Land 1 Labor 
Risk and Management 
Labor I (Hr.) 11430 
Returns to Land 1 Risk 
and Management 
Land 1 ($ invested) $ 2 6 I 2 60 
Returns to Risk and Management 
Source: Same as Table 2 • 
Non-Land 
Price/Unit 
$15.15..v 
8.4oY 
3.80 
.03 
2.00 
35.00 
.so 
.06 
1. 00 
.03 
Total Cost 
$ 
31060.30 
596.40 
766.08 
100.80 
224.00 
160.00 
230.32 
754.56 
11588.38 
$71480.84 
$11731.04 
11430.00 
$ 301.04 
787.80 
$ -486.76 
Per Cow 
$ 74.81 
$ 17.31 
14.30 
$ 3.01 
7.88 
$ -4.87 
.!/Includes 1/10 of Bermuda Grass establishment costs ($22.90/A) plus 
$12.86/A ann. cost. 
Y Haying cost only. 
-62-
Appendix Table 4 
Estimated production requirements and income for beef cow herd (1 00-
cow unit) on Bermuda-Vetch pasture; spring calves; non-creep fed; 
calves born March 1; winter ration cotton seed cake 1 hay and pasture; 
selling good-choice feeder calves October 1 0; east central and south 
central Oklahoma. 
Est. 
Value Total 
Capital Items Unit No. Per Unit Value Per Cow 
Land acre 240 $ 65 $151600 $156.00 
Non-Land Investment 
Capital; 
Hay Storage I Etc. herd 510 60 
Brood Cows each 100 160 161000 
Bulls each 4 300 11200 
Replacement Heifers each 16 125 21000 
Total Non-Land Investment Capital $241260 $242.60 
1/2 Annual Operating Capital 219 69 29.69 
Total Non-Land Capital Requirement $271229 $272.29 
Total Capital $421829 $428.29 
Price Value Total 
Annual Sales No. Weight /lb. Each Value 
Cull Cows 12 987 13. 5 133.24 $11598.88 
Heifer Calves 28 460 21.0 96. 60 21704.80 
Steer Calves 44 485 23.0 111.55 41908.20 
Total Sales $91211.88 $ 92.12 
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Appendix Table 4 (continued). 
No. 
Annual Ineuts Unit Units 
Improve Pasture acre 240 
Hay (Bermuda-Vetch) ton 71 
Cotton Seed Cake cwt. 201.6 
Minerals lb. 3,360 
Vet and Med. An. Unit 112 
Bull Depreciation each 4 
Hauling and Mktg. cwt. 460.64 
Misc. herd 
Interest on Non-
Land Capital $/yr. 26,239 
Total Specified Cost 
Returns to Land, Labor 
Risk and Management 
Labor, (Hr.) 1,484 
Returns to Land, Risk 
and Management 
Land, {$ invested) $15,600 
Returns to Risk and Management 
Source: Same as Table 2. 
Non-Land 
Price/Unit 
$15.151/ 
8.401/ 
3.80 
.03 
2.00 
35.00 
.50 
.06 
l. 00 
.03 
Total Cost 
$3,636.00 
596.40 
766.08 
100.80 
224.00 
160.00 
230.32 
674.54 
1,633.74 
$8,051.88 
$1,160.00 
1,484.00 
$ -324.00 
468.00 
$ -792.00 
Per Cow 
$ 80.52 
$ 11.60 
14.84 
$ -3.24 
4. 68 
$ -7.92 
llrncludes 1/10 of Bermuda Grass establishment costs ($ 22. 90/A) plus 
12. 8 6/A ann. cost. 
1/ Haying cost only. 
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THE GRAIN-LIVESTOCK ECONOMY 
J. Carroll Bottum * 
The grain-livestock economy is faced with two general problems: 
an aggregate supply-demand problem and a structural problem. These 
problems are interrelated. Some producers are in economic difficulties 
because of the changing structure, but the situation appears to them as 
an aggregate supply and price problem. This paper will be divided into 
three parts: the first dealing with the supply-demand problem, the second 
with the structural problem, and the third with proposals for meeting the 
problems in the two areas. 
Aggregate Supply-Demand Problem 
Little space in this paper will be devoted to analyzing the basic 
supply-demand problem in the feed grain area. The basic situation has 
been V~,Tell presented in numerous paper1s including those presented by 
Kaldor.!l and by Kendrick and Ottosonk to the National Agricultural 
Advisory Commission. Suffice to say, we have produced enough food 
and fiber to meet our domestic and foreign needs with a total of 50 to 
60 million acres of cropland retired from 1961 to 1966 at prices that pre-
vailed during this period. True, we reduced our stocks during this period 
but only a little less retired land would have allowed them to be maintained. 
During this same six-year period, 19 61 to 19 6 6, we have retired 
annually 30 million acres of feed grain land. Then with 20 million acres 
retired in 1967, stocks began to build up again. It is obvious that with 
the prices that have been maintained, we have a feed grain plant around 
25 million acres larger than necessary to meet our domestic and foreign 
needs. 
This year, 1967, is demonstrating the problem of maintaining a rea-
sonably stable grain-livestock economy when one is faced, in addition to 
the normal cycles in livestock production, with unpredictable yields, an 
*Professor of Agricultural Economics, Purdue University • 
.!./Kaldor, Donald R. The Free Market as a Farm Policy Alternative. 
pp. 1-11. Supplement to Farm Policy in the Years Ahead. National 
Agricultural Advisory Commission. November, 1964. 
YKendrick, James and Howard Ottoson. Feed Grains -A Situation Paper. 
pp. 12-2 6. Supplement to Farm Policy in the Years Ahead. National 
Agricultural Advisory Commission. November, 1964. 
-68-
unpredictable foreign grain market and a less than clearly defined grain 
storage policy. As a continuing residual supplier of the world's grain 
needs and with the present stage of technological development in weather 
forecasting, this is not likely to be the end of such problems. The less 
than normal accuracy in forecasting market supplies of livestock during 
the past two years has not improved the situation in the eyes of producers. 
With between 24 and 34 million acres of feed grain land retired each 
year between 1961 and 1966 and a growing foreign grain market, were-
duced our grain storage supplies. The carry-over of the four feed grains 
on October 1, 19 66 had fallen to 3 7 million tons as compared to around 
80 million tons during the 19 60-61 marketing year. 
Exports of feed grains during this period rose from 12. 3 million tons 
in the 1960-61 marketing year to 29.1 million tons for the 1965-66 mar-
keting year. They then fell to 22.0 million tons for 1966-67 marketing 
year. These exports of feed grains were largely cash sales. 
Acreages of feed grains retired annually during the 19 61 to 19 66 period 
varied from 24 to 35 million acres and averaged 30 million acres per year. 
The reduction in terms of bushels of corn was probably around one billion 
bushels per year. 
In a research study conducted by Richard J. Edwards and the author of 
this paper at Purdue University, an attempt was made to measure the average 
effective reduction brought about by the feed grain program during its first 
four years of operation, 1961-1964. An average of 27t million acres was 
Table 1. Acreages of land retired in United States, 1961-67. 
(Million Acres) 
Cotton 
Conservation 
Reserve 
and Crop 
Year Feed Grains Wheat Adjustment Total 
19 61 25.2 28.5 53.7 
19 62 28.2 10.7 25.8 64. 7 
1963 24.5 7.2 24.3 56.0 
1964 32.4 5.1 17.5 55.0 
19 65 34.7 7.2 14.0 55.9 
1966 34.7 8.3 12.9 63.3 
19 67 20.6 10.9 41.1 
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shifted out of feed production for this four-year period. Because of the 
voluntary nature of the program, farmers not participating could increase 
their acreage without publicly imposed limits. They did increase their 
acreage more each succeeding year. By 19 64, farmers not in the program 
planted 9 million acres more than the 1959-60 average, as indicated by 
the base acreage at that time. This planting was partly offset by parti-
cipants cutting back even more than the limit for which they could receive 
payments. Much of this underplanting resulted from odd-sized fields and 
the risks attached to exceeding their acreage limit. In 19 64, participants 
planted 5. 9 million acres or 14 percent less than they were allowed. 
Compensations were made for the adjustments farmers were allowed 
in their base acreage and for the land released from the conservation re-
serve program. It was eligible for entry in the feed grain program. After 
these adjustments were made, it was judged that the effective decline in 
acreage averaged 23.7 million acres in this four-year period. 
The effective decline in planted acreage of each crop was multiplied 
by 80 percent of the average yield in that state. Eighty percent was 
judged as sufficient to compensate for the average land selection, although 
independent studies have shown that participating farms have yields equal 
to the average of the state. There is selection within each farm. Yield 
per planted acre was used, in part, to reflect crop failures and difficulty 
with harvest. On this basis the decline in feed production on a corn 
equivalent basis averaged 987 million bushels per year for the 1961-64 
period, Table 2, or a decrease of approximately 17 percent in feed grain 
production. If we are willing to pay the price, our past voluntary land 
retirement programs have demonstrated that we can reduce production. 
Table 2. Effective decreased production compared with anticipated decline 
from diverted acreage, U.S. , by years 19 61-64 • 
Diverted Acreage Effective Decreased Efficiency 
Decline Production of Program 
Year Mil. Bu. Mil. Bu. % 
1961 1153.7 975.3 84.5 
1962 1248.0 1075.0 86.1 
1963 1091.8 824.2 75.5 
1964 1327.6 1073.5 80.9 
Total 4821.2 3947.9 81.9 
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Some would argue that without the program participants would have 
increased their planted acreage. If this assumption were made, it would 
have shown a greater reduction because of the program. Others claim that 
some marginal areas would have gone out of production without the program 
and that fertilizer was substituted for land which increased the amount of 
corn produced. While these other assumptions could be made, this study 
rests on the assumptions stated. On the basis of the stated assumptions, 
the production of grains on a corn-equivalent basis would have been nearly 
a billion bushels higher if the same grain prices had prevailed throughout 
the period. 
By October, 19 6 6, the feed grain carry-over had fallen to 3 7 million 
tons; the corn price received by United States farmers was $1. 29 per 
bushel and many people were expounding the position that United States 
farmers would have an unlimited world outlet for grains. With this back-
drop, plans had to be started on the 1967 feed grain program. As are-
sult of this situation, the 19 6 7 program was modified and, along with a 
bullish attitude on the part of farmers, it resulted in the retirement of only 
20 million feed grain acres in 1967. This was 10 million acres less than 
were retired in 1966; 10 million acres less are proposed again for 1968. 
With this situation, what happened to feed grains in 19 67? Acreage 
planted went up 5 percent. Yields went up 7 percent (assuming we are able 
to harvest the crop). Output went up 12 percent. The foreign market for 
the 1966-67 marketing year declined 7.1 million tons or 24 percent. Ex-
ports will likely remain near this level for the 1967-68 marketing year. 
Feed grain prices this fall fell to and below loan levels. 
If exports had increased as much as they declined and yields had been 
as much below average as they were above, we would have needed more 
corn than we produced in 1967. It would have moved at a price above the 
19 67 levels. With two such large unpredictable variables now in the feed 
grain picture, a realistic storage program to balance out supply and demand 
on an annual basis at reasonable prices becomes a more evident need. 
If the 30-million-acre goal proposed for 1968 should be reached, as 
it appears it might well be, prices of corn could be considerably higher 
during the 1968-69 marketing year. If foreign demand should increase 
or unfavorable weather develop, it could be even higher. Variable factors 
often develop as they did this year to compound the situation instead of 
offset it. 
Grain prices and livestock prices are closely related over time. When 
grain prices decline livestock prices eventually decline and, conversely 
when grain prices rise, livestock prices eventually rise. These relation-
ships vary over time and are obscured at times because of the lead and lag 
factor, but they are persistent. Anyone familiar with the livestock industry 
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is familiar with either the hog-corn ratios 1 the beef cattle feeding ratios 1 
the dairy-feed ratios or the egg-feed ratios. 
This is not to say that these ratios remain constant over time. They 
are modified by other cost and price factors. However 1 grain costs make 
up such a high share of the cost of producing most classes of livestock 
that grain and livestock prices tend to move together over longer periods 
of time. 
If the livestock enterprises expand on the basis of corn prices the 
first half of the 19 67-68 marketing season 1 unfavorable feeding situations 
could develop in the winter of 19 69. This might be particularly true in the 
case of hogs. There is considerable evidence that hog farrowings may be 
further expanded during 19 68 and unfavorable feeding relationships develop 
during the first part of 19 69. The increased feed grain acreage retired in 
19 68 could then be blamed for developing this unfavorable feeding situation. 
This points up the desirability of a commodity loan program to meet pre-
sent conditions. 
Livestock Structure Problem 
The rapidly developing technology in farming has put and is continuing 
to put extreme economic pressure on what has been thought of as the tradi-
tional family-sized farm. Larger power plants accompanied by larger field 
machines 1 mechanized and automated livestock equipment and changes in 
marketing and production according to specification have all increased the 
need for volume on the production unit. Larger farm businesses have 
sprung up to take advantage of size. Large regional shifts in production 
and distribution of livestock have taken place. Integration has developed 
in varying degrees throughout the livestock industry. These larger efficient 
operations have reduced the unit cost of production I changed the marketing 
procedure 1 and placed the smaller traditional producer at an economic dis-
advantage which is often interpreted as an aggregate supply-demand problem 
by him. 
A government supply-demand program which holds prices high enough 
for the larger farm units to operate successfully leaves the traditional family 
farm unit in economic difficulty. Prices held at a level high enough to pro-
vide adequate income for the traditional family farm result in returns on 
the larger units so high that they bring additional resources into agriculture. 
This under a voluntary land retirement program further aggravates the supply 
problem. 
Some producers 1 to avoid making the necessary adjustments 1 have rented 
or sold their farms to larger operators and retired or obtained employment 
in other business. Others increased their crop operations and decreased 
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their livestock and poultry operations which have been taken up by the 
larger specialized producers 1 particularly in poultry and cattle feeding. 
There is now a tendency for livestock production to concentrate on owned 
or partially owned farms. Landlords are hesitant to invest large amounts 
in mechanized and automated equipment for livestock production where 
they know high levels of management and volume are necessary for success. 
Tenants hesitate to go into livestock production without adequate and 
modern livestock facilities. As a result more tenants have turned to grain 
farming and to off-farm employment to supplement their income. 
However 1 a large group of dedicated 1 capable farmers 1 who have 
adopted the best crop and livestock technology 1 have not been able, 
for various reasons 1 to increase their scale of operations or adjust their 
livestock production and marketing programs to market demands. They 
find themselves in economic difficulty. They find their returns squeezed 
by the competition from the large units that are developing. They are in 
difficulty because of the changing internal structure of agriculture. 
At the other end of the scale the American consumers have come to 
want and to demand a continuous flow of high quality standardized food 
products which have now been made possible by technology. The super-
market and food chain efforts to meet consumer demands and to maintain 
their competitive position have put pressure on the processors to supply 
them with a steady supply of uniform high quality products. The processors 
caught between these specific demand requirements 1 on the one hand, and 
the varying supply and quality of products offered 1 on the other hand, have 
attempted to find some means of coordinating livestock production and con-
sumption. 
Many livestock producers 1 seeing various groups attempting to bring 
about coordination through greater integration and the transfer of the decision-
making power to groups outside of agriculture 1 are attempting to find ways 
of becoming more competitive and of maintaining the independence of the 
traditional livestock farm. 
Proposals for Consideration 
With current technology 1 markets and prices, we appear to have around 
25 million acres (land of present productivity) excess capacity in the feed 
grain plant. Whether one subscribes to continued government programs or 
the withdrawal of government programs from agriculture 1 some program of 
land diversion in the immediate period ahead appears desirable. If the 
present land retirement program in the feed grain area were abruptly with-
drawn 1 unjustifiable economic hardships would occur in agriculture. 
-73-
A less costly, more nationally efficient, program could be developed 
if we were willing to: (1) shift towards a grain-to-grass diversion program 
and use the grass, and (2) move more in the direction of doing this on 
marginal whole farms .Y If the grass were used, about 50 percent more 
acres would need to be shifted out of feed grains. The cost would be 
correspondingly less and we could more nearly meet the domestic demand 
for lean beef. Such a program would tend to shift the acres into grass 
that would occur under a free agriculture. It also avoids forcing over-
adjustment in the more marginal cropland areas. If it is anticipated that 
the government should or will withdraw from the land retirement program, 
then the adjustments that would take place under free prices should be 
encouraged before the withdrawal of the program instead of after withdrawal, 
to avoid the most hardship for agriculture. 
As suggested by the National Advisory Commission on Food and Fiber 
we need to modify our grain storage programs. The Commission makes the 
following statement:il "The Commision recommends establishment of a 
national security of strategic reserve, including emergency stock for food 
aid. The reserve should be isolated from the market except as offsetting 
sales and purchases are required to maintain the quality of the reserve 
stocks." 
If reserve stocks are depleted and the government wishes to build up 
stocks, it would appear desirable that the government should announce at 
the beginning of the crop year what it will purchase if production reaches 
certain levels. They then should purchase this in the open market and 
not make the producers pay the cost of building up strategic reserves in 
the form of lower market prices. Complete information concerning carry-
over stocks and the terms under which stocks are acquired or disposed of 
should be made known to all as early in the season as possible. Definite 
rules for the management of the stocks should be established. 
In order for the traditional grain and livestock producer to better 
compete with the large specialized livestock producing units and the non-
producer controlled integrated livestock organizations, he needs modifica-
tions in certain services. 
1. He needs an improved pricing system. This is especially 
important in the case of cattle and to a lesser degree in hogs. 
The ultimate efficiency of the ~ntire production marketing 
system depends largely on how rapidly and accurately price 
31 Land Retirement and Farm Policy. Research Bulletin 704. Purdue 
University Agricultural Experiment Station. September, 19 61 . 
4/Report of the National Advisory Commission on Food and Fiber, pp. 22-23. 
July, 1967. 
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data can be collected and analyzed with respect to desired 
grades, quality, and volume, and how rapidly and accurately 
producers, processors and others can evaluate and act upon 
this information. Some people believe we should have an en-
larged and more effective price system based on the carcass 
and by-product market, and interpreted at various points on a 
liveweight basis so that producers and buyers have a more ade-
quate basis for their transactions as the number of live ani-
mals sold on the central market declines. 
2. The small livestock producer needs a stronger educational 
program in product identification. He needs to know the grade 
and quality of the livestock he has to sell so that he can 
correctly relate them to the pricing system and know what his 
product is really worth in the market. He needs to better know 
what the market is demanding so he can better produce for the 
market. 
3. He needs better market supply and outlook information. Such 
information is particularly important to the traditional pro-
ducer who markets his livestock only a few times a year. 
4. He needs cooperatives or other institutions to represent him. 
Much effort over the years has been devoted to developing 
cooperatives and private institutions to assist the producer 
with his supply and marketing problems. They have not always 
been fully successful in meeting the livestock producer's 
need for localized opportunities to do forward selling. New 
approaches are needed and offer opportunities in today' s 
changing environment. Many of the economies of the large 
units -- in comparison with the smaller producer -- arise from 
savings in feeding practices, purchase of feeds and live-
stock, and the marketing of livestock. To be more competi-
tive the traditional commercial family farmer needs some 
organization to assist him with these functions. 
Summary 
If our goal is to maintain a reasonably stable 1 commercial family-farm 
oriented grain-livestock economy 1 the previously mentioned programs need 
to be given consideration and modified. The supply-demand situation and 
the structure of agriculture will continue to change and our institutions 
serving the grain-livestock economy must also be modified. 
OUR LONG-RUN PRODUCTION POTENTIAL 
Earl 0. Heady* 
Proper evaluation of the nation's production potential and policy 
needs requires an aptly oriented bi-focal vision. For those who are 
economically far-sighted 1 the near-time supply prospects are blurred 
because the perspective and the distance of time provide only optimism 
for food demand. The world population will double in 3 5 years and per 
capita incomes will increase apace. The result 1 in this view 1 can 
be only positive for farmers. Demand will exceed supply, in the same 
vein that domestic supply has exceeded domestic demand in recent de-
cades 1 and the U.S. farm plant will be strained to produce. This far-
sighted glance calls for an immediate mobilization of our farm resources, .. 
especially in the sense of getting more immediately transferable and 
durable inputs into use and releasing immobilized land for production. 
For those who are only near-sighted 1 the potential of world food shortage 
is so distant that it is entirely indiscernable and the near term should 
dominate all aspects of agricultural policy. 
Our present concerns and problems in policy perhaps stem from the 
fact that they have been argued 1 promoted and specified by those who 
are either near-sighted or far-sighted 1 and not by those who possess 
bi-focal vision relative to food supply and demand. 
Eventual World Food Demand 
Without doubt 1 an important portion of the so-called farm unrest 
stems from the expectations which were honed sharply and vigorously 
by those who saw only the long-run and a world food crisis, or who had 
a special interest in getting more inputs used now without regard to the 
short-run consequences. Farmers were led to believe that the food crisis 
was only a year or two ahead, and the 1965-66 rise in farm prices and 
incomes seemed to substantiate this claim. Many committed capital 
accordingly and a sizeable increment in land values over the last three 
years can be imputed to this set of expectations. The anticipation was 
augmented further, even if unwittingly, by government leaders and 
administrators who spread widely the word of a potential world food crisis 1 
simultaneously with a relaxation in supply controls to raise reserves back 
to a more comfortable level against our international food aid commitments. 
* Professor of Economics 1 Iowa State University. 
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Then came the large crop in 1967 with its consequent decline in prices 
and income. Indeed the long run has not yet arrived and expectations 
have simply been brought back to short-run reality. This is a large 
part of what the current "farmer unrest" is about. 
It is true that the very long run could bring a world food emergency, 
but this need not or will not be true if sufficient effort is devoted to 
population management, world-wide agricultural improvement and efficient 
transformation of food from non-farm sources. These are large and im-
portant "ifs." Should we plan that they will be easily attained and 
they are not, the penalty will be great. Hence, we must be prepared for 
the long run. 
Even if substantial progress is made in family planning and agricultural 
improvement over the world, the prospect is that world food demand can 
improve the prosperity of U.S. agriculture in the long-run. This improve-
ment and positive outlook will stem from economic development and improve-
ment of per capita incomes, and expanded trade through commercial markets, 
more than from population pressure and its forced meager cereal diets and 
food aid. 
But even then, the prospect is more than a decade from realization --
in the absence of some startling world economic or political developments 
which convert long-standing complexities into short-term possibilities. 
The simple fact is: our food supply potential is mammoth. It will be 
some time before restraints on our ability to produce will cause strains 
and stresses of the kinds witnessed elsewhere over the world, where 
blame is placed on those whose plans result in too little food. Some will 
be distressed that we have said so, and would rather that we had kept the 
facts hidden. But why should they? Large food supply capacity is no 
reason for gloom and pessimism. The hope for large supplies and low 
real prices of food has been the aspiration of societies for thousands of 
years. Now that the hope has arrived for the U.S. 1 and can be prolonged 
for some time into the future 1 why should we be depressed? Or why 
should those who perhaps properly present the extremely long-run need 
of the world for food become distressed 1 if we present a favorable supply 
picture for U.S. agriculture over the next two decades? 
As we outline below 1 our domestic problem is not the ability to pro-
duce food at a low real price for domestic consumers over the next two 
decades. Neither is it one of being able to make very substantial in-
creases in our exports over the next decade or so. It is more nearly one 
of maintaining and increasing our productivity so that future world food 
contingencies are forestalled 1 so that the real price of food can be kept 
reasonably low for domestic consumers. But at the same time we want to 
mesh supply growth with demand growth so that an income sacrifice does 
not fall on commercial farmers as a by-product of our preparation for the 
very long run. 
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Future Production Potential 
Facts of the past year and other papers of this seminar indicate 
that a rather elastic short-run supply response exists within the capacity 
of our present under-utilized cropland base. We can quite readily step 
up our output in a year or two. This possibility exists because of the 
nature of current supply programs. They rest largely on land withdrawal 
from millions of farms over the country 1 rather than on a "whole farm" 
basis. Since farm operators generally have under-utilized supplies of 
labor 1 machinery and power 1 they can readily incorporate the "idle" 
land into their cropping operations. And their capital position 1 as well 
as that of country banks 1 is favorable to allow this response once re-
straints are lifted. 
This ability in short-run response exists partly because our long-
run potential in agricultural production is very large. Three recent 
studies indicate that exports over the next decade or two will have to 
grow entirely beyond expectations before our agricultural supply poten-
tial becomes strained. It would 1 of course 1 be a happy day 1 for both 
world food consumers and American farmers 1 if world economic growth 
and food trade took place so rapidly as to exhaust our full supply poten-
tial in the next decade and a half. But some new formulae in both develop-
ment and trade 1 or in the amount of public funds this and other nations 
are willing to invest in food aid 1 will have to be developed before this 
is true. 
All previous projections on our output capacity have proved to be 
too conservative. (See table 1.} At the time of a previous world food 
stress 1 1945 1 the USDA projected crop yields and capacity for 1950. 
The projected yields undershot realizations by an average of 25 percent. 
The "miss" was even greater for the 1948 USDA projections to 1965 --
projected corn yields being only half of realization. Similarly 1 1961 
USDA projections for 1965 underestimated actual yields. 
Longer-run projections for 197 5 were provided in 1952 by the Paley 
Commission report and in 1960 by the Agricultural USDA Information 
Bulletin 233. Projections for 1980 were provided in 1959 by the Senate 
Select Committee on National Water Resources. Both sets of these 
projections are summarized in Table 1 1 along with those of earlier 
dates. Even the "maximum" yields for the 197 5 projections have al-
ready been surpassed or will be by 1970. Almost all of the projected 
1980 yields had been attained by 1965. 
Yields for individual years do deviate from trend lines due to 
weather and other variables. However 1 it is rather obvious that the 
rate of technological advance and supply potential is increasing over 
time. There are reasons to predict that they will continue to do so. 
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Since previous projections underestimated shifts in our supply 
potential, program administrators and farm leaders were not well pre-
pared for the sharp increase in output during the 1950's or even in 
more recent years. These past experiences should be kept in mind 
as we further review the future. 
1980 Capacity for the Current 
Cropland Base 
Our projections for the 1980 farm output potential suppose an 
efficient or optimal interregional allocation of production within the 
nation and that all previously used cropland is returned to production • .!/ 
Our estimates are based on the following assumptions or conditions: 
(1) A U.S. population for 1980 of 243.4 million persons, (2) per capita 
income to increase in real terms at 1950-65 trend rates, with the 1980 
level 40 percent greater than the 1965 level, (3) the land base available 
for major crops 1 which actually has been expanding in recent years due 
to the shift from forages in rotations, to be equivalent in acres to that 
used (both for crops and land retirement) in 1965, (d) farm technological 
improvement to continue at the 1948-65 trend rates, a rate which is con-
servative relative to technological improvement in the decade 1958-67, 
(e) an interfarm and interregional allocation of production to allow output 
to be located in areas of greatest economic advantage. 
Per acre yields, under these conditions, are projected to increase 
to the following level by 1980: 
Wheat 
Corn 
Oats 
Barley 
Grain Sorghum 
Soybeans 
Cotton 
Tobacco 
32.2 bushels 
9 9. 4 bushels 
59.1 bushels 
48.1 bushels 
61.8 bushels 
29.3 bushels 
7 54. 0 pounds 
2, 715. 0 pounds 
We consider these 1980 yield estimates to be conservative 1 con-
sidering both the previous tendency fm projections to underestimate 
realized yields and the base period upon which our projections rest • 
.!/Heady 1 Earl 0. and Leo V. Mayer. Food Needs and U.S. Agriculture in 
1980. Technical Report No. 1. National Advisory Commission on Food 
and Fiber. Washington, D.C. 19 6 7. 
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Table 2. Index numbers of major crops and livestock commodities for 
1964, 1965, 1966 and projected values for 1980 assuming 
maximum crop production. 
Actual Projected 
1964 1965 1966 1980 
(1957-59 = 100) 
Total Outputll 112 113 112 157 
Crops 109 117 110 176 
Wheat 109 112 111 246 
Feed Grains 95 112 111 162 
Oilseeds.fi 131 152 156 224 
Cotton 124 121 78 140 
Tobacco 128 107 107 117 
Livestock 113 110 113 144 
Beef and Veal 128 125 129 182 
Pork 103 92 97 120 
Lamb and Mutton 81 74 77 107 
Broilers 142 147 169 230 
Farm Chickens 84 81 84 78 
Turkeys 132 138 152 208 
Milk 103 101 98 113 
Eggs 105 106 107 114 
1f Total output was calculated for those commodities listed. 
2/Includes soybeans and cottonseed. 
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Projected crop output potential 
With a cropland base only at 1965 levels for major crops and yields 
at the above levels, output of crops could increase greatly by 1980. The 
projected level of output of each major crop is indicated in Table 2. 
Wheat production from 88. 7 million acres of cropland would be 24 6 per-
cent of the annual 195 7-59 average output. Total 1980 potential wheat 
production on this acreage is estimated at 2. 9 billion bushels. About 
2. 2 billion bushels would be available for export under projected domestic 
human consumption and feed uses. Our exports were only 741 and 742 
million bushels in 1960-65 period and 1966, respectively. The 2. 2 billion 
bushels for export would be three times greater than annual U.S. exports 
since 1960. In fact, this amount exceeds total exports of all surplus-
producing countries to all importing countries. The total world trade in 
wheat, among all exporting and importing countries, was only 2. 0 billion 
bushels in 1966. With all cropland allocated to mesh with its comparative 
advantage, 1980 feed grain output could increase to 162 percent of the 
average annual 1957-59 output, or from 147 million tons to 224 million. 
In contrast to wheat, the greater feed grain output could be produced on 
somewhat less cropland than in either 1965 or 1966. In the absence of 
programs which cause wide dispersion of acreage among producing regions, 
production would be meshed with interregional comparative advantage for 
both wheat and corn. Or, in other words, feed grain output could increase 
by over 50 percent between 1965 and 1980 without an increase in acreage. 
Part of this increase is due to higher yields as land use is shifted among 
regions on a more complete comparative advantage basis, but an additional 
source is the ongoing shift of land from oats to corn. Corn, which produces 
about three times more grain per acre, is projected to continue replacing 
oats. This continued shift of feed grain land also allows a greater tonnage 
from the same or a smaller acreage. 
Oilseed production in 1980 is projected at a level equal to 224 percent 
of the 1957-59 annual average. Production in 1966 had already risen 
56 percent above the 1957-59 average annual output. The 1980 projection 
would include 58. 6 million acres of soybeans and 9. 7 million acres of 
cotton, thus causing cottonseed to constitute a declining proportion of 
total oil seeds. Since soybeans yield nearly twice as much oilseed per 
acre, the same or fewer acres again could produce a greater output. The 
1980 level of soybean exports could totall,l72 million bushels, as compared 
to 271 million bushels in 1966 and 252 million bushels per year in the period 
1960-65. 
Projected cottonlint production for 1980 could be within the constraints 
of the present cropland base, 140 percent of the 1957-59 annual output. 
The 9. 7 million acres in this use, producing 17.3 million bales, would be 
more productive as output shifts towards the higher yielding areas of the 
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Southwest and further technological improvement takes place. Also, 
an increase in irrigated acreage in the Southwest would add to produc-
tion. Under projected levels of domestic production and consumption, 
1980 exports of cottonlint could be at a level of 6. 8 million bales. 
The 1966 level was 4. 7 million while the 1960-65 average was 4.8 
million. Meshed with demand trends, 1980 tobacco production is 
projected at 117 percent of the 1957-59 annual average. With higher 
yields, the acreage required for this 1980 output is smaller than the 
1964-65 annual average. 
Livestock output 
Livestock production is projected to increase to meet levels of 
domestic demand consistent with population growth, changes in income 
elasticities of demand and increases in real income by 1980. Beef 
production, the main "growth product" of U.S. agriculture, is projected 
to increase to 182 percent of 1957-59 and 150 percent of 1966 annual 
levels. Pork production is projected to increase by a smaller porpor-
tion in 1980, or to only 120 percent of the 1957-59 average annual 
level. This lower trend is consistent with relative shifts in consumer 
demand, since production for both 1965 and 1966 was below the 1957-
59 annual level. 
Broiler production in 1980 is projected at 230 percent of the 1957-59 
average annual level. It is expected that competitive broiler prices 
and changing demand patterns will allow a continuation of past trends 
in per capita production and consumption of meat products. Turkey 
production in 1980 is projected to double over the 1957-59 average 
annual level. With per capita consumption of eggs and milk declining, 
output of both products is projected to grow at a slower rate than popu-
lation. 
Over-all, 1980 livestock production is projected to increase by 
44 percent over the 195 7-5 9 annual average. However, if demand for 
livestock products should increase at faster rates than projected on the 
basis of trends in population and per capita income, livestock output 
could be expanded easily. The level of feed grain projected would allow 
export of 70 million tons, while we exported only 29 and 21 million tons 
respectively in 1965 and 1966. We would expect market encouragement 
of lower grain prices, and thus greater livestock production, under the 
potential production of an efficient agriculture implying optimal inter-
regional allocations of crops. Even the grain production potential in 
the U.S. is still large enough to allow large increases in exports. 
Our projections have been for domestic consumption and production. 
Under the estimates provided above, full use of the current cropland 
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base would allow domestic demand to be met with exports in 1980 three 
times greater than in 1966 for wheat and feed grains, four times greater 
for soybeans and a third greater for cottonlint. Export demand, while 
increasing I has not grown at a rate which will absorb these levels of 
output by 1980 and maintain 1960-65 real prices of farm commodities. 
Hence, the projections pose the possibility of either {1) an increase 
in the rate of export growth if production potential on the current crop-
land base is to be absorbed without any serious decline in farm prices, 
(2) a continuation of supply control programs to restrain output and 
maintain price levels 1 or (3) freeing production potential on the current 
cropland base with trend level increases in exports unable to absorb 
the supply except with a sharp reduction in farm prices. 
Resource requirements 
With agricultural output increased to capacity levels on the current 
cropland base, and with the current structural transformation of agri-
culture continuing, large changes also would take place in the re-
sources used by 1980. Farm employment would continue to decline. 
Capital use, by contrast, would increase substantially. Projected 
1980 manhour requirements for agriculture, based on regression trends, 
are 31.0 percent below 1965 levels, or a decline from 8.0 billion 
in 19 65 to 5. 5 billion in 1980. The decline in manhours is associated 
with a 40 percent reduction in farm laborers, if recent mobility rates 
continue. (National and regional projections of manhour requirements 
are listed in table 3 • ) 
Capital values and use will rise substantially if output increases 
to capacity levels on the current cropland base by 1980. Greatest 
increases in values would be in land and building values. Machinery 
and equipment values also would rise substantially. As indicated in 
Table 4, total assets for land and building, machinery and equipment, 
and livestock inventories are conservatively projected to increase 187 
percent over the 1965 values. 
Consistency with other projections 
The projections presented above are based on a combination of 
regression models of yield trends and programming models of efficient 
production. They agree generally, if we consider differences in the 
proportion of acreage allocation to various crops, with projections by 
-84-
Table 3. Labor requirements by regions 1 actual 19 65 and projected 1980 
needs under a free market with maximum level of exports in 1980. 
Percent Change All All 
All Farmwork Farmworkl/ Livestock All Crops 
Region 1965-1980 1965 1980 1965 1980 1965 1980 
(percent) (million manhours) 
United States -31.0 71976 51501 31066 21210 31798 21654 
Northeast -35.2 627 406 314 202 226 157 
Lake States -27.6 849 615 452 320 284 230 
Corn Belt -32.6 11309 889 658 474 448 293 
N. Plains -25.4 630 470 290 225 240 180 
Appalachian -39.5 11157 700 341 226 658 394 
Southeast -36.6 801 508 219 169 484 289 
Delta States -48.8 594 304 179 135 340 139 
S. Plains -19.5 709 571 247 156 353 340 
Mountain -18.7 470 382 174 143 230 195 
Pacific -20.1 830 663 192 160 535 437 
1/ 
- All farmwork includes manhours used on crops 1 livestock and overhead. 
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Table 5. Farm output and related data I selected years and projections 
for 1980. 
Projected 
Avera,ges AQtJJa,l ]9~ Ill 1949-51 1959-61 1964 
(1957-59 = 100) 
Farm Output 87 105 112 160 
Crop Production 91 106 109 172 
Feed Grains 79 105 97 191 
Hay 88 101 105 129 
Food Grains 88 106 114 178 
Cotton 112 117 124 184 
Oil Crops 66 108 128 249 
Livestock Production 88 104 113 147 
Meat Animals 89 105 116 160 
Dairy Products 93 101 105 119 
Poultry Products 78 107 118 152 
Cropland used for crops 107 98 94 106 
Crop production per acreY 85 108 116 162 
Source: R. F. Daly and A. C. Egbert. Statistical Supplement to A Look Ahead 
for Food and Agriculture. Agricultural Economics Research. January I 
1966 • 
.!/Production with all diverted cropland planted to crops 1 use of added 
production not specified. 
Yrndex of crop production per acre is a ratio of total crop production to 
total land used for crops • 
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Daly and EgbertY and by Abel and Rojko.l/ The Daly-Egbert estimates 
based on a regression model of the U.S. agricultural economy are pre-
sented in Table 5. The results, assuming all diverted land in produc-
tion. by 1980 and without specifying the use of the added output, corre-
spond closely in total output with the estimates outlined above for 1980. 
The results from the Abel-Rojko study are, aside from a few differences 
in crops included, almost identical with our own. Our estimates show that 
feed grains and wheat might use 183 million acres of land and produce 311 
million tons of grain under a 1980 efficient agriculture. Their estimates 
are for 186 million acres of grain-- including rye, rice and buckwheat--
and production of 315 million tons of grain. However, compared to 
their 109.5 million tons, our projections indicate 123.8 million tons of 
grain available for export. The difference arises from assumptions in 
domestic rates of grain utilization relating to demand alternatives for live-
stock products, rates of livestock-feed conversion efficiencies and use of 
grain for industrial products, seed and other purposes. 
Given the consistency of these several sets of estimates for 1980, 
the capacity utilization of land resources in U.S. agriculture thus appears 
to provide a sub$tantial (and conservative) cushion on which output might 
be increased or enlarged exports of grain might be based. That the full 
potential production levels may not be needed through 1980 is a major 
inference which stems from these several sets of data. 
However, the three sets of recent projections are conservative es-
timates of potential U.S. grain production capacity because they do not 
include the acreage of land not now in crop production but which could 
be so diverted if the need arose. As summarized in Table 6, only about 
425 million acres, out of the 806 million acres in land classes one through 
four, have been devoted to crops. Of class-one land, only 27 million 
of 3 6 million acres have been in crop use. Expansion in output could be 
made on this land with only a modest investment. Upchurch estimates 
that 150 million additional acres from our total agricultural supply could 
be converted readily from other uses to crops at an investment of $30-50 
billion in irrigation, drainage, clearing and auxiliary investment.£ If 
Y Daly, R. F. and A. C. Egbert. Statistical Supplement to a look Ahead for 
Food and Agriculture. Agricultural Economics Research. January, 19 6 6. 
YAbel, MartinE. and Anthony S. Rojko. Economic Research Service. 
World Food Situation, Prospects for World Grain Production, Con-
sumption and Trade. Foreign Agricultural Economic Report No. 3 5. August, 
19 67. 
41 Upchurch, M. L. The Capacity of the U.S. to Supply Food. Center for 
Agricultural and Economic Development. Alternatives for Balancing World 
Food Production and Needs. Iowa State University Press. 19 67. pp. 215-223. 
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large-scale expansion of U.S. agricultural production were required, a 
larger proportion of the total 806 million acres of potential cropland could 
be brought under cultivation or more intensive production through appro-
priate investments in erosion control, drainage, irrigation and other land 
improvement measures. Some notion of the types of investments required 
is given in Table 7. Erosion possibilities are the greatest deterrant to 
use of more land for crops. Of the 806 million acres potentially available 
for crops, 52.2 percent has problems of erosion control. Of course, 
much of this is now in use, with or without proper soil conservation 
measures. Drainage problems are the major limitation restricting use on 
23.3 percent. Thus investments in these two programs alone, if expanded 
adequately, could affect over 75 percent of the total land available for 
crops. Additional land resources are available in the U.S. in the event 
that expansion in production were required and the return on the invest-
ment in land reclamation and improvement could be brought to an appro-
priate level. 
Given the previous projections from the 1965 land base and the po-
tential for increasing cropland by 50 percent, by improving land and 
shifting it from such uses as pasture and forestry, the total output of 
U.S. agriculture probably could be doubled in 25 years without any great 
increase in real supply price. And, if demand price were sufficiently 
high to draw forth the appropriate amounts of capital in fertilizer, irriga-
tion and other inputs, output of grain might be increased by 150 percent 
in the next quarter century. 
Policy Needs 
Our capacity will increase at a fast rate over the next decade or two, 
perhaps causing our projections to be surprisingly conservative by 1980. 
There are several "variables" which can, and undoubtedly will, cause 
the rate of productivity growth to increase beyond past trends. One is 
the capitalization of agriculture and an even greater reliance on industrial 
inputs from non-farm sources. These new technologies provide the agri-
business industry with a large input market, and thus a strong incentive 
in getting more of them used. They will continue or step up efforts in 
this direction accordingly. Another is the outflow of new technologies 
which is certain to be ahead as the nation's total scientific investment 
has direct and "spillover" effects on agriculture. The changing nature 
of fatm managers -- including their higher education levels and the 
thinning of their ranks down to the more capable ones, particularly with 
retirement of many from our older generation of farmers -- also will 
speed the process. Finally, our public educational services are gearing 
up to methods which should be more effective in communicating scientific 
knowledge more rapidly to an improved population of highly commercial 
managers. 
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The time has not yet arrived when our most urgent agricultural 
policy problem is one of "how to get more output." Nor does this 
appear to be a problem of the next decade. Instead, unless someone 
or some organization comes up with a "complete surprise" on how to 
organize and finance the supplying of food to meet the world problem 
of low nutrition, the problem will remain one of balancing production 
on that "fine line" separating (a) too much to satisfy U.S. farmers in 
prices received or U.S. taxpayers in storage costs, and (b) too little 
to meet unexpected large food emergencies growing out of widespread 
crop failure for two or more years. 
One danger is that those with only long-run vision will be carried 
away with the distant prospects for world food and will encourage us 
to spend too much too soon in expanding our agricultural plant. The 
producing capacity is there for a large scale expansion in output and 
exports, just as it is in countries such as Canada and Australia. But 
rather than overinvest in additional producing capacity in the short-
run, with the cause thus laid for increased farm program costs, we 
will realize a larger long-run return if we divert some of the invest-
ment increment to aid in population control and family planning through-
out the world. Our underdeveloped land can always be put into produc-
tion when it is needed and when world demand promises the payoff that 
merits the investment. The decision to help aid population control is 
not similarly a two-way road. No feasible method will exist for re-
turning from a doubled population in 35 years to one which would be 
possible if we implemented appropriate population planning and 
policy at the present. Thus our conclusions are: Adequate production 
capacity exists for the next decade, the greater short-run problem 
being one of how to manage it and the extreme long-run problem being 
one of how to attain effective population control and economic develop-
ment to allow more rapid increases in per capita income and raise the 
plane of nutrition and food demand. 
Policy Problems and Alternatives 
With large production capacity before us for the next decade or 
longer, and with no clear prospects that some "international buyer" is 
going to show up and tell us that he will "take off our hands" all the 
extra we can produce, policy will be a delicate problem for the next 
few years. We need to carry a stock which conforms with the inter-
national aid which has become rather institutionalized, either because 
other countries have incorporated it into their planning or have come to 
look upon it as their "right." We cannot release production capacity 
faster than demand increases from the export market and domestic con-
sumption, or we soon will, as this year has clearly shown, produce 
either heavily price-depressing or stock-accumulating quantities. 
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While the very long run may bring large increases in food demand from 
a growing world population 1 even if the birth rate is significantly slowed 
by effective family planning 1 the manifestation of this full demand is 
a long way in the future. It just isn't reasonable to pose this potential 
as the demand for the next year and get farm expectations 1 resources I 
and production geared to a market which isn't here yet. To a degree 1 
a population-food dilemma has existed over the last century I just as 
it probably will over the next one. In any case 1 overproducing in the 
U.S. or export food aid abroad (a) is not the answer to the world's pop-
ulation problem; (b) is not the long-run solution to the world's food 
problem; (c) may be largely inconsistent with development of food 
supplies elsewhere in the world; (d) is not an efficient way to meet our 
own farm policy problem; (e) is inverted relative to a sensible market-
oriented world food program 1 wherein our agriculture would res pond to 
world food needs and demand 1 rather than producing surplus stocks 
which the world would accept in response to our domestic farm problems; 
and (f) does not yet have the consent of our society to forever provide 
the large margin of food above misery and starvation 1 or for other na-
tions forever to accept it without sorrie reasonable fiscal and financial 
arrangements. 
For these and other reasons 1 we cannot expect the press of the 
world's population problem to erase problems of our food supply po-
tential for the next decade. Undoubtedly 1 this capacity is going to 
be large enough to create short-run price situations which are un-
pleasant or unacceptable to farmers in the absence of supply restraints. 
With this cc:pacity and environment 1 continuation of some type of 
program seems likely. Programs of recent years I especially feed 
grains I have been favorable 1 or even logical 1 in the sense that they 
(a) were voluntary and did not restrict the management freedom of 
those who wished not to participate 1 (b) did provide an important 
increment to income 1 and (c) at least largely offset technological 
advance I even if doing little actually to reduce output .Y 
Yet if the same programs are continued for another 10 years 1 their 
total costs will be large. As long as the public does not object I the 
same format could be used to help forestall further price and economic 
declines over the next decade. We cannot be certain 1 of course 1 
that the general public will view the next decade as it has the past. 
S/ For more details on needs and possibilities in adapting domestic 
and international food aid policies to each other 1 see Earl 0. Heady 
and John F. Timmons. Objectives 1 Achievements and Hazards of 
U.S. Food Aid and Agricultural Development Programs in Relation to 
Domestic Policy. Center for Agricultural and Economic Development. 
Alternatives for Balancing World Food Production and Needs. Iowa 
State University Press. 1967. pp. 186-223. 
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Farmer problems will be eased if the public does so 1 but the problems 
in our cities 1 in our educational system 1 and internationally are going 
to require very large outlays which may claim priority on public funds. 
Available resources to cope with our city 1 educational and basic 
international problems are urgent and cannot take second place if we 
are to have the type and conditions of society preferred in two decades. 
In the face of our existing capacity 1 can we continue present programs 
for another decade? Or can we find acceptable policy substitutes 
which accomplish the same ends but either require less public money 
or provide more basic solutions to our capacity problems in the next 
decade? Without such moves 1 it is quite certain that today' s capacity 
problem will still be with us in 10 years if we simply extend our pre-
sent programs into the indefinite future. 
Certainly we must have programs that are economically and polit-
ically acceptable to the farm and rural publics if such programs are 
to pass Congress. They cannot break sharply from current price and 
income levels of agriculture 1 because these now are too much "in-
stitutionalized" and their abandonment would bring rapid capital 
losses to the rural community 1 although this is typical for assets 
in towns even under present programs. 
We have commented elsewhere on program alternatives which would 
allow us to start from where we are and 1 gradually over a 1 0-year period 1 
progress to a position where we could maintain desireg levels of market 
prices 1 while bringing an end to large public outlays • .§! It would seem 
useful to start in such directions now. 
61 Heady 1 Earl 0. Food 1 Agriculture and Public Policy. Random House. 
New York. 1967. pp. 140-152. 

WORLD FOOD DEMAND--WHAT'S AHEAD FOR U.S. FOOD EXPORTS? 
Anthony S. Rojko* 
The future of U.S. exports of agricultural products, particularly 
grain, cannot be separated from the world food problem--one of the 
important issues facing man today. What is the world food problem? 
In a nutshell, it is that of keeping a delicate balance between food 
supplies and a level of consumption acceptable by society in each and 
every part of the world. Historically, because of vagary of weather, 
and lack of planning, adjustments of the imbalances have taken place, 
including the oldest kind of adjustment, famine. But, given the present 
state of technology and the values we attach to human life, such adjust-
ments are no longer tolerable even in the remotest part of the globe. 
Significantly, India's recent prolonged drought resulting in two succes-
sive small grain crops and reportedly the worst in a century, did not 
result in widespread famine, as many predicted. 
But this drought, along with large imports of grain by communist 
countries and reduction in U.S. grain stocks, helped bring the food 
problem to the fore even though the basic problems--population explo-
sion and lagging agricultural and economic development in the less 
developed world--had been with us for a while. More important, it 
brought about a shift in the agricultural policy goals as aptly expressed 
by Secretary Freeman: 11 For many years now I have been talking about 
the National Food Budget. This implies a careful advanced determina-
tion of what demand will be--how much must be provided for commercial 
use at home and abroad and how much must be produced for needy hungry 
people at home and overseas. 11 !I The legislative basis for this National 
Food Budget are the Food and Agricultural Act of 1965 and the Food for 
Freedom Act of 1966. Export programs under the latter are very different 
from those under the former Food for Peace Program, in operation for more 
than a decade. Under the earlier programs , food moving in aid programs 
had to be in surplus. Thus, it is important that we view prospects for 
our agricultural export market not only in relation to U.S. agricultural 
production and supplies but, also, in relation to the capabilities, needs 
and demands of the rest of the world. The emphasis in this paper is on 
the latter, including both the concessional and commercial market. 
*Foreign Regional Analysis Division, ERS. 
l/ Freeman, Orville L. A Natural Food Budget--Can We Make it Work? 
Address by Secretary of Agriculture to the 45th Annual National Agri-
cultural Outlook Conference. Washington, D.C. November 1967. 
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Our export market for farm products has grown. From a level of 
under a billion dollars in 1940 the value of our agricultural exports 
grew to $6.8 billion last year and will hold at about that level this 
year. Exports under various kinds of public assistance helped boost 
this total, especially beginning with the original P.L. 480 in 1954. 
However, in recent years the growth in exports has been in commer-
cial sales with concessional exports holding fairly constant at about 
$1. 6 billion annually. Feed grains and soybeans have been the main 
contributors to this growth and are expected to play an important role 
in the future growth of the commercial export market. 
Projections of world food needs and of the future of U.S. agri-
cultural exports are often too strongly influenced by most recent 
events. Two successive years of reduction in per capita food sup-
plies in the less developed countries, a rapid drawdown of world 
grain stocks, and greatly expanding imports of grain by India, the 
USSR, and China saw the return of Malthusian thought to give a 
pessimistic glow to long-term prospects a year ago. This situation 
was taken by many as evidence that the world food situation was 
deteriorating and raised the question whether there would be sufficient 
food in the future to supply the rapidly expanding world population at 
acceptable levels of nutrition. Since grains play such an important 
role in the world food situation, a wave of optimism prevailed con-
cerning future exports of U. S. grain. And this optimism followed the 
burdensome world grain surpluses of the late 1950's and early 1960's. 
The current situation looks somewhat different. Record grain 
crops were produced in the USSR, Canada, and Australia in the 1966-
6 7 crop year. Prospects are good for an output of 95 million tons of 
grain in India in 1967-68 compared to 72 and 76 million in the previous 
two years. Crop prospects also have improved in 1967 for Pakistan 
and. West Asia.. In Western Europe and Latin America, grain produc-
tion established a record. South Africa also had a record corn grain 
crop in the spring of 1967. Grain production in the USSR for 1967 
fell short of the exceptionally large 1966 harvest but will be more 
than adequate to cover domestic needs and some exports. The record 
U. S. grain crop in 1967 also contributed to the record world total. 
This rapidly changing world food situation clearly demonstrates 
the risk of projecting solely on most recent events. Projections must 
recognize that the world food situation is dynamic. Population has 
been continuously changing. So too has the cultivated area. Crop 
and livestock yields have gone up and in some areas of the world 
have increased sharply in recent years. Changes among countries 
in agricultural production, economic growth, and trade in agricultural 
products have been marked. 
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It is not change per se that create's problems. Rather, problems 
are created when the rates of change among several factors get out of 
balance. The world is changing faster today than at any previous time. 
As the rate of change accelerates it becomes increasingly difficult to 
maintain the desired balances among many variables. 
World Food Prospects 
Two recent studies published by the United States Government 
present a fairly comprehensive outlook on the world food situation. 
Though conducted independently, the conclusions in both studies point 
in the same direction. The first is the report of the President• s Science 
Advisory Committee (PSAC)Y, directed toward an assessment of what 
is required to solve the world food problem. It makes policy recom-
mendations for action by both the developed and less developed nations. 
The second, "World Food Situation, "V was by the Economic Research 
Sezvice of the Department of Agriculture. It makes no policy recom-
mendations but analyzes world grain trends, probabilities, and poten-
tial needs that are of primary importance to decisions regarding food 
aid, economic assistance, commercial assistance and domestic farm 
programs. 
The PSAC report views the world food problem as awesome but 
indicates that it can be solved. However, solutions will not come 
easily. 
It concludes that "gigantic efforts will be necessary in the 
developing countries to attain the desired food and income levels," 
and then it warns that "the developed WOrld 1 in tum, Will have tO 
as~ist in the next 20 years with the provision of a high level of economic 
and food assistance and private capital and, perhaps even more impor-
tant, with the creation of an environment more favorable to the growth 
of developing countries• exports." It emphasizes that food aid should 
be "conditioned on implementation of self-help requirements" and 
that it should be "administered to provide maximum incentive to the 
developing countries to increase production by investing in their own 
agriculture. " 
y The World Food Problem. A Report of the President• s Science Advisory 
Committee. Report of the Panel on the World Food Supply, Vol. I 
and II. The White House. May 1967. 
y Abel, Martin E. and Anthony S. Rojko. World Food Situation. 
Prospects for World Grain Production, Consumption, and Trade. 
Foreign Agricultural Economic Report No. 3 5. U. S. Department 
of Agriculture. September 1967. 
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While food aid will be needed for ·years to speed total economic 
growth, the report says, "expansion of concessional sales over an 
indefinite period is not in the best interest of either donor or recipient 
nations ••• recipient nations may use such imports as a crutch to 
avoid the consequence of unchecked population growth, an unproductive 
agriculture, and irresponsibility in accelerating domestic economic 
growth." The report is an eloquent, persuasive appeal for more tech-
nical and capital help for poor nations, and for encouraging and 
facilitating their economic development. 
The second report, the USDA report on the "World Food Situation" 
considers prospects for world grain production and use. Measuring 
world food needs and potential supplies for both food and feed grains, 
it looks to 1970 and then considers prospects that would be likely to 
prevail up to 1980 for four different assumptions of rate of growth in 
developing nations. (Tables 1 and 2). The report deals only with 
grains but most of man• s food comes directly or indirectly from grains, 
thus trends in grain production and consumption are a good indication 
of trends in the world food situation. 
The study does not project what the actual production will be 
in 1980: rather it shows the productive capacity that will be available 
in the developed world. In this way, it is possible to examine the 
surpluses or deficits that would result from each of the alternative 
assumptions and to evaluate needed adjustments in production, con-
sumption, and trade. Whether there is an actual surplus of grain 
depends upon how much of the capacity in the developed world is 
used, which in turn depends on many factors, especially government 
policies. 
The study bases its projections of the world grain supply to 1980 
on ·four different sets of assumptions, all geared to increases in eco-
nomic development and related increases in grain production in the 
less-developed countries. A key to these alternatives is that the pro-
jections relate demand to levels of economic development. In other 
words, the higher the income the greater the demand for food. The 
"effective demand" analyzed in the study includes commercial demand 
and the amount of food aid consistent with the economic progress of 
the developing countries. 
The alternative projections for the less-developed world are 
based on recent historical trends, some adjustment of trends, moderate 
improvement, and rapid improvement above these historical trends. 
For the developed world only one set of projections is used. This is 
based on the most likely rate of growth in grain production capacity 
and consumption, assuming world market prices remain at about the 
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average levels of the past three years and that excess production over 
consumption at these prices would be withheld from markets in the form 
of either idled production capacity or increased grain stocks. For the 
United States available grain acreages are assumed to be 186 million 
acres in 1980 (compared with about 165 million acres harvested in 1967 
and 184 million in 1958-60). 
The study concludes that the world will have sufficient over-all 
productive capacity to meet rising food needs, but adequate distribution 
will determine if the hungry nations are well fed. The study further 
indicates that growth in production capacity will continue in the devel-
oped world and will be more than ample to meet the rising import needs 
of the less-developed world. This is expected to hold true even if 
production trends in the less-developed world do not exceed the rates 
of the recent past. 
The developing nations as a group will probably be short of food 
needed to meet minimum nutritional standards. But assuming some 
continued gain in their production, combined world output of grains can 
provide for some continued improvement in their diets. 
If the less-developed countries increase their levels of agri-
cultural productivity to 4 percent annually--a rate achieved by only 
a few countries in the past--they could achieve a high enough rate of 
economic growth to reach desirable minimum caloric levels for their 
people by 1980 and break their dependence on food aid. This would 
require unprecedented increases in resource commitments to agricul-
tural development. It would require massive efforts by many developing 
nations and considerable assistance from developed countries. 
. Thus, food aid probably will continue to be needed at least 
through 1980. The dependence of the less-developed nations on food 
aid, however, should diminish as they accelerate agricultural develop-
ment and economic growth to a level where they can produce or com-
mercially import food requirements. 
What then is the major conclusion with respect to the world food 
problem? 
It is that the world food problem is basically one of disparity 
of food production and food availability between the developed and 
developing nations. It is inseparable from the problem of the develop-
ment gap between rich and poor nations. The less developed countries 
of the world will have to achieve a better rate of growth in food produc-
tion. They need to do this in order to avoid a growing dependence 
upon external food supplies and all the problems of distribution, both 
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between developed and less developed countries and within the less 
developed countries, that growing grain import requirements imply. 
They need to do this in order to provide significantly better diets for 
their people. Most of all, they need to do this in order to achieve 
a much better rate of total economic development. 
Another implication is that the rate at which grain production 
capacity in the developed countries increases will be largely indepen-
dent of the rate at which production grows in the less developed 
countries. The rate of improvement in agricultural production in 
Eastern Europe, the USSR, and free-world developed importing 
countries--particularly the countries of Western Europe which have 
highly protective agricultural policies--probably will not be influenced 
very much by what happens to food production in the developing 
world. Continued increase in the capacity of developed countries to 
produce food is an important element in the total world food picture. 
Import Demand for Food in Developing Countries 
Much of the optimism concerning grain exports has been 
generated from the situation in the less developing areas. In terms 
of meeting acceptable dietary levels from current production levels 
in the less developed countries, the export market to these countries 
seems unlimited. However, a major deterrent is buying power. In 
addition, the amount of food that can move in aid programs is limited 
by several very practical factors. These include the ability of the 
developing nations to handle food--dock, storage, and distribution 
facilities. This also includes the amount that can be absorbed 
without complete disruption of their own agricultural development. 
It is not that total food production has failed to increase 
significantly in the less developed countries. In fact, the annual 
growth in both the developed and less developed countries has been 
between 2 1/2 and 3 percent. However, because of the rapid 
population growth, per capita food production in the less developed 
countries has shown very little, if any, progress. Between 1956 
and 1964 there was some uptrend in food production per capita in 
the LDC' s. But the per capita index fell in 1965 and again in 
1966, largely because of the drought and resulting lower production 
in India. In 1967 the per capita index is apparently back to the 
19 64 level or slightly above. 
But demand has been rising faster than production. Almost 
without exception, the less developed countries have embarked on 
a program of economic development. These have had varied success, 
-103-
but in general they have brought about some improvement in per capita 
income: 1 to 2 percent annually. With rising incomes, people demand 
more food. They also desire high quality foods which require more 
agricultural resources for their production. This increase in demand 
has been met to a large extent by imports of grain. 
A continuation of past growth rates for food production and 
consumption in the less-developed, grain-importing countries would 
result in their having grain import requirements by 1980 of nearly 60 
million metric tons, more than double their 1964-65 imports. Although 
food imports of this magnitude could be met through expanded produc-
tion in the developed countries, ways to finance them would have to 
be found. 
Thus, it would appear that reducing the rate of growth in 
population, expanding food production and developing the economic 
capacity to purchase needed food supplies are all essential ingredients 
to solving the food problem in the less developed world. 
Scientists are generating the technologies required to slow the 
rate of population growth and bring about more rapid agricultural 
development in the less developed countries. Progress has been 
made in the development of effective, inexpensive4 and acceptable 
methods of population control. Donald J. Bogue, Y Director, Com-
munity and Family Study Center, University of Chicago, stated last 
year that the trend of world-wide movement toward fertility control has 
already reached a state where declines in death rates are being 
surpassed by declines in birth rates in some countries. The world 
has entered a situation where the pace of population growth has 
begun to slacken. He says that the rate of growth will slacken at 
su.ch a pace that it will be zero or near zero by about the year 2000. 
By then population growth may not be regarded as a major social 
problem, except in isolated and small 11 retarded 11 areas. Few demo-
graphers agree with Dr. Bogue but most now feel that mankind will 
limit population growth in preference to mass starvation. 
The projections of world population in the USDA study assume 
there will be greater efforts in family planning, but that these efforts 
will not affect growth rates much in the next 15 years. Thus, the 
population projections used in that study do not attempt to minimize 
the impact of population growth on the demand for food. 
1/ Bogue, Donald J. The Prospects for World Population Control in 
Alternatives for Balancing World Food Production Needs. Iowa State 
University Center for Agricultural and Economic Development. 1967. 
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Food production has expanded in the less developed countries 
and developments in this direction have been encouraging. Such 
things as incentives, fertilizer, improved grain varieties such as 
Mexican wheat varieties, and rice varieties developed at the Inter-
national Rice Research Institute in the Philippines, have become 
common topics for discussion by both farm and non-farm people in 
a growing number of less developed countries. Their impact on 
food production is becoming increasingly convincing. Also, an in-
creasing number of less developed countries are demonstrating the 
political will required to achieve accelerated agricultural develop-
ment, which can contribute to over-all economic growth and in-
creased standards of living in these countries. As agriculture 
develops the economic capacity of nonfarm people to purchase 
needed food supplies also increases. 
The USDA study shows that the impact of substantial progress 
in agricultural and total economic development would mean a reduc-
tion in total import requirements. However, these lower require-
ments would result in a "better mix" between food aid and commercial 
imports. This would be a reversal of the trend established in the 
1960's. In fact, it is difficult to assess what the real import demand 
for grains, particularly feed grains, would be if some of the live-
stock enterprises such as poultry really took hold in some of the 
rapidly developing economies. 
Not all of the imports to the less developed countries are 
under a food aid program as a significant portion is already on a 
commercial basis. For example, about 45 percent of the grain imports 
in 1964-65 in the grain importing less developed countries was com-
mercial. Considerable coarse grains are shipped to Latin America on 
a commercial basis. The Philippines have been a growing commercial 
market for wheat. Taiwan, which has received significant shipments 
of P.L. 480 wheat, has been shifting her wheat import requirements 
to the commercial market. Brazil has also been increasing her 
imports of wheat while exporting corn. Most of the cash wheat has 
been from Argentina although U.S. sent 0. 6 million tons on a com-
mercial basis (including barter} in 1965-66. 
Import Demand in Developed Countries 
We assume that most of the trade in the commercial market 
will continue to be between the developed nations. High levels of 
economic activity will foster this trade despite the presence of trade 
barriers. Population growth rates in the developed countries, which 
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are commercial markets for our grains, have been a little in excess of 
one percent. However, these countries have been enjoying a very 
high rate of economic growth and rising incomes in the past decade. 
Per capita gross national product in Japan has been rising at the 
astonishing annual rate of 8 percent in the past decade • .§/ We expect 
it to continue to rise at a lower but still substantial rate of 6 per-
cent over the next decade. Per capita incomes in Western Europe 
have also been rising significantly and on the basis of several supply 
and demand studies completed for the U.S. Department of Agriculture, 
they are expected to rise at an annual rate of over 3 percent during 
the next decade. Y 1 J./1 !V 1 .V 1 .!.Q/ 
Rising incomes have promoted and will continue to promote a 
shift in demand to livestock products. The shift to a livestock 
economy requires more land resources. Many of these nations, 
particularly Japan, do not have the land resources to meet both the 
growing demand for meat and livestock products and the demand for 
food crops. The policy of these nations has been to develop a live-
stock economy based on feed imports rather than import the live-
stock products. Expansion in the livestock economy has increased 
import requirements for feedgrains and oilcake and this growth is 
expected to continue for the rest of the decade • 
.§/ Japanese Import Requirement: Projections of Agricultural Supply 
and Demand for 1965, 1970 and 1975, Institute of Agriculture 
Economic Research. University of Tokyo, Japan. March 1964. 
§/ Long-Term Development of Demand and Supply for Agricultural 
Products in the Federal Republic of Germany, Institut fur 
Wirtschaftsforschung, Munich, Germany. 19 68. 
Zf Long-Term Development of Supply and Demand for Agricultural 
Products in Belgium, 1970-1975. Studiecentrum voor Economisch 
en Sociaal Onderzoek, Antiverp, Belgium. 19 6 8. 
§I Production and Uses of Selected Farm Products in France: Pro-
jection to 1970 and 1975. Centre de Recherches et de Documen-
tation sur la Consommation, Paris, France. 1967. 
W Supply and Demand, Imports and Exports of Agricultural Products 
in the Netherlands, Forecast for 1970 and 1975. Landbouw -
Economisch Institut, The Hague, Netherlands. 1968. 
10/ Tsu, Sheldon and Ernest Koenig. Italian Agriculture: Projections 
of Supply and Demand in 1965, 1970 and 1975. ERS-Foreign 68, 
Economic Research Service, U.S. Department of Agriculture. 
1964. 
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Markets for wheat and U.S. exports 
The major commercial markets for wheat at present are Western 
Europe and Japan; the developing countries are becoming increasingly 
important. 
Imports of wheat by Western Europe probably will continue to 
decline as a result of the tendency toward self-sufficiency and par-
ticularly the rapid growth in wheat production in France. However, 
U.S. exports have held up remarkably well as the need for high 
quality wheat continues strong. Although Europe has developed some 
hard varieties, they are not expected to replace the market for North 
American hard and durum wheats. 
A major area for expansion of commercial wheat trade will be 
Japan--where per capita consumption of wheat is expected to in-
crease. Domestic production in Japan is expected to decline. 
Japan's wheat imports increased from 2. 4 million to 3. 6 million tons 
during the last 10 years and this growth is expected to continue. 
In 1960-61, the U.S. shipped less than one million tons to 
Japan but this increased to 2.1 million in 1966-67. This is a growing 
market in a country where rice was the traditional food. The value 
of rice being at about twice the value of wheat is helping the shift 
to wheat. But the shift is also coming from the desire to diversify 
and improve diets as tastes and preferences change with rising 
incomes. 
The experience in Japan may provide clues to prospects in 
developing countries where rice is the main food. Wheat is 
expected to become an important item in the diets in such countries 
as· their economies develop. For example, as indicated earlier, 
Taiwan and the Philippines are growing commercial markets for wheat. 
The communist countries represent another major wheat market, 
a market in which the United States has played only a minor role. 
China became a net grain importer in 1961 and has imported around 
5 million tons annually. Large imports of wheat by Communist 
China probably will continue. There is no evidence that China 
has cured its production ills and recent contracts suggest that the 
sizable purchases of recent years will be continued. The USSR also 
imported substantial quantities of wheat in the mid-1960' s--12 
million tons in 1963 and 9 million in 1965. But there is evidence of 
an improvement in the factors affecting production in the Soviet Union. 
This was partly reflected in the bumper grain crop harvested in 1966 
and a good crop in 1967. If the emphasis on agriculture continues 
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as it has in the past two years I the USSR would be a net exporter of 
grain. However 1 following two good years I there is some evidence 
of a "food" vs. "steel" debate which in the past has favored "steel." 
For the USSR to be an exporter would require continued emphasis on 
agricultural inputs • 
We expect that East European countries probably will acquire 
most of their wheat imports from the USSR. With the Soviet Union out 
as a market for wheat, there are immediate implications for wheat 
exporters. 
A year and a half ago, we projected U.s. exports of wheat 
at 24 million metric tons by 1970 ll/. This projection is still within 
the range of possibility. Because this projection includes sizeable 
exports under P.L. 480, the actual level will depend on the level of 
exports under the Food for Freedom program. In any given year, this 
may be conditioned by special needs such as the large amounts sent 
to India during two successive drought years. 
Markets for feed grains and U.S • exports 
The major market for coarse grains will continue to depend on 
the growth in demand for meat in the principal markets of Western 
Europe and Japan. li/, W~ W~ 1§/ 
The U.K. now has a per capita meat consumption of 140 pounds, 
which is up 10 percent from the late 1950's. In West Germany the 
figure is 120 pounds, up 16 percent. In the Netherlands, it's 108 
pounds, up 15 percent. In Spain, it's in the 50-pound range, but 
even this is a gain of more than 3 5 percent. In Italy, it's 82 pounds, 
up 56 percent. 
!.!/ West, Quentin M. Foreign Supply and Demand Projections: 
Outlook for U. S. Agricultural Exports. Paper presented at 
Annual Meeting of American Farm Economics Association, Col-
lege Park, Maryland. August 1966. 
ll/ EEC Commission Comparison Between the Current Production 
and Consumption Trends and Those Planned in the Prospective 
Studies for 1970, 1. Dairy Products, 2. Beef, 3. Grains. 
General Agriculture Office, EEC. June 19 6 6 • 
.u/ Regier, Donald W. Growth in Demand for Feed Grains in the 
EEC, Projection to 1970 and 1975 in Relation to Consumption 
of Meat and Livestock Products. ERS-Foreign 158. July 1967. 
11/ Sorenson, V. and D. Hathaway. Changes in the Grain-Live-
stock Economy of the EEC and Their Effects on Foreign Trade 
Patterns. Preliminary Report. Michigan State University. 1967. 
!..§/ Loc. cit. (5). 
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In Japan, per capita meat consumption of only about 15 pounds, 
although relatively low, is significant because it is twice what it 
was in the late 1950's and with much room for expansion. 
In short, wherever you have an industrialized country that is 
moving ahead economically and where there is a strong upward 
trend in meat consumption, there you have a strong potential mar-
ket for the things that make meat--namely, feed grains and protein 
supplements. 
In addition, rapidly changing feeding practices will likely 
cause some further expansion in feed grain consumption per head 
of livestock. There is evidence that grain is replacing potatoes in 
livestock rations in Northern European countries.!..§! Large scale 
broiler production in many West European countries as well as Japan 
is expanding rapidly. Hog production in these areas is also moving 
into intensive feeding enterprises. 
The United States is expected to continue to be the dominant 
supplier of coarse grains in world trade, with Argentina a distant 
second and, as indicated in the next section, with increasing com-
petitors from new suppliers. A year and a half ago U.S. exports of 
feed grains were projected to around 2 9 million metric tons in 1970, 
only 15 percent above the record level of 2 5. 5 million tons achieved 
in 1965-66 • .!1/ The record level was the simultaneous result of a 
continuous strong demand in Europe and Japan, a relatively lower 
grain crop in Europe and relatively lower exports from South Africa 
and Argentina, substantial exporters of grain to Europe. In addition, 
U.S. programed substantial grain sorghum for food under P. L. 480 
to the less developed world. 
While this 1970 projection appeared conservative in relation 
to 1965-66 exports, it may be overly optimistic in relation to the 
estimated 21.7 metric tons in 1966-67 and a forecast of close to 
the same level in 1967-68. These current levels result from 
substantial increases in Argentina's corn crop in the last two years, 
the doubling of the corn crop last spring in South Africa, the 
record grain crop this year in Western Europe and significant in-
creases in corn production in Thailand. To achieve 2 9 million 
metric tons in 1970-71 would require very substantial increases 
in each of the three years from the expected 1967-68 levels. The 
increase in feed grains in 1965-66 from 20 million metric tons in 
1964-65 was 6 million tons. 
!..§/ Loc. cit. (6). 
!1/ Loc. cit. West (11) 
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A critical factor in the expected rise in feed grains over the next 
few years will be the import demand in Western Europe 1 especially EEC. 
Several studies published recently indicate net imports of total grains 
into the EEC of around 11 to 12 million metric tons • .!.§/ 1 W 1 .fQ/ 1 l!/ 
These studies assumed some exports of wheat by France; thus, gross 
imports of coarse grains would be somewhat higher. The EEC studies 
indicate strong pressures for increasing wheat exports from EEC while 
at the same time increasing feed grain imports. One studyW sug-
gests that, while EEC will have a net deficit of around 23 million 
metric tons of feed grains in 1970, there would be a wheat surplus 
of 12 million tons above the food demand for wheat. In the face of 
the probable world wheat price and supply level over the next few 
years, it would be difficult to export this much wheat. Thus , either 
production of wheat would have to be reduced or more wheat fed 
directly to livestock, thereby reducing the imporf:_r~quirement for feed 
grains. The recent changes in EEC price policy& will probably 
encourage more feed grain production within the EEC, making it more 
difficult to increase U.S. shipments of feed grains to the EEC. The 
new feed grain prices agreed to by the Council to take effect on or 
before September 1, 19 68 will give EEC grain producers a greater in-
centive for expanding feed grain production rather than wheat. More-
over, livestock producers will have more incentive for using wheat in 
their feeding programs. Increased feed grain prices will also increase 
levies on feed grain imports and will tend to push the retail price of 
meats, milk and eggs to high levels and so act to restrict consumption. 
In contrast to wheat, the bulk of the coarse grain exports are 
utilized as feed. However, in the past several years, the use of 
coarse grains as food under P.L. 480 has assumed significant propor-
tions. In fiscal year 1966, 2. 3 million metric tons and again close to 
4 million metric tons in fiscal 1967 were shipped under P.L. 480 pro-
grams. Most of this went to meet food needs in India when food grain 
stocks were being rapidly drawn down. In addition, the introduction 
of ASP mixture, which consist of 5 percent nonfat dry milk, 25 percent 
soy flour and 70 percent gelatinized corn meal, should continue to 
have a significant part in overseas donation programs. One advantage 
in using coarse grains in a food aid program is the lower cost for the 
same amount of available nutrients. 
!.§/ Loc. cit. (12). 
11/ Loc. cit. Regier (13) • 
W Loc. cit. Sorenson (14). 
ll/ Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations. Agri-
cultural Commodities -Projections for 1975 and 1985. Rome. 1967. 
W Loc. cit. Sorenson (14). 
W The EEC rece.ntly announced increases in EEC feed grain prices, 
both absolute and relative to wheat. 
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To the extent that more com and grain sorghum may be exported 
under P.L. 480, there will be a plus factor in increasing U.s. exports 
of coarse grains. However, programing more coarse grain as food 
would require less wheat, since com and grain sorghum may be 
substituted for wheat to a certain extent. Because of these sub-
stitution possibilities the exact mix of grain will depend on relative 
prices, supplies and policies of the U.S. and other governments. 
Production and Trade in Other Exporting Countries 
Recent increases in world wheat production to record levels of 
2 8 0 million metric tons in 19 6 6 and estimated 2 7 7 million for 19 6 7 
are the result of both increased acreage and rising yields. Wheat 
production in Canada, Argentina and Australia has increased sharply 
during the last ten years. In 1966 Canada achieved a record harvest 
of 2 3 million metric tons, which was 15 percent above the previous 
record in 1963. Because of poor weather, production in 1967 is 
estimated at 16 million tons. Australia also had a record crop of 
12. 6 million metric tons last year. Early forecasts of the current 
harvest in Australia, which has just begun, indicate production 
between 7 and 8 million metric tons. The wheat crop now being 
harvested in Argentina is currently estimated by the USDA at 7. 8 
million metric tons. Though not a record, this level has been 
exceeded in only two of the last ten years. 
An increase in land inputs has been the major factor respon-
sible for the rising wheat output in these three countries. The 
area seeded to wheat in Canada has expanded by a third in 10 years, 
reaching 12.2 million hectares in 1967. Australia's wheat area has 
more than doubled during the past ten years, reaching an all-time 
high of 9 million hectares in 196 7. Acreage sown in wheat in 
Argentina has also expanded and is currently about 20 percent above 
the 1955-59 average. 
Part of the increases in wheat production in these countries 
is also due to moderately rising wheat yields. The increase in 
Canada can be attributed in part to a rapid increase in the applica-
tion of fertilizers in the prairie provinces • Use of fertilizer quad-
rupled from 1957 to 1966. In Australia, fertilizer applications of 
superphosphate on wheat lands has doubled since 1957-58. How-
ever, gains in yield from increased use of fertilizer appear to have 
been offset by losses in yield resulting from expansion into less 
productive lands. On the other hand in Argentina, although the use 
of improved varieties has spread, the use of fertilizer is still 
negligible. 
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The rapid increase in wheat production in Canada, Australia 
and Argentina has been in response to price incentives. In Canada, 
higher levels of realized wheat prices received by farmers in the 
five years following 19 59 have been a definite factor in the expan-
sion of wheat acreage. In Argentina, continuous inflation and 
frequent devaluation of the peso complicate an appraisal of the 
effects of prices on farmer decisions, but there is evidence that 
Argentine farmers respond to sharp price changes. Price incentives, 
particularly government price supports, seem to have been the main 
factors affecting changes in the area seeded to grains. In 
Australia the greater profitability of wheat production compared to 
the other production alternatives, principally sheep, has been an 
important factor contributing to the upward trend in the wheat area. 
As much of the rapid increase in wheat production in Canada, 
Australia and Argentina has been in response to the increase in 
exports to USSR and Communist China, these countries may follow 
several alternative routes in compensating for the loss of the USSR 
market. In fiscal years 1964 and 1966, two years in which Canadian 
exports of wheat reached record levels of about 15 million metric 
tons, Canada exported over 5 million to the USSR. The loss of the 
USSR market would mean reducing the export market by approxi-
mately one-third. If we exclude exports to the USSR, Canadian 
exports would have remained around 10 million metric tons. To com-
pensate for the loss of the USSR market, Canada would have to take 
a more active part. in some food aid program for the less developed 
world. Implicit also is that there will be an adjustment in area and 
production of wheat. Also likely is that Canada might just compete 
more for existing markets. 
Similar situations will also prevail for the other exporters. It 
will be difficult for Argentina to compensate for the loss of the USSR 
market for wheat, an increase in self-sufficiency in Western Europe, 
and increased competition from Australia and Canada for the market 
in Communist Asia. It is assumed that some of the reduced acreage 
in wheat would be shifted to coarse grains or used directly for 
grazing livestock. We expect that Australia will continue to be the 
major supplier to Communist China but with increasing competition 
from other suppliers • 
If the exporting countries are slow in adjusting to the lower 
level of commercial demand, this could easily result in a sharp build-
up in stocks along with a general downward pressure on prices. It 
is possible that accumulating stocks at depressed prices would pro-
vide the incentive for eventual adjustment in production. 
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The substantial growth in import demand for feed grains in 
recent years has generated increased output of traditional exporters 
and has opened new sources of exportable supplies. Argentina, 
the second largest exporter of grains, will continue to be our main 
competitor in Western Europe. Argentina's strong competitive 
position in the world market reflects its ability to produce a high 
quality product at relatively low cost. Argentina can easily main-
tain a high level of exports as there is considerable room for in-
crease in output from improvement in yields of com and sorghum 
without significant increases in area. Another important supplier 
of com to Western Europe is South Africa and is expected to have 
increased export availabilities of com in the future. South Africa 
also ships significant amounts to Japan. 
Japan, the other major growth market for feed grains, has 
been developing new sources of grain supplies. Apparently the 
strategy has been to diversify the sources of feed grain supplies 
while at the same time encouraging imports of agricultural com-
modities from countries which may be markets for Japan's industrial 
products. These efforts are being directed toward East Africa for 
com under bilateral arrangements. Considerable effort is also being 
spent in Cambodia and Indonesia. For example, a joint Japanese-
Cambodia enterprise is getting underway with expectations to produce 
360,000 tons of com in Cambodia for export to Japan by 1969. 
Previous similar efforts in Thailand made that country an important 
competitor of the United States in the Japanese market. Thailand 
exported about one million tons of feed grains to Japan in 1966-67. 
Increased competition in this market can also be expected from 
Australia. A joint venture of Australian Fertilizer Ltd. and Mitsui 
of Japan is aimed at shipping one million long tons of grain sorghum 
to Japan annually. Projections of U.s. exports of feed grains must 
take into account the importance of these developments. 
Some Concluding Remarks 
The discussion in this paper suggests several important 
implications for future U.S. exports of grain. It suggests that there 
will be a substantial increase in demand for grain in the importing 
countries as incomes and affluency continue to rise. But the analysis 
also shows that the capacity and willingness to produce exceeds the 
import demand at prevailing prices. This excess capacity will con-
tinue to exert downward pressure on prices, making it difficult to 
maintain stable world grain prices. Thus, the United States should 
be vitally concerned as to the consequences of the alternative paths 
that might be taken in balancing future world grain supplies in line 
with effective world demand. 
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The level of U. S. exports of grain will depend greatly on the 
alternative path taken. An important consideration is whether the 
United States is the only nation pursuing supply management programs 
or whether this function is distributed more broadly. It is evident 
that a high level of international cooperation will be needed to 
achieve equitable sharing of both the responsibilities and gains to 
be expected not only from the commercial market, but also in 
assuring effective growth in the developing countries. 
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CONSIDERATIONS FOR A GRAIN RESERVE POLICY 
Vernon R. McMinimy and Francis A. Kutish* 
Much of the recent concern regarding adequate reserve levels has 
centered on wheat and feed grains. Reserves of these commodities, on 
the basis of percentage of utilization, are down significantly from 
recent years and are at levels equivalent to those held in 1952. 
The Unanswered Question 
Recently, considerable attention has been focused on the level of 
reserves that should be maintained. During the late 1950's, many 
thought the nation had accumulated excessive and burdensome reserves 
of grain. But during the past year of two, some have expressed concern 
that our reserves of grain might be ipadequate. 
Where do we stand now on our reserves (also commonly referred to 
as stocks or carryover)? What size reserves should we hold? 
The following table shows the level of reserves we expect to have 
on hand at the beginning of the 1967-68 marketing year as well as the 
reserves we have held in previous years. These reserves are expressed 
both in terms of physical quantities and as a percentage of utilization. 
These figures indicate where we are at present on reserves held, 
but the question remains, what level of reserves should we carry? 
Theoretically, the grain reserve that had best be carried in the 
United States should be decided on the basis of a study of weather vari-
ability from one year to the next, and its interrelationship with variability 
in demand -- coupled with the degree of price variability the nation is 
willing to experience. 
The history of the past several decades, however, indicates that 
the size of grain stocks in the United States in fact has been a result 
of decisions made primarily with other objectives in mind. In most 
cases, stocks were accumulated as by-products of public activities 
designed to assist farmers by raising prices. 
* Staff Economists, U.S. Department of Agriculture. Views expressed 
are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent those of the 
Department. 
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Federal Farm Board 
The first active public step in this direction of stabilization was 
taken in 19 29 when the Government established the Federal Farm Board. 
Loans were made to cooperatives for merchandizing programs in which 
commodities were withheld from the market to facilitate "orderly market-
ing." 
However, in 1932 the depression proved too much of a strain and 
the Farm Board died. 
The next move by Congress was to establish in the 1930's the 
Agricultural Adjustment Administration, through which the Government 
undertook to control farm production and make price support loans. In 
response, the ever-normal granary was launched, with a comparison to 
the biblical parable of storing during the seven years of plenty for the 
years of lean. 
The efforts at control were not very successful and Government stocks 
began to accumulate. Then World War II broke out and provided new de-
mands for farm production. The war, followed by early postwar reconstruc-
tion in Europe, provided enough demand to absorb all farm production as 
well as the stocks which had accumulated during the 1930 1 s. 
With the end of the postwar reconstruction era in the late 1940 1 s, 
surplus grain stocks in governmental hands again began to mount. Na-
tional farm output once again expanded faster than the market could ab-
sorb at prevailing prices, and carryover stocks grew. 
The Korean Conflict provided brief relief, but by 1953 the expan-
sion of surplus farm stocks again was on its way. The mounting surplus 
stocks caused Congress to pass the Soil Bank Act in 1956. But it did 
not prove very effective in restraining output and the program was largely 
abandoned in 19 59. 
By 1961, feed grain carryover stocks had built up to nearly 85 million 
tons and wheat stocks to over 1. 4 billion bushels. It became apparent 
that something had to be done. It was costing the Department of Agriculture 
over a million dollars a day just to store and maintain the surplus stocks. 
Controlled grain production 
So, the Government 1 s farm policy again became one of attempting 
to control grain production. At this time, the Congress directed the 
Department of Agriculture to reduce its holdings of commodities. About 
60 million acres of land were idled under farm programs during the early 
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1960's. Under these programs, the idea was to restrain farm production 
to below what was used. Then the difference between the reduced pro-
duction and the larger use would be made up by taking some of the grain 
and other farm products out of the surplus stocks on hand. 
There was a great deal of discussion as to the desirable level of 
stocks. In the early 1960's the National Agricultural Advisory Commit-
tee suggested a level of 40 to 50 million tons of feed grains and 600 
million bushels of wheat. These figures were well below the level of 
stocks then on hand. However, the Department of Agriculture never 
adopted any official figure as a desirable reserve for either wheat or 
feed grains. 
Along with the policy of reducing Government stocks, a new objec-
tive was adopted. It was to expand market outlets. Public Law 480 
had been passed in 1954. It permitted the Government to sell surplus 
grains and other surplus stocks in Government hands to developing 
countries for local currencies. Some products could be donated, such 
as wheat for school lunch programs and wheat and feed grains to poor 
people in foreign countries. 
In 1965 and 1966, India and Pakistan had a bad drought. The 
United States shipped large amounts of grains to both countries under 
the program authorized by P. L. 4 80. At about the same time, communist 
countries entered the world market for grains, further drawing down 
world supplies. By the summer of 1966, there was mounting apprehen-
sion over the world food outlook. 
By the end of 19 66, most of the American grain surpluses were gone. 
Instead of being concerned about surpluses, the public clamor then be-
came one over whether the nation had adequate reserve stocks. It 
appeared that wheat stocks might fall below 400 million bushels on July 1, 
1967, and that feed grain stocks might fall to 25 million tons or less on 
October 1. Some believed that wheat stocks would fall below 300 million 
bushels and possibly even as low as 200 million bushels. Because of 
this, the feed grain and wheat programs for 19 67 relaxed acreage restraints 
and some 20 million acres were brought back into production. 
However, after the 19 67 programs were announced, bumper crops were 
harvested all over the world. The world wheat harvest was 14 percent 
higher than a year earlier. The U.S. feed grain harvest for 1967 was up 
12 percent, setting an all-time high. Carryover stocks of both wheat and 
feed grains now seem certain to rise. We appear to have met the 19 66 
food emergency with the U.S. reserve production capacity not fully tested, 
and with no undue pressure on our carryover stock position. 
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Some Level of Reserve 
Recently, attention again has been placed on the need for "re-
serve stocks" and a "reserve" policy. This seems to be one point 
on which all groups can generally agree -- that there should be some 
level of reserves maintained by the public through Government action 
and at public expense. 
Today, few proposals are embraced by so many for such dissimilar 
reasons. Yet the acceptance of the~reserve concept by people of di-
verging views on related matters may signal divergence of views when 
the details of a tangible proposal are put forward. Certainly the only 
agreement reached on the latest reserve proposals introduced in Congress 
was an agreement to disagree. Much of the producer interest stems from 
the price-strengthening effects that would accompany the accumulation 
of such "reserve stocks." At the same time, concern is expressed by 
producers over the rules of management and release of such "reserve 
stocks." 
Although it split on several important questions, the National Food 
and Fiber Commission agreed that we need a national reserve policy. 
One side felt that a reserve policy would facilitate stabilization with-
in the operation of the annual land adjustment programs, while the other 
group felt that a reserve policy would be a stabilizing influence under 
a completely market-oriented agriculture. 
No reserve policy can be expected to achieve complete acceptance 
by all interested parties unless the parties seek the same objectives, 
and the prescribed reserve program seeks these ends with means that 
do not materially affect policy parameters in other areas. 
What are the objectives that a reserve policy should seek to achieve? 
What are its goals? Certainly the first and overriding goal is to provide 
adequate supplies in times when production falls short of satisfying needs. 
Dr. Fred Waugh, in his study on reserve stocks for the Food and 
Fiber Commission, listed seven possible aims which could be served by 
a reserve program . ..!/ They are: provide adequate working stocks; reduce 
the danger of a food shortage both here and overseas: assist in maintaining 
commercial exports: stabilize farm income and the general economy: in-
crease the average level of product prices and farm income; assist growth 
in the underdeveloped countries; and foster private industry • 
..!lwaugh, Fredric V. Reserve Stocks of Farm Products. Agricultural Policy: 
A Review of Programs and Needs, Vol. V. Technical Papers, National 
Advisory Commission on Food and Fiber. August, 1967. 
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. Any reserve program must in one way or another indicate which of 
these objectives it wishes to achieve and what level of achievement it 
wants to attain. Unless these goals are rather clearly defined the 
development of a lasting reserve program will prove difficult. 
Among the objectives just listed there are some which will be 
achieved whether or not we adopt an "official reserve program." First 
among these is maintaining an adequate working stock. Working stocks 
will be maintained whether or not the Government officially adopts a 
policy to hold additional stocks at pu.blic expense. Thus, while one 
needs to recognize such a requirement we need not be concerned beyond 
estimating its probable magnitude. Also, the objective of fostering pri-
vate industry means that the reserves should not be acquired, held, or 
discharged in a way which would stifle private industry. Again this is 
an objective which can be readily facilitated. 
Five objectives 
The really meaningful problems are contained within the five re-
maining objectives. What is their order of importance, and to what 
extent do we wish to achieve them and at what expense ? 
The order of importance within the remaining five objectives 
probably would be: (1) reduce the danger of a food shortage here at 
home (secondly overseas); (2) stabilize farm incomes; (3) maintain 
commercial exports; (4) increase the average level of grain prices, 
and (5) assist growth in the underdeveloped countries. 
As one can see, any such ordering creates problems; some objec-
tives are interrelated and the achievement of one objective will move 
another closer to realization. 
The ultimate question posed is what constitutes an adequate level 
of reserve. To answer that question, several others must first be an-
swered. What demands do you want to meet -- domestic demand, 
commercial export demand, concessional demand? ·How much adjust-
ment in each are you willing to endure? · How much uncertainty are you 
willing to tolerate in each? How much price fluctuation or adjustment 
are you willing to experience? What is the ceiling price you wish to 
protect? Correspondingly on the supply side, what is the variability 
of supplies you are likely to experience -- in one year, over two years 
or more? How much influence can you exert on supplies through prices, 
adjustments in acreage progri;ims, and non-price adjustments in the 
allocation of supplies to various uses? 
Then there is. the matter of sharing the burden of world risks with 
other countries -- either through multilateral or bilateral agreements. 
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How much of the world reserves should be held in the form of physical 
reserves, and how much in the form of financial resources to trigger 
purchases of stocks needed to meet emergencies? Finally, how do 
you define an "emergency"? On these, there must be agreement. 
Answer these questions and you can tell what level of reserves the 
United States should carry. To date the discussion and debate on re-
serves has little more than touched on any of these questions. 
Factors to Consider in a Reserve Model 
Variation in production is a function of acreage and yields. Yields 
in turn are affected by many factors, including technology and weather. 
The uncertainty of production arises primarily from weather. Thus, a 
reserve is basically designed to protect against unexpected adjustments 
in production due to weather. 
While weather is a factor of major importance, its impact on produc-
tion in a series of events should not be overemphasized. The impact of 
weather on production during a growing season cannot be corrected during 
the season. However, its effect on total production can be altered in 
subsequent time periods through adjustments in acreage as long as there 
is a reserve of acreage not in production. Production can be increased in 
subsequent time periods even with a run of unfavorable weather years. 
Thus, in estimating the desirable reserve level one needs to consider 
the adjustments which can be made in acreage. In the United States to-
day we have a reserve production capacity in our diverted acres. These 
acreages can readily be called into production during the next season if 
we experience a poor weather year. Certainly the existence of this 
acreage reserve reduces the level of commodity reserves required to pro-
tect us against a given level of risk in time periods of varying lengths. 
An adequate reserve policy should take this reserve production capac-
ity into consideration. In considering acreage as a manipulatable variable, 
it would be advisable to evaluate production variability on the basis of 
yield variation rather than on historical variation in production. "Normal" 
yield should be used to determine the acreage required to provide the re-
quired production. The probability of deviations from the normal yield 
can be considered in determining what acreage should be required to assure 
an adequate supply. 
This approach would also be helpful in determining the extent to which 
we are utilizing our potential acreage capacity -- and therefore how large 
the reserve capacity is. 
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On the demand side of the equation, several factors that affect 
the level of reserves must be considered. First, one must determine 
the level of utilization that is to be insured. This decision in large 
part specifies the level to which one is willing to let prices rise --
particularly in those cases where the distribution is based on prices 
as the sole allocator. 
Price is of primary importance in determining the lev.el of utiliza-
tion for some commodities, such as corn. But it is of less importance 
in the case of others, particularly wheat and rice. Much of the alloca-
tion of the latter commodities is determined by administrative action. 
The quantity programed under P. L. 480 is almost entirely determined by 
administrative action. Even commercial exports may be substantially 
affected through export assistance programs (subsidies}. 
Where price is the primary allocator, it may be preferable to de-
termine reserve levels in terms of that quantity which will maintain 
prices below a given ceiling with a 90 percent probability of success. 
With a commodity such as wheat., in addition to specifying the price 
ceiling, one will have to determine (within those areas which are large-
ly administratively determined} what level of utilization will be main-
tained. 
World production variation 
Exports are affected, as we have seen vividly demonstrated in re-
cent years, by the variation in production throughout the world. Here 
again we must determine what the variation potential is, and how much 
insurance we wish to provide through reserves. 
In the 1960's we have seen the impact that crop failures in other 
countries can have. Russia, China, India and Pakistan have each had 
difficulty producing enough to satisfy their needs in the past few years. 
The major exporting countries expanded their exports significantly, 
world prices rose, and acreages devoted to grain production expanded. 
The needs were met. In the case of India and Pakistan, the needs were 
met not only through increased imports of traditional food grains, but 
also through substitution of some sorghum grains for wheat and rice. 
Within India and Pakistan the substitution chain involved rice, wheat, 
and sorghum grains. 
Any determination of the level of stocks required to insure an ade-
quate world grain supply must consider not only the responsibility of 
the United States but that of the other major exporting and importing na-
tions. It seems proper that a world food-(grain}-reserve policy, should 
be established, maintained, and administered by some international body, 
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or at least operated under an international agreement. Otherwise, the 
U.S. policy regarding reserves should be based heavily on the poten-
tial for commercial trade which flows from variations in world produc-
tion and on the level of development commitment we wish to be able to 
honor. 
Finally, in considering a proper reserve level we should estimate 
the cost of failing to have adequate supplies to satisfy needs. The cost 
to the Government of maintaining an adequate reserve is readily calculable; 
defining and measuring the costs of not meeting needs is more difficult. 
By the nature of each demand category, the cost of experiencing a shortage 
of a given magnitude in each category for each commodity is different. 
The allocation of reserves by commodity and by type of demand 
should be such that the cost to the United States is minimized. Achieviug 
this is probably impossible. However, it is why we should be aware, to 
the degree possible, of the costs of not being able to cover shortfalls of 
given magnitudes as well as the costs of carrying reserves. 
Consideration of the factors described above takes time and effort. 
In the meantime, the question of what level of reserves we should main-
tain remains. Until a reserve model has been produced, it would seem 
that for the present (with a few exceptions) the level of stocks we will 
have at the end of the current marketing year will be adequate to meet 
any foreseeable emergency of the nature encountered in the past decade 
or two. These levels certainly seem adequate when considered in con-
junction with the unused grain production capacity in America. 
This unused capacity in effect constitutes a ready-reserve in the 
form of idle acres that can be brought back into production on a year's 
notice. The cost of buying and stockpiling more grain than is required 
to meet "normal contingencies" is greater than the cost of diverting the 
equivalent productive capacity. And once the bins are filled, acreage 
diversion will need to be increased to absorb the amount of grain no 
longer being added to the reserve. From then on, the cost of maintain-
ing the ready-reserve in the form of the idle acres will be no different 
than if the extra cushion had not been added to the bins. But the added 
interest and carrying charges of the larger stocks go on yearly, as do 
their effect on market prices while we await the "unusuaf contingency." 
Thus, the total cost of the diversion program and the reserve program 
would rise unnecessarily during the period we are adding grain in ex-
cess of that required to meet "normal contingencies." 
Stocks of rice low 
The holdings. at the end of the 19 67-68 marketing year will be 
around 500 to 525 million bushels of wheat, 40 to 45 million tons of 
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feed grains, 125 to 150 million bushels of soybeans, 6 to 7 million 
bales of cotton. Stocks of rice undoubtedly are too low, with the 
carryover in recent years having been consistently (roughly) below 
9 million cwt. Demand for U.S. rice has been expanding and world 
prices rising. At this time, a poor world rice crop would have a 
significant impact on world rice prices and would cause an increased 
demand for other food grains. Our reserves of rice should probably 
be above the 7 to 9 million cwt. of recent years. A level of 12 to 15 
million cwt. would be more appropriate -- though possibly not ade-
quate. 
In determining the level of reserves, there is a strong tendency 
to specify how much of each type grain should be held. In the case 
of wheat, the question can reach the stage of trying to determine how 
much of each class of wheat should be held. 
The extent to which one differentiates between commodities should 
be determined by the nature of the demand for each. How great is the 
substitutability of other grains? We found recently in India that wheat 
could be substituted for rice, and that grain sorghums could be substi-
tuted for wheat. This suggests that it might be beneficial to consider 
a reserve as a total stock of grains, with some minimums specified 
for those grains which can find substitutes only at very high price 
differentials. 
This concept is further strengthened when it is realized that in 
some parts of the world, food grains (wheat) are extensively used as 
feed grains. During the 1960-65 period, the United Kingdom used 27 
percent of the wheat it produced as a livestock feed. France fed 31 
percent of its wheat. The EEC as a whole fed 18 percent. In recent 
years the use of wheat as a feed grain has also been increasing in the 
United States. 
There is a substantial capacity to increase the world supply of 
wheat for food use just by discouraging its use as an animal feed. 
Because of this substitutability between wheat and feed grains it would 
seem appropriate to specify the desirable reserves in terms of total 
grains, with some minimums indicated for the food grains. Thus, if 12 
million tons were determined to be appropriate for wheat, grain stocks 
of say 50 to 55 million tons with at least 12 being wheat might be 
a more desirable target than attempting to maintain specific reserve 
targets for each of the grains (to say nothing of maintaining a reserve 
of specific classes of grains, as some suggest). 
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Rules Governing Management and Release of Stocks 
The issue of how the reserves are managed is now and undoubtedly 
will continue to be a more sensitive issue than the level of reserves. 
For the answers to this question 1 we will have to rely on the political 
process. 
The objective here may not be to obtain the best rules. Rather it 
may be to avoid those rules which will cripple the ability of the stocks 
to function as true reserves. 
Reserves are meant to be used when needed. Certainly some agree-
ment on how an "emergency" is defined is imperative. Rules that pre-
clude the use of such stocks except under the most extreme circumstances 
prevent those quantities from serving as useful reserves for meeting the 
normal shortfall in supplies we have been considering. In such cases 1 
the effect will be to result in larger total carryover stocks than if the rules 
governing release of the so-called "strategic reserves" were not so 
restrictive. 
While we do not wish to prescribe what the rules should be 1 we 
do want to point out that the rules may well affect the size of stocks 
which must be held to provide the desired level of insurance. 
Maybe it is too much to expect that the "reserve policy" debate will 
provide answers to the question or even consider many of the factors 
we have discussed. But if the debate doesn't try to center on these 
questions and these factors 1 then our reserve policy will continue to 
be a residual of the farm income programs. We will not have a "re-
serve policy" per se. 

GOVERNMENT PROGRAMS: WHAT ARE THE NEAR-TERM PROSPECTS? 
Don F. Hadwiger* 
and 
Ross B. Talbot* 
Our first task is to look for the factors likely to be associated 
with farm policy innovation. Granted that each major farm policy 
change has been a unique blend of factors, the absence or presence 
of some of these factors is a useful basis for predicting in advance 
whether major policy will be enacted or implemented. Past predictions 
of major enactments made on this basis have been accurate on balance. 
Less accurate predictions have been made about the direction and 
content of such programs. 
Some major enactments had not been generally anticipated 
(perhaps those in 1956, 1963, 1965), and presumably the major 
efforts which failed were not usually predictable failures. However, 
some major laws had been anticipated well in advance of the session 
during which they were passed (1929, 1933, 1938, 1948, 1962). As 
for the quiet years , it had usually been fairly clear that no major 
legislation was likely to be passed. 
The factors of farm policy change are related to leadership 
and, also, to the context in which change must take place. Let us 
first look at the precedents with respect to leadership. 
Leadership 
Passage of major policy ordinarily requires a planned, 
persistent effort by a well-positioned and vigorous leadership. 
Past sources of such leadership have been: 
1. Administrations seeking to carry out campaign promises 
(1929 1 19331 19491 1954, 1961, 1962, 1965) o 
2. Administrations seeking to reduce budgets or to avoid 
market surpluses (1938, 1948, 1954, 1956, 1961, 1962, 1965). 
*Professor of History, Government and Philosophy, Iowa State 
University. 
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3. Administrations preparing for an election campaign (1956, 
1964). 
4. Commodity blocs composed of interested l~gislators. 
5. Farm organizations seeking to enhance power and to increase 
farm income (of importance during several years , key leaders in 
1922 and 1938). 
6. Other groups seeking to enhance their power or to advance 
some public interest concept have been important participants in 
leadership on several occasions, including government agencies 
(1936, 1938, 1949, 1956), business organizations (1929, 1954), 
and labor unions (1949). 
During 1968 and 1969, numbers 1, 2, and 3 above are the most 
likely sources of effective leadership. However, the political 
context, as described below, does not seem particularly amenable 
to substantial policy change. Nor is there likely to be substantial 
commercial farm income improvement. 
Political Con~ of .Dmn Policy Change 
1. Context of the executive branch. Three factors affecting 
the posture of the executive branch with respect to farm policy 
are as follows: (a) time periods within the electoral cycle, (b) 
relative prominence of domestic policy, and (c) relations with 
Congress. 
a. During the first post-election year or two, a new 
administration may support policy revisions. Also, during election 
years, demands for increased farm income are likely to encounter 
a low threshold within the administration. 
b. Both the normal concerns and the normal constraints of 
farm politics are less prominent during wartime, when the Chief 
Executive is seeking to mobilize resources for war. In the present 
limited conflict, the Administration has tried to minimize the effects 
of limited war upon the domestic policy. However, as needs of 
the present war have increased, the Administration has probably 
diverted resources which would otherwise have been used for 
agricultural policy. It has been the function of congressional 
agriculture committees during such a period to seek to prevent the 
executive from overriding the usual political and "equity" criteria 
for farm policy. 
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Although the wartime executive remains under pressure to 
meet peacetime domestic objectives 1 he finds in general that he 
is allowed more freedom in the choice of mechanisms. World War 
I 1 for example 1 occasioned the first use of the government mar-
keting corporation. This was then put into mothballs for the 
decade following the war 1 and used again in the crisis of depression. 
c. Observing the swinging pendulum of presidential-
congressional power relationships 1 clearly most farm legislation 
has been passed during periods of executive dominance. However 1 
Congress has still had an impact on farm policy during such 
periods 1 because the President has often given way on farm policy 
as a means of shepherding his power for use on other matters. 
For example 1 during World War II 1 the Roosevelt Administration 
reluctantly allowed the inauguration of high 1 fixed price supports 
in order to keep rural legislators supporting his vexed administration. 
2. Context of the Congress. The congressional agriculture 
committees 1 in their function of ironing out farm programs 1 have 
been a most useful access point for commercial farm interests 
which commodity legislation has served. These committees 1 
when preparing bills for enactment I could be counted on to increase 
income benefits and in other ways to make these programs more 
pleasing to their constituency. Lately I the committees may be 
losing the confidence of their legislative bodies 1 as their member-
ship drifts away from the mainstream of liberal support which has 
been essential for passing their farm programs. 
As Table 1 indicates 1 agriculture committee membership 
falls increasingly within the conservative coalition 1 even while 
recent farm programs have been pas sed mainly by the liberal 
coalition. The lack of harmony with their supporters is revealed 
in the committees' most recent efforts to get major legislation 
passed on the floor. In 1967 1 as we shall see 1 the committees' 
offerings were often rejected or revised substantially before 
passage. There is reason to quest! on 1 too 1 whether the Democratic 
coalition which passed President Johnson's domestic legislation 
will continue in its present form. 
3. Context of the courts. Ever since the first major pro-
duction control measure was invalidated by the Supreme Court 
'(U. S. v. Butler 1 1936) 1 farm policy makers have been mindful 
of the Court's existing concerns 1 although policy makers perhaps 
have a poor record of anticipating the future concerns of the Court. 
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Table 1. Agriculture Committees Versus Their Congressional 
Supporters. 
Conservative Coalition 
Support Scores* 
Both 
D R Parties 
Average of House Committee 1963 48.14 77.14 59.74 
on Agriculture 
1965 43.45 84.55 55.08 
1967 
Average of Senate Committee 
on Agriculture and Forestry 1963 48.45 61.83 53.17 
1965 51.72 68.40 56.93 
1967 
Average Conservative Coalition Support Score (89th Congress) of 
House members who voted for (against recommitting) the Food and 
Agriculture Act of 1965 = 24.7 
*Based on Congressional Quarterly's calculation of the percentage 
of roll calls on which the Representative or Senator voted in agree-
ment with the position of the conservative coalition. 
-135-
Again as in the New Deal, farm policy offers inviting targets 
for judicial scrutiny should the Supreme Court expand the boundaries 
of its present concern over race discrimination embedded in economic 
policy, or should the Court find other dimensions of the 14th 
Amendment -- such as restrictions on economic policies which 
have the result of constricting residence patterns of citizens of 
the United States, and policies which definitely even if inadvert-
ently channel internal migration. In the case of Brown v. Board 
of Education (1954), Chief Justice Earl Warren remonstrated that 
the Court is interested in preventing "sophisticated" discrimination 
as well as "simple-minded" discrimination. Given the present 
character of the Court, and the nature of the times, the Court may 
be expected to pursue its interest in sophisticated and silent 
discrimination, and perhaps even to develop an interest in inad-
vertent dis crimination. 
4. Termination dates. Most recent farm income legislation 
must be renewed periodically, because termination dates are 
written into the legislation. Of course, payments to farmers must 
be funded in yearly appropriations, although CCC price support 
operations may in theory continue indefinitely, using existing 
capital or authorized credit. 
5. Electioneering. As an election issue the importance of 
farm policy to farmers is relative to the importance of other issues 
and the importance of candidate personalities. It is relative also 
to the level of farmer frustration, which stems from perceived 
conditions or from experience under an incumbent administration. 
Put another way 1 the "farm issue" will be more important to farmers 
if it does not have to compete for their attention with such issues 
as war and domestic disturbances, and if attention to issues is 
not overriden by farmer identification with an attractive presidential 
candidate. If farmers are feeling an economic pinch due to indebt-
edness, inadequate income 1 or other factors, the "farm issue" 
may be paramount in any case. 
In addition 1 frustrations from whatever source tend to be 
cumulative during a given administration. As Table 2 suggests 1 
farmer support tends to dwindle as an administration becomes 
familiar to them. 
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Table 2. Farmer Disillusionment With the Incumbent Administration 
In A Rural Iowa District (Iowa 7th). 
1946 
1948 
1950 
1952 
1954 
1956 
1958 
1960 
1962 
1964 
1966 
Table 3. Summary of Factors. 
For policy change 
Wartime experimentation 
Possibility of new Administration 
Approach of termination 
dates 
Farmer frustration 
Possibility of judicial 
intervention 
For A Higher Commercial 
Farm Income 
1968 election year 
Congressional leverage in 
wartime 
Congressional oversight 
Farmer reaction against 
government 
Vote for U. S. Representative 
%Democrat 
37.0 
43.1 
37.7 
32.6 
44.2 
43.9 
53.5 
40.9 
% Republican 
67.3 
60.4 
55.4 
51.5 
55.8 
Against policy change 
Lack of well-positioned, 
vigorous leadership 
Balance of power between 
Congress and President 
Against Higher Commercial Farm 
Income Policy 
Competing war demands 
Weak congressional 
committees 
Relative importance of 
personalities and 
non -farm is sues in 
next election 
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Summary of Factors in Farm Policy 
The general situation is neither wholly favorable nor unfavorable 
to legislation. It remains to be seen whether adequate leadership 
will be forthcoming from the Administration during the election year 
or during the two years following. On the side of new policy is the 
tendency of wartime problems to generate novel solutions 1 and the 
fact that legislative termination dates are approaching. Farmer 
frustrations also give urgency to the search for new policy. 
It is not clear whether commercial farmers will lose or gain 
from such changes as are made (see table 3). In support of a 
higher commercial farm income policy: 19 68 is an election year; 
Congress has leverage because the President needs its cooperation 
in conducting a major military conflict; farmers are unsatisfied. 
Against higher commercial farm income policy: the Administration 
gives war needs the highest priority; the congressional committee 
link in the farm policy chain has become critically weak; and there 
is a possibility that the clash of presidential personalities I and 
interest in other pressing issues I will crowd out farm policy as 
an important election issue. 
Having outlined the general political context of American 
agriculture today I we now proceed to examine the near-term 
prospects for political action to alleviate the "farm problem." 
The main thrust of our earlier analysis was: the time is not ripe 
for major changes in basic farm legislation. This section of our 
exposition assumes that there is a logical consistency in American 
politics in that policy follows power; where the elements of power 
are not available the forces of change will not prevail. 
What~ farmers expect from the 90th Congress (1967-68)? 
The easy I reasonably accurate I answer seems to be: not 
much. However, we will attempt to outline an answer by posing 
and discussing three subordinate questions: What has been passed 
thus far? What legislation will probably be passed? What will 
more than likely not be passed? And why not? 
1. What legislation has been passed thus far? 
(a) Agriculture appropriations for fiscal 1968. 
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All in all, the Johnson Administration received about what it 
has asked for-- an appropriation of nearly $5 billion. The major 
controversy centered around the issue of whether to reimburse the 
Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC) for losses sustained in fiscal 
1966. The President and Secretary Freeman decided to request only 
enough ($1. 4 billion) to cover anticipated losses for the current 
year. The Senate voted to restore the full amount; the House was 
adamant in its demand to uphold the Administration's request, and 
the House position prevailed. The issue here was actually more 
concerned with inflation and budgetary deficits than it was with 
farm programs or farmer incomes. 
The P. L. 480 appropriation was cut back some $167 million; 
the ASCS allocation was whittled down about $29 million; and the 
food stamp program ($185 million) was paid for by a direct 
appropriation rather than through the proposed use of tariff receipts 
under "Section 32." 
(b) Food Stamp Act Revision. 
A second major legislative decision (as of mid-December, 
1967) of direct concern to farmers was the extension for two years 
of the Food Stamp Act of 1964. We cannot try here to unravel all 
the political implications of this bill, but it involved conflicts of 
ideology, and pointed up the persistent urban-rural conflict over 
allocation of costs and the assumption of responsibilities. Divi-
sions on this bill revealed, again, a lack of party unity --
particularly within the Democratic Party, and also among the major 
farm organizations. It was difficult even to get the bill reported 
out of the rural, conservative House Committee on Agriculture. 
When the bill did emerge there was attached a cost-sharing provi-
sion which would have required each state to pay 20 percent of 
the costs. Chairman Poage (Democrat, Texas) declared that 
"there is not a state in this Union that is S?t_ poor that it cannot 
pay $1 out of $5 to feed these poor people.,::_; Congressman 
Belcher (Republican, Oklahoma) favored killing the bill altogether. 
However, the House by a 173-191 roll-call vote rejected the cost-
sharing provision. Democrats voted 49-164 against the amend-
ment (N.D. 2-132, S.D. 47-32), while Republicans supported the 
amendment, 124-27 • 
.!/ Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report. June 16, 1967. p. 1003. 
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Mter extensive debate in both Houses, culminating in sharp 
disagreements between the House and Senate versions and almost 
irreconcilable differences in the conference committee, a two-
. year bill was finally passed with authorizations of $200 million 
for fiscal 1968 and $225 million for fiscal 1969. 
(c) Wholesome Meat Act of 1967. 
Surely one of the most interesting developments concerning 
food legislation pertains to the passage of the Wholesome Meat 
Act of 1967. Meat processors who sold only within a single state 
have been exempt from USDA meat inspectors. For some years 
there have been a few voices in Congress protesting "The Jungle-
like" conditions which ostensibly prevailed in these non-federally 
inspected plants. Little was done, although it now appears that 
the USDA had fairly well confirmed the accuracy of these charges 
through spot checks conducted in 1962 and 1967. 
Through newspaper and magazine disclosures, skillful 
leadership in both the House and Senate, an aroused consumer-
housewife public, and the stubborn and reluctant tactics of the 
American Meat Institute and the Western States Meat Packers 
Association, this simmering issue gradually escalated into a full-
scale legislative assault, led by Representatives Smith (Democrat, 
Iowa) and Foley (Democrat, Washington) and Senators Montoya 
(Democrat, New Mexico) and Mondale (Democrat, Minnesota). 
When the House first passed the bill on October 31, it was 
just another example of moderate-type "creative" federalism, 
with Federal funds to be used as an inducement to the states for 
the improvement of their administration of intrastate processing 
plants. The Senate version, passed on November 28, gave the 
USDA inspection control over nearly all intrastate plants, and per-
mitted the respective governors the discretion of placing intra-
state plants .under USDA jurisdiction immediately. 
The Conference Committee report was very close to the 
Senate version, although the provision relating to the governors• 
power was deleted. House conferees Poage and Gathings (Democrat, 
Arkansas) refused to sign the conference report, but the measure 
had acquired such a political momentum that the report was 
accepted on December 6 by a voice vote in the Senate and a 
336-28 roll-call vote in the House. 
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It appears that no other significant food legislation will be 
passed in 1967. Congress did approve House Joint Resolution 267 
late in March, which authorized an additional three million tons of 
food grain to India at an estimated cost of $190 million. However, 
the Department of State and the USDA already had the authority 
to make this decision. The Administration asked for Congressional 
approval in order to strengthen its diplomatic moves to push India 
toward more self-help and to maneuver other Western food-exporting 
nations into a position of "lending more of a helping hand. " 
Other legislative acts and resolutions which passed pertained 
to the transfer of tobacco allotments and acreage-poundage quotas, 
to the extension for three years of the special milk programs for 
the Armed Forces and veterans hospitals, and other special laws 
of minor importance. 
What bills will most likely be passed Ql the 90th Congress in 1968? 
By far the most important decision to be made next year in the 
area of food legislation will be concerned with the Agricultural 
Trade Development and Assistance Act ofl954 (P.L. 480). This 
law was extended for two years by the Food For Peace Act of 1966, 
so its future, in some form, must be decided by the second session 
of the 90th Congress. P.L. 480 will almost surely be renewed again, 
but there are very serious questions as to what will be its scope 
and magnitude. 
Probably every person concerned with food assistance to the 
less-developed nations is concerned that there is, actually or 
impending, a "world food crisis." There are, however, serious 
and fundamental disagreements as to what the U. S. should do to 
alleviate this crisis. Capsuling the issue in too simple a manner, 
there are three fundamental positions. First, the general farm 
organizations , except for the AFBF, would move toward expanding 
production of food grains in the United States in order to feed the 
hungry nations. According to a recent editorial in Wallace's Farmer: 
"We are in the best position of all the countries in the world to 
expand food production quickly. We have the land, the capital, 
the production supplies, and the skilled farmers to do it.·~ 
V Massive Food Aid? (ed.) Wallace's Farmer. November ll, 1967. 
p. 17. 
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Secondly, the Farm Bureau would abolish the present price 
support laws, institute a more extensive land-retirement program, 
and use the money that would be "saved" to purchase surplus food 
in the "free market" for shipment to the less-developed nations. 
On the other hand, and third, there seems to be a consensus 
among the agricultural and development economists that the U. S. 
cannot feed the hungry nations, at least for more than a few years--
perhaps to 1975. Moreover, they contend that it is not in the 
interests of the new nations to receive this food assistance, other 
than to meet short-run national emergency conditions. Rather, 
the prime emphasis should be on self-help assistance in the form 
of various types of developmental aid. This position is clearly 
set forth in the May 1967 report of the President• s Science 
Advisory Committee.1/ 
The USDA finds itself caught in a political dilemma. The 
ideological inclinations of the Freeman Administration seem to 
indicate a preference toward •ifeeding the hungry world," but 
mounting military expenditures, an already serious budget deficit, 
and a bitter and aggressive demand for a far greater allocation of 
federal funds to the metropolitan areas, do not permit an all-out 
attack in "the war on hunger." 
Our best guess is that this Congress will extend the Food 
for Peace Act of 1966 for one more year, that appropriations will 
be about the same ($1. 6 billion), perhaps a slight increase. If 
the hot war in Viet Nam is transformed into a type of "cold war, " 
then the all-out production school might well prevail. 
Secondly, it looks as if Congress will make some extensive 
amendments to the Consolidated Farmers Home Administration Act 
of 19 61. These amendments would provide for a considerable 
increase in federal financial aid, through the assistance of the 
Farmers Home Administration, for low middle-income commercial 
farmers, under-employed farmers, and rural development. S .1504 
passed the Senate by voice vote on August 28, but the bill has not 
yet been acted on by the House Committee on Agriculture. 
Finally, the USDA has recently asked Congress to overhaul 
the Packers and Stockyards Act of 1921. From November 1965 to 
November 1966, 10 packers went out of business, owing farmers 
1/ The World Food Problem Vol. I. Washington, D. C. U. S. Govern-
ment Printing Office. 1967. 
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some $3.25 million for livestock. Farmers and farm organizations 
are in full agreement that this malpractice should cease, and farm 
leaders seem to agree with the USDA's proposed revisions of the 
basic law. 
What farming legislation will probably not be passed in the 90th 
Congress and why? 
Throughout most, if not all, of American history, farm leaders 
and many farmers have been convinced that they need more bar-
gaining power in order to negotiate on more equal terms with those 
to whom they sold their product, and from those who sold them the 
tools of production. 
For some years, farm organizations -- and especially farm 
cooperatives -- have been of the opinion that the Capper-Volstead 
Act of 1922 exempted cooperatives from the provisions of Federal 
anti-trust legislation. U. S. Supreme Court decisions in 1960 and 
1963 have given them some concerned second thoughts. Moreover, 
increased emphasis in the area of contract farming and vertical 
integration have led farm groups to the conclusion that they need 
federal protection against large-scale business organizations 
involved in the production, processing and distribution of food 
products. 
This controversial issue is packed with complexities but, 
looking at the matter simply in terms of the legislative process, it 
can be summarized as follows: the Senate did pass an Agricultural 
Producers Marketing Act (S.l09} in 1967, although several weakening 
amendments had to be accepted in order to get the bill out of 
committee. The proponents of the bill anticipated that the House 
Committee on Agriculture would strengthen the proposal, but it 
emerged from that committee in about the same form as it had 
passed the Senate. 
At this juncture, the farm organizations -- except for the 
AFBF --asked the House Rules Committee to "kill" the bill. And 
it looks very much dead, at least for the 90th Congress. In the 
expressive phrase of the NFO, "What was hoped for was a bill 
that would give the chickens a bit more protection from the fox. 
What we have instead is a bill that in a number of respects 
protects the fox. ·~ 
y The NFO Reporter. November 1967. p. 3. 
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Another major area of farmer concern is that of food imports. 
Imports of dairy products tripled in 1966 -- 9 biflion pounds of 
milk equivalent were imported in the 1965 calendar year as con-
trasted to 2. 7 billion pounds in calendar 19 66. ,. Junex 11 (a butter-
fat/sugar mixture) went from 4 million pounds imported in 1965 to 
105 million pounds in 1966, and attempts by the USDA to curtail 
these imports through the use of Section 206 of the Sugar Act were 
unsuccessful. However, the new dairy import quotas, proclaimed 
by the President on June 30, have caused a sharp decline in dairy 
imports. 
Meat imports have increased to the point where it is estimated 
that they will equal from 5. 7 to 5. 9 percent of the domestic 
consumption in 1967, as contrasted to 4. 2 percent in 1965. The 
cutoff point, based on the Meat Import Control Act of 1964, has 
not yet been reached, and some meat producers are having serious 
second thoughts as to the acceptability of that piece of legislation. 
The Dairy Import Act of 1967 was introduced as S. 612 by 56 
Senators in January, 1967, but it seems quite doubtful that it will 
be passed. The Americanfarmer must export in order to prosper, 
and farm exports of some $6.7 billion are anticipated for the current 
fiscal year, with about $5.1 billion of that amount as dollar sales. 
The remark by Raymond Ioanes, director of the Foreign Agricultural 
service, at the USDA • s recent Outlook Conference, seems to sum 
up the dilemma: 11 Too many people -- and I will not exclude 
people in our own country --want to have all the pleasure of 
trade without any of the pain. ·~ At this point it would appear 
that the Administration's opposition, including the threat of the 
Presidential veto, will prevent the passage of any dairy or meat 
~mport control legislatio'n. 
During the early part of 1967, when carryover stocks of wheat 
and feed grains were relatively low, there was considerable 
political talk about the need for a grain reserves bill. H. R. 
12067, introduced by Congressman Purcell (Democrat, Texas), 
would have required the CCC to maintain stocks equal to 20 per-
cent of the annual domestic use and exports of wheat, 15 percent 
of field grains, 6 percent of soybeans, and the same for rice. 
Somewhat comparable bills have been introduced in the Senate by 
McCarthy (Democrat, Minnesota) and McGovern (Democrat, South 
Dakota) • 
..§/ Ioanes, Raymond A. U. S. Agricultural Exports Are Continuing 
at High Level. Foreign Agriculture. November 27, 1967. p. 6. 
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Purcell was unable to get his bill out of sub-committee; the 
vote was 8-6 against reporting. Those who favored the measure 
based their arguments largely on national security reasons, 
although Secretary Freeman clearly had economic and political 
objectives in mind, too. He expressed his unhappiness at the 
demise of the Purcell bill by observing that the measure would 
have boosted market prices for wheat and feed grains by 10 cents 
a bushel, thereby raising farm income by as much as $500 million.Y 
The AFBF led the opposition to the grain reserves bill. They 
viewed it as just one more piece of evidence that the USDA wanted 
to control the farm economy, and they were sharply suspicious 
that -- even with legal protection -- the reserves would be used 
to low~r market prices, if these prices reached parity or above .!..J 
Early in January of this year, the USDA sent to Congress a 
bill (H .R. 1400) which would have substantially revised the 
financing procedures for the Rural Electrification Administration. 
An Electric Bank and a Telephone Bank would have been set up 
to administer the financing of both these REA programs. In 
Chairman Poage•s words, it was the 11 major piece of legislation .. 
before his committee this year. The bill, as finally reported, 
was unacceptable to the National Association of Rural Electric 
Cooperatives and the National Farmers Union, who were the pri-
mary advocates. Thus it seems doubtful that the bill will be 
acted on by this Congress • 
The AFBF-sponsored Wheat and Feed Grains Act of 1967 will 
almost certainly never leave committee. Revisions to the U. S. 
Grains Standards Act may be accepted. A so-called National Labor 
Relations Act for migratory farm workers is being considered by 
the Senate L~bor and Public Welfare Committee and the House 
Education and Labor Committee, but it is not likely to be passed. 
The NFU has resurrected its proposal, first made by M. W. 
Thatcher in the mid-194o•s, for a National Agricultural Relations 
Act .y The basic idea is for the establishment of federal control 
.§/National Farmers Union. Washington Newsletter. Nov. 17, 1967. 
p. 2. 
J.l The American Farm Bureau Federation • s Official Newsletter. 
November 20, 1967. p. 185. 
!!/Farmers Union Herald. March 27, 1967 and October 9, 1967. 
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over matters of price and supply, commodity-by-commodity, and 
after winning a referendum vote for the producers of each commodity. 
Apparently the NFU w:ill have a draft bill ready for introduction by 
the 1968 session, and the USDA seems to be analyzing several 
versions of this type of bargaining-power legislation. However, 
the NFU is the only major farm organization supporting this approach, 
so the odds are against its acceptance, although it might prove to 
be helpful for campaign purposes in 1968. 
What about the policy-making role of the USDA? 
At the moment, the Secretary of Agriculture is being pulled and 
hauled in several incompatible directions. The White House demands 
a farm policy that decreases public costs, maintains "cheap" food, 
and increases -- or at least stabilizes -- farm income. The farmer 
expects to receive parity through voluntary, but costly, federal 
price support programs. To some extent, the food-deficit, less-
developed nations look to the USDA as a residual supplier who will 
be able to step in during time of famine, drouth and rising popula-
tion. The food-surplus western nations have come to view the 
United States as the world leader of the so-called "free world," 
which seems to mean that we must be reluctant to exploit the 
"dollar" markets, but be willing to fulfill the food needs of the 
"local-currency" markets • 
In a sense the USDA had learned to live with this mixture of 
political incompatibilities by developing a kind of food version of 
Keynesian economics. The so-called voluntary commodity programs 
are to be manipulated so that supply moves upward by lowering the 
acreage requirements for participation in the price support programs, 
while increasing or stabilizing the compensatory payments. When 
we need less production, the procedure is reversed. 
The technique is hardly infallible, to be sure. Natural 
disasters and biological enemies -- among other uncertainties --
intervene to distort the economists' curves, but American foreign 
policy has recently proven to be by far the most recalcitrant 
variable. When food stocks moved down to rather low levels , 
compensatory techniques were employed in late 1966 and early 1967 
to move the supply curve upward. But the "heating-up" of the 
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Vietnam war made it most difficult for the Secretary of 
Agriculture to move dramatically in the relief of farmer suffering 
from the new heap of piled-up food. Low farm prices, in tum, 
have left farm interests disenchanted with the Food For Peace 
program and somewhat cynical relative to the major aims of the 
Administration • s farm program. 
Already moves have been made to decrease the 1968 production 
of wheat, feed grains and soybeans, but this procedure means 
added treasury costs in an economy already 11 0ver-heated ... 
What can the farmer expect from the USDA in 1968? First, 
the wheat and feed grains programs for 1969 will quite likely be 
announced after the Democratic National Convention in late 
August and before the presidential and congressional elections 
in early November. We do not feel it is cynical --but only 
realistic -- to forecast a minor .. improvement .. in the size of the 
compensatory payment and the acreage-reduction payment. 
Second, the USDA will do its utmost to bring about more 
emphasis on federal policies favoring a decentralization of 
industry into the medium-sized cities and towns (1, 000-5,000 
population). This struggle is far from won. Even winning, of 
course, means only a small-sized cut of the development funds 
for rural America, but the size of the cut is important. 
Third, the USDA will learn to manipulate the nine self-help 
criteria in the Food for Peace Act of 1966, and its eventual suc-
cessor •. Burdensome food surpluses will be exported while a 
shrinkin9 domestic food reserve will still be protected by a skill-
ful application of the criteria. All in all, these criteria may well 
prove to be a flexible and adaptable political tool. 
Fourth, the USDA will continue to find some way to live with 
the results and the failures of the Kennedy Round negotiations. 
lt will surely be most difficult to reconcile a free trade program 
based on the economic law of comparative advantages, and a 
mildly protectionist program based on the .. reasonable .. protection 
of domestic producers, with the aggressively protectionist 
policies of the European Economic Community and, possibly, the 
predatory trading policies of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. 
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What is the outlook for government food programs in 1969-70? 
The American farmer is caught in Tocqueville • s circle of 
determinism .Y It may be that the narrow "verge" of the farmer• s 
circle has caused the mounting frustration, discontent, and even 
alienation, to which we earlier made reference. 
So many external factors tend to control a farmer• s destiny 
that he is free to act only within a political world over which he 
has less and less control: the 1968 elections, Vietnam, the 
costs of the ABM missile system, the "moon race," funds to 
curb race riots and to further urban rehabilitation, the Foreign 
Assistance Program, nagging and proliferating international trade 
barriers. Nevertheless, we hazard these general statements about 
the farm political situation in 1969-70. 
First, the Food and Agriculture Act of 1965 expires in 1969. If 
the Democrats control the Presidency and the Congress, we guess 
that the law will be extended for another four years in approximately 
its present form. Should the Conservative Coalition control both 
branches , then a bill like the AFBF• s Wheat and Feed Grains Act 
might be enacted. 
Second, the "War on Hunger" will probably be stepped up a 
notch or two. 
Next, the rural-oriented centers of power in Congress are un-
likely to generate enough votes to pass an up-dated version of the 
Capper-Volstead Act for farmers and their cooperatives. The problem 
is that the AFBF, NFU, NFO, National Council of Farmer Cooperatives 
and, to a lesser extent, the National Grange, are not agreed on 
either strategy or tactics. 
Fourth, there may be massive inputs for rural developmental 
assistance, but only if military expenditures are abruptly reduced. 
Y de Tocqueville, Alexis. Democracy In America. Andrew Hacker 
edition. New York. Washington Square Press, 1964. p. 331. 
"Providence has not created man entirely independent or entirely 
free. It is true, that around every man a fatal circle is traced, 
beyond which he cannot pass; but within the wide verge of that 
circle he is powerful and free: as it is with man, so with 
communities." 
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Finally, there will most likely be many other food-oriented 
legislative bills proposed, and even some passed during the 9lst 
Congress. It does not appear, however, that they will have much 
direct impact relative to farm prices and farm income. Food 
legislation protecting the consumer will be in evidence, and some 
type of REA "Bank" bill will probably be enacted -- once the loan-
subsidy issue is resolved. Food for welfare and educational pro-
grams will be expanded -- school lunch, special milk, food stamps, 
and direct distribution. 
Congress may have reached the political position where it will 
be possible, even necessary, to pass restrictive legislation con-
cerning the amount of government payments which can be received 
by any single producer. Using 1965 crop year, and excluding 
price-support loans and purchases, something over $1 billion would 
have been "saved" if no payments for the various programs had 
exceeded $5,000 per producer. If that cut-off figure were raised 
to $10 , 0 0 0 , then the "saving" would have been over $ 6 0 9 million, 
with less than one-third as many farmers affected.!Q/ 
All in all, our estimate of the situation is that the near-term 
prospects for farm-food legislation is not dismal; the status quo, 
in terms of renewing existing legislation, can probably be main-
tained. The scientific-technological revolution has made dynamic 
changes in the economics and sociology of American agriculture; 
it has yet to bring its full weight against the politics of that same 
agriculture • 
.!..Q/ Congressional Record. 90th Congress - 1st Session. June 6, 
1967. p. H-6670. 
OBJECTIVES AND GOALS FOR FARM COMMODITY PROGRAMS AFTER 1969 
Luther G. Tweeten* 
We have had some success with our space program because the 
goal of putting a man on the moon by 1970 has appeared attractive 
and attainable. Similarly, the success of commodity programs can 
be improved with a careful outline of where we need to go, even 
though the objectives may not be as glamorous as putting a man on 
the moon. 
It is easy to list a set of objectives for farm programs. The 
hard part is to lay out a set that can be reconciled with reality, 
and to appraise the means and degree by which the set can be 
realized. 
This paper begins with a list of objectives for farm commodity 
programs after 1969. The list would have looked about the same in 
1960. It is a little like the test questions that remain the same in 
an economics course; only the answers change. Similarly, the 
interpretation and means for achieving the objectives of commodity 
programs change over time. Thus, the discussion of each objective, 
which follows the initial listing, is the heart of this paper. 
One theme of this paper is that the declining political power of 
farm interests should lead to greater stress on society's goals for 
farm programs. The paper concludes with a specific program pro-
posal which hopefully represents a reasonable compromise of farm, 
consumer and government interests. 
Objectives For Programs 
The over-all objective of our commodity programs after 1969 
should be to provide adequate food and fiber at a minimum social 
cost. The term "adequate" refers to the quantity, variety and 
quality of farm products. The term "social cost" refers to a 
reasonable compromise of taxpayer costs, consumer costs and 
farm income. The generalized objective entails these specific 
objectives: 
*Professor of Agricultural Economics, Oklahoma State University. 
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(1) Adequate food and fiber to meet not only domestic but 
foreign commitments for our farm products at reasonable costs to 
consumers and taxpayers; 
(2) Encouragement of technical and economic efficiency in 
agriculture; 
(3) Maximum feasible reliance on the market mechanism; 
(4) Production flexibility and reserve supplies to meet 
unpredictable contingencies such as drouth in the U. S., brush-
fire wars , and variation in foreign demand; and 
(5) Measures to at least partially compensate farmers for 
economic losses resulting from a national policy of food abundance 
and reserve capacity in agriculture. 
Each of these objectives is discussed below. 
Adequate Supplies Of Farm Products 
Problems of managing our food abundance in the last decade 
testify to the adequate quantity of farm products. Quality and 
variety also have been continually improved. The outlook for farm 
policies after 1969 depends heavily on the demand-supply balance. 
Food shortages would lead to government efforts to encourage 
production through high support prices and subsidized inputs. 
Problems of controlling and managing excess capacity would fade 
into the background. On the other hand, an outlook of food 
.abundance would give opportunities to plan in advance to wisely 
manage that abundance. 
To interpret the goal of adequate supplies of farm products, it is 
necessary to examine estimates of the food balance after 1969. The 
World Food Situation.!/ projections to 1980 are the most competent esti-
mates to date of the outlook for world food production and consumption • 
..!/Abel, Martin and Anthony Rojko. World Food Situation. U S D A 
Foreign Agri. Economic Report No. 35. Washington, D. C. 
September 1967. 
------·--· 
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The study projects world grain production and consumption to 1970 
and 1980 under various assumptions. The authors projected consumption 
independently of production I and did not balance the production and 
consumption figures. The result was net world exports -- supplies 
exceeded utilization. Since the opportunities for food storage are 
somewhat limited over such a period 1 supplies will in fact have to 
be in line with utilization. 
I will assume that this balance is accomplished by a reduction 
in U. S. production and exports. It may be argued that the U. S. 
will not accept the role of residual supplier of world grains if 
its market share falls off too sharply. Thus 1 I assume that the 
U. S. will be the residual supplier of grains 1 subject to the 
restraint that the future U. S. market share of world exports not 
digress too drastically from the past share. 
My revised projections in Table 1 for 1970 and 1980 1 based on 
the Abel-Rojko data 1 fall close to the recent U. S. share of world 
grain exports (about 50 per cent) 1 except for the "rapid improve-
ment in production" to 1980. Thus the residual approach appears 
to be reasonable. 
The "historical trend" projections are merely an extension of 
past trends in production. The "modified historical trend" is the 
historical trend adjusted upward for investments that many developing 
countries are making and that seem fairly certain to pay off in 
raising output above the past trend (table 1). The "moderate 
improvement in production" assumes that less developed countries 
will carry through their plans to place even greater emphasis on 
agricultural development; this projection is an entirely attainable 
target without a crash program. The "rapid improvement in produc-
tion" is a normative projection of what would be a desirable 
increase in production to reach satisfactory nutritional goals by 
1980. Translated into investment requirements 1 this latter projec-
tion would require a crash program that appears unattainable. 
However 1 the projection is useful for illustrative purposes. The 
projections differ only for the developing countries--the rate of 
growth in production in developed countries is the same for each 
projection. Projected compound rates of growth in production for 
the developing countries are 2. 4 1 2. 6 I 3.1 and 3. 5 per cent 1 
respectively 1 under the four 1980 assumptions between 1970 
(modified historic trend) and 1980. 
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Abel and Rojko projected a 2.1 per cent annual increase in 
U. S. grain yields from 1970 to 1980. This low yield increase is 
partially explained by the assumed expansion of acreage from 
158 million in 1970 to 186 million in 1980--hence a move to some 
lower yielding land. 
I regressed grain yield per acre on acreage and time, using 
annual data for 195 7 to 1966. The coefficient of acreage was 
highly insignificant, indicating that changes in acreage had 
little impact on yield in this decade. The coefficient of time was 
highly significant, and indicated that yields of grains had 
increased on the average 3. 9 per cent per year during the decade. 
Ibach estimated that the farm rate of return on fertilizer 
expenditures as an average over the U. S. is around 100 per 
cent.Y He estimated that crop yields could be doubled in the 
U. S. if farmers used fertilizer to the point where the last dollar 
invested in fertilizer brought a return of a dollar. Even if Ibach's 
estimates are discounted for upward bias, the weight of all the 
above evidence is heavily on the side of food abundance pre-
dominating from 1969 to 1980. 
Projections are measures of what is likely to be, under 
specific assumptions. A prediction is what is likely to be 
"period," and is the one projection with the most realistic 
assumptions. Under this criterion, the "modified historical 
trend" for 1970 and the "moderate improvement in production" for 
1980 have the most realistic or likely assumptions and are the 
best predictions. 
According to the results in Table 1, the harvested U. S. 
grain acreage will need to be around 153 million acres in 1970 
and 163 million acres in 1980. This represents no challenge to 
the U. S. production capacity--185 million acres were harvested 
in 1959 and acreages had been even larger in earlier years. By 
shifting grassland, cotton land and other land to feed grains, 
the U. S. could easily have 200 million acres of grains. 
Y' Ibach, D. B. Fertilizer Use in the United States • USDA, Agri. 
Economic Report No. 92, Washington, D. C. May 1966. 
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Grains currently account for half of the harvested cropland in 
the U. S. Assuming other crops maintain their current supply-
demand balance to 1980 and that commodity programs similar to 
current ones are used in 1980, then the acreage diversion projected 
for 1980 ranges from 42 to 61 million acres with a most likely 
estimate 4 7 million acres. This compares with 60.4 million acres 
in 1966. 
Data in Table 1 can be used as a basis for predicting total 
demand for food and fiber in the U. S. Domestic demand for the 
output of all U. S • farms is not too difficult to predict. If the 
domestic income elasticity of demand for farm products is .1, the 
per capita income increases 2 percent annually and population 
increases 1.4 per cent annually, then total domestic demand in-
creases at the rate of 1.4 + (.1)2 = 1.6 per cent per year. If 
demand for exports other than grains increases at the same rate 
as grains, about 4.1 per cent annually based on the "best" 
estimates in Table 1, and if exports constitute 18 per cent of the 
demand for U. S • farm output, then total demand for U. S. farm 
products will increase .82 (1.6) + .18 (4.1) =2.0 per cent annually 
(the first term on the left is the domestic share, the second term 
the export share) • 
The average annual increment in productivity of farm resources 
from 1950 to 1965 was 1. 7 per cent. If this holds from 1966 to 1980, 
farm production resources would need to increase 2. 0 - 1. 7 = • 3 
per cent annually to meet growing demand. The increase in farm 
resources has been about this rate since 1960. The conclusion is 
that farm resources will not be under stress to meet domestic and 
world needs after 1969. The most reasonable estimate, that farm 
production inputs will need to increase only • 3 per cent annually, 
could be revised upward substantially and still represent no serious 
challenge to agriculture. 
If productivity does not increase at the indicated rate through 
increased specialization, consolidation and expansion of farm size, 
and introduction of improved inputs , the slack will have to be 
filled with more conventional inputs. Nevertheless, it is quite 
clear that U. S. farmers can meet any foreseeable contingency 
that arises, and excess production capacity is likely to exist by 
1980 under a considerable range of possible circumstances. The 
prime objective for agriculture, providing ample food, will be met. 
Not only Americans but foreigners will be eating more and better 
food in 1980 than today. The objectives for farm programs after 1969 
must be formulated within the dynamic context of abundance. 
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Efficiency 
Commodity programs to maintain farm income should at best 
enhance farming efficiency and at worst not unduly retard efficiency. 
Diversion of land from crops to soil conserving uses by government 
programs reduces efficiency. For this reason, farm programs for 
years have taken their lumps from efficiency-minded people. 
Inefficiency stemming from diverting cropland shows only the 
first-order effects. Because of the security and capital provided 
by government programs , the larger, more efficient farmers have 
substituted big machines and purchased inputs for their own labor 
and for hired labor. They have mightily expanded their operations 
by taking over the land of their neighbors who have retired or 
taken nonfarm jobs. As a result of this substitution of capital for 
labor, there are fewer workers in agriculture, and larger farms 
than under a free market. This is what Tyner's simulation of the 
farm economy over a 30-year period says.l/ Also, land prices 
stimulated by commodity programs have formed a capital barrier 
to new starts in farming. According to Tyner's study, the level 
and mix of farm resources in aggregate was slightly closer to that 
of a perfect market under government programs than would have 
occurred under a free market. Introduction of a free market would 
initially release many more workers from farms per year than would 
current programs. Many of these released workers would be 
efficient young farmers who are now heavily in debt. But over a 
longer period, according to Tyner• s study, more workers would be 
released under commodity programs. 
The ironic result is that farm programs were initially justified 
as measures to improve equity, although the authors and supporters 
recognized that they would cause inefficiency. The reverse has 
occurred in practice. Farm programs have not contributed to 
equality of income (benefits are distributed among farmers nearly 
in proportion to sales of products) , but programs have been 
compatible with efficiency. 
Still, much inefficienc.[ exists in agriculture. Forty per cent 
of farm labor is redundant .Y Programs could be designed for 
agriculture which not only would stabilize farm markets, but also 
V Tyner, Fred H. A Simulation Analysis of the Economic Structure of 
U.S. Agriculture. Ph.D. thesis. Library, Oklahoma State University. 
May 1967. 
~ Tyner 1 Fred and Luther Tweeten. Optimum Resource Allocation in 
U.S. Agriculture. Journal of Farm Economics 1 Vol. 48, No. 4. 
August 1966. pp. 613-631. 
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would encourage more out-movement of excess labor. Long-term 
land retirement that concentrates on marginal cropland that would 
have a higher social value in grass, forest or recreational use 
would fall in this category. For this program to be effective, it 
must be accompanied by programs to educate, train and in other 
ways prepare farm people for smooth and productive assimilation 
into non-farm employment. 
Flexibility 
The aggregate supply elasticity measures the responsiveness 
of farm output to changes in prices received by farmers. It is 
about .1 in 1-2 years 1 • 3 in 3-4 years and is 1. 0 only in the long 
run. This indicates that farm output is not very responsive to 
changes in price. Of course any one commodity responds very 
rapidly to a change in its price; many individual commodities have 
a short-run supply elasticity of • 5. It is easy to shift farm re-
sources from one crop to another. But for farm income policy we are 
concerned with aggregate output 1 which really depends on the volume 
of all resources committed to agriculture. This total volume is not 
highly sensitive to price. And because of capital limitations and 
uncertainty 1 private investment does not provide sufficient storage 
to meet contingencies that arise. 
A game against nature. The world food problem can be viewed 
as a game against nature as shown below: 
Public policies for agriculture 
Invest in farming s1 
Invest in industry s2 
States of nature 
Abundant Niggardly 
al2 
a22 
Agricultural production is not very predictable, and it is 
impossible precisely to match future food needs with public investments 
to increase the productivity of agriculture. The social payoffs above 
are indicated by the a .. (a11 1 a 2 1 a 21 1 a 2). Public investment in 
agriculture will avert ~ cnsis rminimlze tosses) if nature is niggardly. 
Similarly 1 allocating the mass of public investment to develop industry 1 
a behavior characteristic of many developing countries 1 will cause 
no agricultural crises if nature is abundant. Payoffs associated with 
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public investment to raise agricultural productivity coupled with a 
niggardly nature (a12) 1 and with little public investment and an 
abundant nature (a21J result in minor errors and insignificant 
problems. 
One public policy error 1 in the framework of game theory 1 
arises from a combination of investment in agriculture and an 
abundant nature--a crisis of abundance indicated by payoff all. 
The second major error is failure to invest in agriculture 
coupled with a niggardly nature--a crisis of food shortage indi-
cated by a • Crisis all is a "happy" problem; crisis a 22 is a 
disaster. ~e minimum gain (maximum loss) from strategy sl is 
all and from s 2 is a 22 • It is clear that a society concerned with 
maximizing its minimum gain would choose s 1 1 investment in 
agriculture. In practice 1 the game is not black or white and all 
public investment would not be in agriculture. But the decision 
framework of game theory brings into sharp focus the advantages 
of making an error on the side of too much rather than too little 
food. Too much farm production capacity is a problem of low 
prices and income for farmers; too little is a problem of food 
shortages and high food prices for consumers. The former 1 
although irritating 1 is the preferred problem. Objectives for 
farm commodity programs must recognize not only the advantages 
of abundant farm output 1 but the need to deal with resulting prob-
lems of over-capacity and low farm income. 
For these reasons 1 it would appear to be in the interests of 
society to maintain reserve capacity for contingencies such as 
drouth 1 war 1 world famine 1 etc. Reserve capacity tends to reduce 
farm prices and income 1 other things equal; and society can hardly 
expect farmers to shoulder the burden of maintaining a strategic 
reserve. 
Partially out of recognition of the value of a ready reserve 1 
society in the 1960's has maintained reserve capacity that has 
equaled about 7 per cent of farm production capacity at existing 
. 5/ . pnces ·-
.§/ Tyner 1 Fred and Luther G. Tweeten. Excess Capacity in U. S. Agri-
culture. Agricultural Economics Research. Vol. 16 I No. 1 • January 
19 6 4 • pp. 2 3-31. 
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.A case for reserve production capacity 
Managing production capacity to stabilize prices and incomes 
has long been an accepted procedure in nonfarm industries. While 
sometimes the U. S. Chamber of Commerce attacks adoption of 
such practices by farm groups with a vigor exceeded only by their 
defense of such practices for nonfarm industry, supply management 
is now an accepted objective of the American economy. Excess 
capacity, measured as the per cent of capacity not utilized, in 
the manufacturing sector averaged 16 per cent from 1953 to 1961 and 
was 9 per cent in 1966 .Y An estimated 25 per cent of the steel 
industry capacity and 22 per cent of the automobile industry 
capacity lay idle in the average during the 1953-64 period.11 
Excess industrial capacity has been justified as necessary to 
stabilize prices, protect industrial investment, serve as a reserve 
for emergency needs, and buy time for adjustments toward more 
efficient plants. These arguments can also be used to justify 
reserve capacity in agriculture, although they appear to hold 
more water at the 7 per cent level that has characterized farming 
than at the 22-25 per cent level found in the steel and auto 
industries. 
Who pays for reserve capacity should depend on who benefits 
and who can afford to pay. Since even under the most adverse 
conditions U. S. consumers would have sufficient food and fiber, 
it is clearly foreigners who stand to gain most. But neither 
foreigners nor domestic farmers are in a position to pay. Thus, 
the burden falls on the federal government. Potentially, at least, 
the federal government is in the best position to work out a com-
promise among interests of U. S. farmers and domestic and foreign 
consumers. 
While there is some agreement that an affluent society finds 
reserve capacity (above what a free market would hold) a desirable 
.§/ Economic Report of the President. U.S. Government Printing Office, 
Washington, D. C. January 1967. p. 253. 
1J Keyserling, Leon H. Agriculture and the Public Interest. Conference 
on Economic Progress, Washington, D. C. 1965. p. 41 
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and affordable luxury, there is less than complete agreement on 
how that reserve should be stored and who should pay for it. 
Reserves can be stored in the bin as feed grain or wheat, in unused 
technology not released to farmers, in cropland diverted from 
production, or in exports dumped on "needy" countries. I have 
suggested elsewhere how an augmented price mechanism can be 
used to obtain a proper mix between domestic production controls 
and disposal of excess capacity in developing countries • .V 
The goal of flexibility cannot be separated from the goals of 
economic stability and efficiency in farming. Efforts to maintain 
strategic reserves are most efficient (have lowest real costs) if 
they are coupled with efforts to stabilize farm prices. A reserve 
isolated from the market as proposed in recent Congressional 
legislation and by the Food and Fiber Commission does not have 
the economies of multiple uses. Farmers are satisfied to see the 
CCC bolster farm prices by accumulating stocks. But when stocks 
are released on the market, farmers get very upset. Yet if the 
price stabilization objective of farm programs is important, and if 
it is useful to keep the government cost down, then buying and 
selling and multiple uses of strategic reserves are desirable. One 
way out of this impasse is to legislate clear guidelines in advance, 
specifying when CCC stocks can be bought and sold. The Purcell 
Bill is in this direction, but does not go far enough. If guide-
lines are clear in advance 1 established properly to stabilize 
prices 1 and explained carefully to farmers , commodity sales under 
these guidelines should not disturb farmers to the extent that they 
have in the past. 
Government Costs 
If holding reserve capacity as a means toward farm economic 
stability and national security is one of the objectives of farm pro-
grams 1 then one becomes disturbed at the trend toward inability of 
a given acreage withdrawal to reduce production I and at the high 
cost of commodity programs. Government payments to farmers 
totaled $3 • 3 billion in 19 6 6 compared with $2 • 2 billion in 19 64 • 
And it wasn •t that excess capacity increased so rapidly that the 
.!V Tweeten 1 Luther G. A Proposed Allocative Mechanism for U. S. 
Food Aid. Journal of Farm Economics. Vol. 481 No. 4. November 1966. 
pp. 803-810. 
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government had to pay heavily for diverting production in the latter 
year. Rather, the government increasingly is moving toward direct 
payments, frequently masqueraded as acreage diversion programs. 
The advantage of direct payments is that they can be made equitable, 
going to the really poor farmer. Also such payments could encourage 
movement toward an "efficient" free market equilibrium of prices 
and output. Perhaps these reasons prompted the National Commission 
on Food and Fiber to recommend direct payments. But the direct 
payment "diversion" programs as now operated are the worst of all 
worlds--they go to the high income farmers and do not hold 
reserve capacity. Because farms are short on capital, they also 
stimulate output of large farms. Furthermore, because direct 
payments are an expensive way for the government to maintain 
farm income and are very visible, they are highly vulnerable to the 
political exigencies of Congress and the President. 
Slippage can be defined in two ways: (a) as increasing 
failure of diverted acres to reduce cropland harvested, and (b) 
as decreasing ability of a given government outlay for production 
controls to divert land from production. Some slippage of the first 
type is apparent in Table 2. On the average, the loosely run pro-
grams of the soil bank (Acreage Reserve and Conservation Reserve) 
removed • 8 6 acres of harvested cropland for each acre in the pro-
gram from 1957 to 1960. Despite the fact that the acreage diversion 
programs of the Kennedy and Johnson administrations have 
emphasized cross compliance, idling of cropland, and have con-
centrated on better land, they have on the average removed less 
cropland per diverted acre than did the soil bank. 
The second type of slippage may be measured by the number 
of government dollars required to divert a given amount of farm 
production. I have elsewhere given a number of estimates, and 
have compared the cost-effectiveness of various programs .V In 
general, long-term acreage diversion programs such as the 
Conservation Reserve which concentrated on marginal cropland 
ranked high in efficient use of government dollars. Another issue, 
however, is the efficiency of government dollars in a given type of 
program over the years • 
W Tweeten, Luther G. Commodity Programs for Agriculture. National 
Advisory Commission on Food and Fiber. Agricultural Policy: A Review 
of Programs and Needs. Washington, D.C. August 1967. pp. 107-130. 
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Table 3. Federal expenditures for agriculture and total budget, 
1932 to 196~ 
Agricultural expenditures Federal expenditures 
Income Proportion Proportion 
stab!liza- Total of Federal Total of 
tionb/ budgetb/ budget budget GNP 
($ Bil.) ($ Bil.) (Per cent) ($ Bil.) (Per cent) 
1932-39 (Total) 2.2 4.5 8.3 54.2 9.0 
1940 .7 1.5 17.0 9.1 9.1 
1941 .8 1.3 9.9 13.3 10.6 
1942 .6 1.5 4.4 34.0 24.4 
1943 .s .6 .8 79.4 44.7 
1944 .4 1.2 1.3 95.0 47.1 
1945 ...J;/ 1.6 1.6 98.3 45.3 
1946 ~/ .7 1.2 60.3 29.9 
1947 -.1 1.2 3.2 38.9 17.7 
1948 .1 .6 1.7 33.0 13.5 
1949 .3 2.5 6.4 39.5 15.2 
1950 .s 2.8 7.1 39.5 15.0 
1951 .5 .7 1.5 44.0 14.2 
1952 .3 1.1 1.6 65.3 19.4 
1953 .3 2.9 4.0 74.1 20.7 
1954 .8 2.6 3.8 67.5 18.7 
1955 3.1 4.7 7.3 64.4 17.0 
1956 3.2 4.9 7.4 66.2 16.2 
1957 2.5 4.2 6.0 69.0 16.0 
1958 2.1 3.9 5.5 71.4 16.2 
1959 4.7 6.2 7.5 80.3 17.1 
1960 2.9 4.3 5.6 76.5 15.5 
1961 3.1 4.4 5.4 81.5 16.1 
1962 3.8 5.1 5.8 87.9 16.2 
1963 4.7 6.1 6.6 92.6 16.2 
1964 4.8 6.2 6.3 97.7 16.0 
1965 4.2 5.6 5.8 96.5 14.8 
1966 2.8 4.2 3.9 107.0 15.0 
,..2/ Data from Bureau of the Budget, 1967; Economic Report of the 
President, 1967, p. 283; and unpublished worksheets, ERS, USDA. 
_Q/ Includes half of Food for Peace outlays. 
s/ Less than $50 million. 
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Table 3 helps to clarify the latter issue. Programs have been 
basically of the same type since 1961 1 and the excess capacity 
has been about the same. Yet the budget for income stabilization 
increased from $3.1 billion in 1961 to $4.8 billion in 1964. Then 
the budget appeared to go down. This is a temporary condition 1 
made possible by huge sales from CCC stocks. 
A reduction in the federal cost of farm programs while at the 
same time maintaining farm income has long been an objective of 
farm programs 1 and those after 1969 will be no exception. Much of 
the dramatic effort of the Administration in 1962 and 1963 to move 
toward mandatory programs was motivated by this objective. 
Rejection of mandatory programs by farmers in the early 1960's led 
to voluntary programs. The issue then is which voluntary program 
makes government dollars go farthest to raise farm income. Acre-
age diversion programs theoretically should go far to hold up farm 
income with a given government outlay. It is disappointing to 
find 1 however, that these programs are little more efficient than 
direct payments--perhaps because as stated above they have 
essentially become direct payment programs. 
Yet in the interests of holding a strategic reserve of production 
capacity 1 making farmers feel they are doing something to warrant 
receiving a payment 1 and reducing the federal cost of farm programs 1 
I feel an objective of farm programs should be to efficiently use 
acreage diversion programs. This entails long-term acreage 
diversion administered in a hard-headed business-like manner by 
the ASCS on a quid pro quo basis. Sealed bids might be used to 
divert acres. The idea would be to hold the federal budget to 
around $6 billion. Efficient management of farm excess capacity 
would hold a needed reserve within this budget and give farmers at 
the same time a satisfactory income. 
The real burden of this budget will decline. Table 3 shows that 
federal agricultural expenditures were 8. 3 per cent of the total 
federal budget in the 1932-1939 period. The budget of $6.2 billion in 
19 64 was only 6. 3 per cent of the total federal budget. Also 1 since 
the total federal budget has tended to remain about 16 per cent of 
the GNP since World War II, it follows that the federal farm budget 
is a declining portion of the GNP. The data show that the real cost 
of farm programs is falling 1 and can be used to justify some assistance 
to stabilize the farm economy with government programs after 1969. 
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Market Mechanism 
Our society prizes the price system because it efficiently 
allocates resources and rewards factors of production according to 
their contribution. Another value judgment is that income through 
the market is unequivocally superior to income through the U. S. 
Treasury. The considerations prompted listing "maximum feasible 
reliance on the market mechanism" as one objective of farm pro-
grams after 19 69. 
How much can the market be used? Can we go all the way to 
a free market? Numerous studies have compiled impressive 
evidence that the short-run consequences of a completely free mar-
ket would be disastrous, and that a careful program of transition 
would be essential. 
There does not appear to be much reason to keep farm income 
much above a free market equilibrium for extended periods. This 
is because government programs do not raise net farm income over 
a number of years anyway--at least not without accelerating 
transfer payments to farmers. 
There are three important reasons why commodity programs do 
not support farm net income in the long run. First 1 the adjustments 
in labor and other resources tend to reverse the initial downward 
adjustment in commodity prices and resource earnings following 
a return to a free market. 
Second 1 benefits of commodity programs are capitalized into 
land. One estimate attributes one-third of the gain in land prices 
since 1950 to farm commodity programs 1 and indicates that the 
expected benefits have already been capitalized into land • .!.Q/ 
The program benefits are lost to the new generation of farmers and 
accrue to the original landowners 1 many of whom have retired or 
live off the farm. This may be one reason for current farm discontent • 
.!.Q/ Tweetenl Luther and Ted Nelson. Sources and Repercussions of 
Changing U. S. Farm Real Estate Values. Oklahoma Agri. Exp. Sta. 
Tech. Bul. T-120. 1966. 
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The ratio of prices received to prices paid by farmers can be 
at various levels, without having much effect on farm income after 
several years. Land prices are determined by efficient farmers 
who also tend to be large farmers because size is required for 
efficiency. These farmers are rational and tend to bid a price for 
land that will earn as much as they can earn on their capital 
invested elsewhere. The little, inefficient farmer who must com-
pete for land on the same market will have a paper loss (based on 
the opportunity cost of his land) if he fails to buy land, and will 
have an actual loss if he pays the exorbitant (for him) price of 
land. Land prices at the margin reflect realistic rates of return to 
efficient farmers--hence are in dynamic equilibrium--but are 
clearly too high for the small farmer. My analysis indicates that 
in this context 90 per cent of the operators are "small" farmers. 
Commodity programs walk a tightrope. Returns are already 
so high on large farms that agriculture is on the brink of attracting 
huge amounts of investment by nonfarmers. Setting support prices 
even higher to help small and medium size farmers will attract 
massive investment by nonfarmers, corporate farming and other 
outside interference, against which farm supports initially at least 
were designed to protect farmers. And the alternative of setting 
lower price and income supports places continuing financial hard-
ships on most farmers. 
Finally, my results indicate that the price elasticity of demand 
for farm output is approximately -.3 in 1-2 years, -.5 in 3-4 years 
and -1.1 in the long run 2:!/ An elastic demand means that restric-
tions on production do not raise gross farm income in the long run. 
If they do not raise gross farm income, production controls also 
cannot be expected to raise net farm income. 
Then why have farm programs if they do not raise net farm 
income over an extended period--a period of more than about 10 
years? The principal reason for farm programs is to reduce insta-
bility in farm income. In the old days, farmers could postpone 
expenses and take a low return on their own labor and land. Today 
cash expenses for items purchased for the nonfarm sector are a 
higher proportion of farm costs, and it is not easy to postpone such 
]Jj Tweeten, Luther G. The Demand Elasticity for U. S. Farm Output. 
Food Research Institute Studies. Stanford University. December 196 7. 
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expenses. Many farmers today are highly vulnerable to fluctuating 
prices, and farmers are unlikely to tolerate the instability of a free 
market--at least for very many years. An unstable farm economy 
brought on by an exodus of government from agriculture would create 
a vacuum which would be filled by strong (and I believe eventually 
successful) efforts of farmers to form their own bargaining associa-
tions for even the major farm commodities. 
Political Realities 
Farm programs and their objectives must be viewed in the light 
of political realities. Farmers have been extremely successful in 
the political arena. Since 1954, farmers have paid approximately 
$1.4 billi2n annually in personal taxes to federal, state and local 
sources.-:.::..; Since 19 59, the annual federal budget for price 
supports alone has averaged approximately $4 billion. The political 
success implied by these data can be explained by several factors 
including: (a) Switch voting of farmers. Farmers are by nature 
conservative, but also vote their "pocketbook." Since their poc-
ketbook is often pinched, the result is switch voting that packs 
a good deal of political wallop. (b) A farmer's vote has been 
weighted more heavily than his urban counterpart. Reapportion-
ment has already gone a long way, and by 1969 each farm vote will 
have about as much weight as a city vote. The political position 
of farmers will be further eroded by the drop in the farm population 
as a proportion of the nonfarm population from the current 6 per 
cent to almost 3 per cent in 1980. (c) Southern voter loyalty. 
Southern senators and representatives not only are very able 
political tacticians, they have accumulated senior positions on 
strategic committees. Their bargaining power and interest in 
ctgriculture have lent decisive support for farm commodity programs. 
They have shown skill in forming pragmatic alliances to support 
their programs. The rise of the Republican party in the South and 
attendant erosion of voter loyalty to a one-party system, increasing 
age and retirement of strategic legislators, and a rising urban-
industrial class in the South will weaken the Congressional base 
for commodity programs • This trend will perhaps accelerate after 
1969. (d) Goals, values and conditions in agriculture. Some 
argue that society has supported commodity programs out of a 
W U. S. Department of Agriculture. Farm Income Situation. FIS-207. 
Washington, D. C. July 1967. p. 48. 
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lingering farm fundamentalism in the rural and urban electorates and 
because these programs contributed to the goal of preserving the 
family farm. The number of urban people who have a fond affection 
for the farm has created the phenomenon of increasing farm aid 
while the proportion of farm votes diminished .13 I In recognition 
of this view Brandt holds that 11 ••• the extraordinary good will 
which the urban public entertains toward farmers should be treated 
by them with utmost respect, and nursed by them and their repre-
sentatives with more care than the Treasury• s gold reserves in 
Kentucky are guarded. 11 
I have contended that the old image that nonfarmers had toward 
farmers is changing and that farmers would do well to seek a 
positive new image .14/ Where possible, it is useful to make the 
goals and objectives of farm programs more nearly consistent with 
the interests of urban-industrial society. The declining position 
of farmers in the voting booth, reduced effectiveness of farm-
oriented legislators, and declining ability of farm groups to form 
and direct effective coalitions in Congress (since they will have 
a smaller bargaining base) suggest a basis for concern and a need 
to seek common cause with urban legislators. 
Farmers need to stress the fact that several aspects of farm 
commodity programs are in the interests of non-farmers. In some 
instances, it may be necessary to reformulate or change the 
objectives of farm programs to place them more nearly in the 
national interest. The following aspects of farm programs are 
consistent with the objective of urban-industrial society and 
should be stressed: Past programs have not reduced efficiency in 
agriculture, they have helped to maintain a useful strategic 
.reserve, and they have given potential supply flexibility that a 
free market would not have provided. It is not too far-fetched to 
contend that commodity programs are a price society pays for an 
atomistic farm market structure. That is, the absence of commodity 
1.1/ Brandt, Karl. Guidelines for Constructive Revision of Policy in the 
Coming Decade. Journal of Farm Economics. Vol. 43. February 1961. 
pp. 1-12. 
W Tweeten, Luther. 1968 (forthcoming}. Emerging Goals and Values for 
Rural People in an Urban-Industrial Society. A National Basebook for 
Agricultural Policy. Center for Agricultural and Economic Development. 
Iowa State University Press. 
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programs would eventually lead to successful efforts of farmers 
to form effective bargaining groups to raise domestic food prices, 
and to entail a social cost from reduced marketings that would be 
greater than the social cost of current programs • In addi~ion to 
emphasizing such goals as flexibility, strategic reserves, stable 
food prices and efficiency that are in the interests of non-farmers, 
commodity programs should make efforts to hold down the federal 
cost, avoid undue contribution to income inequality (base acreage 
withdrawal on a hard-headed quid pro quo basis), and streamline 
the efficiency with which programs are administered. While 
pressure groups and political infighting may be the operational 
framework within which farm programs are made, still what 
political punch farmers can muster will go farthest if managed 
within the context of a favorable image for agriculture and farm 
program objectives that are in the interests of non-farmers as well 
as farmers. 
A Suggested Program 
It perhaps would be remiss to end this paper without a program 
proposal which would be broadly in line with the objectives of farm 
programs listed above. In this, I am somewhat half-hearted, for 
one economist cannot adequately handle the value judgments that 
must necessarily be part of the framework. Despite these mis-
givings, the following suggestion contains many objectives desir-
able in a farm program. 
The key provisions of the program include (a) an Agricultural 
Board removed one step from politics to administer programs, (b) 
a long-term land retirement program, (c) extension of market 
pricing and multiple pricing, (d) substitution of unspecified cost 
or credit foreign aid for P.L. 480, with a discount given on U.S. 
farm commodities, (e) a computerized management of reserve 
stocks operating within preset guidelines. 
The long-term land retirement program and one guaranteed 
11 high., price in the multiple price system would contribute to the 
objective of economic stability and security in programs. A free 
market price on the marginal production would contribute to the 
objective of efficiency--it would add income in elastic export 
markets and would discourage domestic overproduction. In 
addition to the long-term land retirement, a reserve would be kept 
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in commodity stocks, with the inventory mechanically managed by 
a prearranged electronic computer inventory program designed to 
stabilize economic conditions while at the same time holding a 
strategic reserve at minimum social cost.~/ 
Long-term land retirement 
To reduce government cost, the program would entail only long-
term land retirement, with loans made to farmers for the cropping 
rights on their farms • Contracts would be for whole or part farms 
for an indefinitely long (infinite) period.; The long-term feature 
would greatly reduce the over-all program costs, although the 
initial cost of bringing land under loans would be large. The 
government would take sealed bids, accepting for loans only that 
farmland that removed the greatest amount of production per 
dollar of the loan. Owners would retain title to the land, and con-
tinue to pay taxes. Grazing might be permitted. The tendency to 
concentrate production withdrawal in marginal areas and on whole 
farms would be consistent with economic efficiency, but safe-
guards in the form of limiting production withdrawal to one-third of 
the land in any one county would cushion the impact on the rural 
non-farm sector. The new program would be introduced and 
phase out other programs over a 10-year period. This would re-
duce the immediate cost of the program. A total of perhaps 50 
million acres eventually would be included. Loans would have no 
interest. But if the owner wished to place the land in crop produc-
tion, he could repay the loan plus interest. This would provide 
flexibility in the long-term program. Times of pressing food and 
fiber· needs would lead to a considerable amount of loans being re-
paid with lands again placed in crop production. Also, the govem-
.ment might temporarily suspend some proportion of each land 
retirement contract in time of excess demand for food and fiber. 
Much land would indefinitely remain in grass, trees or recreational 
uses, however • 
.!..§/ The social cost is defined here as the triangle bounded by demand 
and supply curves and a line indicating the deviation of production 
from the perfect market equilibrium. By assigning various weights 
to costs and returns, allowance can be made for a divergence of 
private and social cost. 
-170-
Market, marginal and multiple pricing 
Research indicates that the export demand for U. S. farm 
products is price elastic.~ As long as export prices ax:e above 
marginal costs of production, gross and net farm receipts will be 
increased by lower export prices • To reduce charges from competing 
exporters that we are "dumping" surpluses, to lower the cost of 
U. S. government export subsidies, and to use prices to restrain 
U. S • farm production, it is recommended that U. S. farmers 
actually receive the world market price for their marginal 
production. 
One of the lessons apparent from the history of farm policy 
is that a radical departure from past policies is politically 
feasible only in times of crisis. Since I foresee no crisis, and 
since there are many highly desirable features in recent programs, 
my general recommendations are deliberately framed to avoid a 
major shift in policies. 
Efforts to remove export barriers including tariffs , quotas and 
variable levies should be vigorously pursued. Reciprocal trade 
agreements, barter and other measures should be used to expand 
farm exports. The most effective means to increase U. S. farm 
exports in the long-run is to have economic development, 
especially in less developed countries which now lack effective 
demand and foreign exchange to purchase our products. Our 
nonfood aid to improve industry in foreign countries should be 
increased, perhaps at the expense of food aid. I suggest that 
instead of pressuring developed countries to share in giving food 
aid, that they instead be encouraged to give other foreign aid 
that will promote economic development in the LDC' s. Because 
other developed countries have a higher opportunity cost of food 
than does the U. S. , their comparative advantage lies in giving 
nonfood aid. 
A commodity-by-commodity approach is needed to keep 
domestic policies consistent with goals of maintaining the 
stability and level of farm income, holding food prices at reason-
able levels, holding some reserve capacity, utilizing foreign 
markets and giving farmers maximum feasible control over their 
production and marketing decisions. In all cases, the marginal 
price would be determined by the commercial market forces--of 
which world markets would be a major factor • 
.!.§/ Loc. cit. Tweeten (11). 
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For individual commodities, these are some suggestions: 
(a) Soybeans, livestock, poultry, fruits and vegetables 
would have no production controls and no special price or income 
supports. 
(b) Dairy: A two-price system would be used, with a 
higher price for Class I milk paid on a fixed historic base of 
production. Other milk would be priced at market levels, with 
farmers paid the market price on production above the Class I 
base (no blend price). There would be no production controls. 
(c) Cotton: The market price would prevail for cotton. 
A direct payment from the government would be used to maintain 
a higher price on a fixed portion of the historic allotment, with a 
limit on the size of payment. There would beno production con-
trols, and any farmer who wished could produce and sell at the 
market price. If deemed necessary, however, the direct payments 
would be used to divert land to soil conserving uses. 
(d) Wheat and feed grains: The commodities would 
essentially become part of a single market. Farmers would 
receive the market price for feed grains and wheat. A certificate 
plan would be continued on wheat, with the full cost paid by 
processors. The certificate would be paid on the fixed proportion 
of the historic allotment for domestic use of wheat. The certifi-
cate payment might be used to induce farmers to convert some 
land to soil conserving uses. Also, the certificate payment 
might be gradually reduced and eliminated over a ten-year period. 
For feed grains, the government would use a direct payment 
to make up the difference between the market price and support 
price of say $1.30 per bushel. This payment would be made only 
to farmers who converted some land to soil conserving uses. In 
periods of depressed income and excess production the payment 
would be used as effectively as possible to reduce production. 
In periods of less excess capacity, payments per farm might 
have an upper limit to curtail subsidies to large farms , and would 
be used as a direct supplement to income of smaller farms, based 
only to a limited extent on their withdrawal of land from production. 
The marginal price of feed grains and wheat would be deter-
mined by interplay in the markets. They would be priced 
competitively, and farmers could grow any grain. Farmers would 
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receive the market price for their production. The commodity programs 
would be supplemented by additional acreage withdrawal and, if 
necessary, stock adjustments by the CCC to reduce undue pressures 
of excess U. S. farm production capacity on markets and prices. 
The above programs would be voluntary. No calculations of 
cost are included, but costs would be much less than with programs 
of the early 1960's. A goal might be for the government to grad-
ually eliminate its function of maintaining a two-price system as 
farm bargaining groups gained strength and assumed this function. 
It was argued earlier that government support programs do not 
raise the long-term level of net farm income. While lower land 
values would mean that farmers would receive just as much net 
income with a lower gross farm income, it does not follow that 
this policy should be pursued. It is a very traumatic experience 
for farmers to adjust to a lower gross income, and price policies 
should be designed to forestall a sizeable drop in farm receipts • 
Nevertheless, prices should not be supported at levels so high 
that much of the gain from rising farm productivity would not pass 
to consumers in the long run, or so high that land prices would be 
unduly inflated. 
An Agricultural Board 
Narrow political interests have contributed to the inadequacies 
of current farm policies • To overcome this problem, farm programs 
would be administered by a "nonpartisan" Agricultural Board, 
similar in structure to the Federal Reserve Board. Board members 
w-ould be appointed by the President with approval of Congress for 
long terms, staggered to give continuity. The purpose would be 
to remove the Board from the immediate political exigencies of 
partisan politics. The Board would have the mandate to make 
decisions on production controls and prices that would be a reason-
able compromise of farm, consumer and foreign interest. Placing 
of the administration of farm programs in an Agricultural Board 
composed of members with various geographic and policy back-
grounds operating within guidelines and budgets established by 
Congress and the President would be a step away from narrow 
politics and a step toward more realistic farm policies • 
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There would be a minimum of government commodity programs 
for individual commodities and the price system would allocate 
resources within the farm economy. However 1 farm bargaining 
associations for commodities would be encouraged. Thes.e 
associations would function more effectively if aggregate excess 
farm production capacity were controlled by the government by a 
land retirement program. As these bargaining associations be-
come sufficiently large and effective 1 they would alleviate prob-
lems of short-run price instability I and the two-price provisions 
of the CCC and other government activity in the farm market 
eventually would be phased out. 
Summary and Conclusions 
The traditional base of farm political power is eroding 1 and 
farm programs after 1969 will not be enacted by political muscle 
of farmer people or legislators alone. It is contended in this paper 
that farmers need to improve their political image and to reformulate 
the objectives of commodity programs I looking for common ground 
with the interests of the now dominant urban-industrial society. 
This is not hard to do--there is considerable basis for 
framing farm policy goals in the interest of non-farmers as well as 
farmers. The net effect of commodity programs has not been to 
retard efficiency or labor adjustments. They have permitted labor 
adjustments out of farming to be more orderly 1 with the principal 
burden of adjustments on young people. Programs have provided 
f01ward pricing 1 stability and security to farmers and encouraged 
substitution of capital for labor--adjustments that should have 
been made based on a perfect market allocation. (cf. Tyner and 
Tweeten 1 1966). Farm programs have provided a strategic reserve 
that society has prized for meeting emergencies such as wars and 
droughts. 
The agricultural plant is a cumbersome vehicle. In the absence 
of central planning 1 it tends to bump from crises of abundance and 
low prices to crises of shortage and high prices. Avoiding this 
instability is the major reason for commodity programs • Contrary 
to the views of many 1 farm programs don •t do much to support net 
farm income over an extended period. 
All is not well with commodity programs • They cost too much 
and divert public money from more urgent problems of educating and 
training the really disadvantaged in agriculture. They entail direct 
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payments that go disproportionately to the big farmers who already 
have high income. Programs are hard to administer and sometime 
price farm products out of foreign and domestic markets. 
Several changes are suggested for farm commodity programs 
after 1969 to correct abuses and make programs more acceptable to 
non-farmers. In general 1 greater stress is placed on society's 
goals of flexibility 1 efficiency 1 tidy administration and holding a 
strategic reserve. A specific program was proposed which entailed 
a long-term land retirement program 1 a computer-managed commodity 
inventory system 1 multiple-pricing (with farmers receiving the 
world price for their marginal output) 1 and an agricultural board 
to remove farm policies one step from narrow political interests. 
The long-term land retirement program would be administered in 
a hard-headed business-like manner 1 with sealed bids used to 
remove as much production as possible per government dollar spent 
on the program. Foreign aid would be given in unspecified (cash 
or credit) form 1 and foreign countries would be allowed to pur-
chase fertilizer plants for example rather than corn if they felt it 
more in their interests. A discount would be given on U. S. farm 
commodities purchased with aid funds. The size of the discount 
would be geared to the degree of excess capacity in U. S. 
agriculture. 
FOOD AND FIBER, FARMS, AND RURAL COMMUNITY: 
POLICY ALTERNATIVES FOR THE FUTURE 
James T. Bonnen* 
That the structures of the food and fiber industry 1 of farming 1 
and of rural communities have changed and continue to change is 
unavoidable and obvious. However 1 we are still struggling to 
develop a relevant intellectual framework 1 even the constructs 
and language, which will lead to an adequate treatment of the 
problems of a fragmented rural society. Much of our difficulty 
arises from now obsolete concepts we learned at our mother's 
knee. One of these is the identity: 
farming = agriculture = rural society 
Another is the inequality: 
rural society I urban society 1 
which carried the implied value judgment that 
rural society ::::. urban society 
None of these constructs will stand inspection today .y 
* Professor of Economics 1 Michigan State University. 
1/ These are the structural elements of what I have argued 
before: (1) (farming I agriculture). Present and Prospective 
Policy Problems of U. S. Agriculture: As Viewed by an Economist. 
J.F.E. 1 Vol. 47, No.5. Decemberl965. p. ll25. (2) (agriculturel 
rural society). The Rural Economy--Interrelationships 1 Emerging 
Issues 1 and Problems. 43rd Annual Agricultural Outlook Conference. 
USDA, Washington, D. C. November 16 1 1965. p. 6 1 and (3) 
farming I agriculture I rural society). The Colleges of Agriculture: 
Old Bottles, New Wine? Proceedings of the Annual Meetings of the 
National Association of State Universities and Land Grant Colleges. 
Columbus, Ohio. November 1967. 
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We seem to have the most difficulty adjusting our thought 
and behavior when the realities underlying simple constructs 
change. I shall treat all these relations briefly 1 but the focus of 
this paper will lie with farmers and farming. 
In 19th century traditional rural society the identities of 
farming = agriculture = rural society generally held true and the 
traditional culture of rural life was clearly different from that 
evolving in urban America. Since the mid -19tt'l century the 
application of science to the production processes of society 
has resulted in great specialization in which whole new industries 
have been created around what were formerly single functions in 
a traditional production process or old industry. Thus 1 many of 
the processing activities and the production of many farm inputs 
have been removed from the farm so that today farming is only 
one of several industries inextricably interrelated in the food 
and fiber sector of the economy.'!:./ 
Originally the occupational structure and most of the 
employment in rural society was accounted for by farming. As 
functions have been transferred from the farm 1 often to urban 
industrial settings 1 and as the great transformation in farm 
productivity has occurred reducing farm labor force needs 1 
farming has become only a sector of the economic life of rural 
society. Thus 1 the identity of farming with rural society and with 
the food and fiber sector has ceased to have any reality and con-
ceptual utility. 
At the same time the industrialization and urbanization of 
the society and accompanying changes in communication and 
transportation technologies have resulted in an urbanization of 
'traditional rural culture. Rural people today tend to hold much 
the same se·t of aspirations and beliefs as do urban people .V 
This is most obvious in the case of successful commercial farm 
operator families. The economically successful sectors of rural 
life are (almost by definition) just those sectors most completely 
y From this point on I substitute the term 11 food and fiber .. for 
.. agriculture .. to eliminate a word which has been used in so 
many senses as to become ambiguous 1 if not meaningless. 
V See C. E. Bishop. The Urbanization of Rural America. J. F. E. 
December 19 6 7 . 
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integrated into and sharing in the mainstream of the American 
economic and social order. Only in those areas and economic 
sectors of rural life that have been left behind does any major 
component of traditional rural culture still dominate behavior. 
Thus 1 the distinction between rural and urban has also lost much 
of its reality and conceptual utility. 
Social and Political Changes 
All of this is very obvious--and most thoughtful people seem 
to recognize it in one form or another. But I wonder if we are 
not failing to draw some of the most important conclusions from 
this phenomenon. I think we tend to see the economic organiza-
tion change but do not recognize adequately the social and the 
political structure changes that necessarily follow or precede 
major transformations of economic organization. Politics and 
social organization have much to do with the alternatives we 
face in policy decision making. 
This is too broad a topic to develop fully here 1 but let me 
make a few points. The economic and social organization of 
farming grows increasingly distinct from that of rural society. 
Farming relates less to rural institutions today than to the 
industrial structure of the food and fiber sector. Both farming 
and the food and fiber sector are withdrawing from rural life and 
institutions. It follows that the economic 1 political 1 and 
social interests diverge in many ways and often conflict. In 
designing public policy we cannot assume I as many still do 1 
that farmers and their organizations or the food and fiber sector 
organizations will expend any of their political capital in 
support of rural community interests. Nor can we assume that 
rural society or the food and fiber sector will support farm 
programs that sustain farmer incomes by restricting inputs or out-
put. Why should they support policies that reduce the volume 
of their business? As the political power of the nonfarm portion 
of the food and fiber sector continues to grow 1 "farm policy" 
as a distinct entity ceases to exist and a "food and fiber" policy 
develops which does not have as its object higher farm income 1 
but maximum food and fiber "thru-put" at price levels that 
optimize total food and fiber sector income (but weighted by the 
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political power coefficients of the various components of the food 
and fiber sector). The price level that results will no doubt be 
lower than would prevail under a "farm policy." The individual 
firms and industries of the food and fiber sector will increasingly 
find that the only realistic path to maximum firm profit will be 
greater firm efficiency .i/ Farmers will be no exception. An even 
more intense search for greater productivity and maximum efficiency 
is being forced on farmers by the food and fiber sector. 
Family Farm Survival 
A new issue, the first of major consequence in decades, now 
confronts commercial farming. Perhaps for the first time the ques-
tion of the survival of the family farm as the characteristic organ-
ization of farming may be taken seriously. It arises as a logical 
consequence of the fact, attested to by the "Parity Report," that a 
very large part of commercial farmers are now getting better than 
opportunity cost returns on their resources • .V One of the major 
consequences of this situation is a rising rate of entry into farming 
by large nonfarm corporations such as the Monsanto Chemical 
Company which has embarked on a program to acquire 100,000 
acres of farmland. The Wall Street Journal has a feature article 
describing the entry of other nonfarm firms • .V The vertical inte-
gration of food and fiber sector industrial firms back into farming 
continues and accelerates. All of these firms have better access to 
capital and specialized management skills than the typical 
commercial farmer. 
Another matter complicates this problem. After the minimum 
e.fficient size of farm is reached there is no real evidence of 
either economies or diseconomies over the range of farm size for 
which we have observations. At least this is how I read the 
evidence and it is the conclusion as well of the fine recent study 
.1/ Consumer interests will reinforce this trend. 
Y Parity Returns Position of Farmers. Senate Document 44, 90th 
Congress, 1st Session. August 10, 1967. p. 22. 
§./Wall Street Journal. August 9, 1967. p. 1. 
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by Pat Madden.V This means that the cost of food and fiber to the 
society is unaffected by the size of the farm firm. Thus, the ques-
tion of the organizational structure of farming is not an economic 
matter at all (at least in the short run). It is directly a social issue 
of what kind of organizational structure we, as a society, wish in 
farming .Y It is a rare situation in which the issue of the optimum 
organizational structure of an industry does not involve primary 
alternatives of greatly differing direct economic costs. 
I have simplified, of course, so let me add a few qualifications. 
There is nothing in the uncertainties of politics that guarantees that 
farm programs will continue indefinitely to generate opportunity 
cost returns or better in farming. It is interesting to note, however, 
that some rather large well run corporations are betting their balance 
sheet on it .2/ Also it has to be said that the range over which we 
have data on economies of size in farming is not so great as to 
preclude large scale corporate enterprises from encountering dif-
ferent economic conditions as they expand well beyond this range. 
In any case, it is clear that an interesting five to ten years lie 
immediately ahead and economists had best prepare to answer the 
full range of economic questions that arise in industrial organiza-
tion problems--the effects of 1) various restrictions on entry, 2) 
imperfect market pricing, 3) nonprice competition on structure, 
performance, and behavior, to point out only a few. 
Policy analysts 1 inability to meet many of the issues of the 
changing industrial organization of farming is evident in the handling 
of the current problems of bargaining. Despite some excellent 
J.l Madden, J. Patrick. Economies of Size in Farming. Agricultural 
Economics, Report No. 107. E.R.S., USDA. February 1967. 
It should be noted that the "Parity Report" is also primarily the 
product of Madden 1 s research efforts. 
Y In the long run, of course, it very likely remains more of an 
economic issue. Certainly in the limiting case of an oligopoloid 
structure substantial net economic as well as social costs are 
probably generated when compared to current industry organization. 
Y It is clear that many firms believe they possess superior managerial 
skills and it is also likely that they are counting on their own and 
other major corporations of the food and fiber sector to exercise 
the necessary political influence. 
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research in industrial organization, agricultulal economists are not 
well prepared to meet these policy problems.~ And farmers and 
farm organizations are developing expectations of bargaining that 
cannot possibly be realized. 
Program Benefit Distribution 
Another dimension of "farm policy" in which options may be 
changing involve the equity considerations of the distribution of 
farm program benefits. The commodity programs particularly have 
come under fire in recent Congresses for the inequality of the 
benefit distributions and for the large size of payments made 
directly to the larger beneficiaries. We all have long appreciated 
that commodity program benefits are generally distributed propor-
tionate to farm output. Even so, some work I did recently for 
Brookings and the Rural Poverty Commission, measuri9.~ these bene-
fit distributions, left me surprised on several counts.::_,/ The 
most concentrated benefit distributions are indeed very highly 
concentrated. The sugarcane program exhibits a Gini ratio of 
• 800 with individual states running higher. Cotton had a Gini of 
.653 and rice .632. There is evidence in some cases of a time 
trend toward greater concentration. The addition of direct pay-
ments to price supports increased slightly the concentration of 
total wheat program benefits (the difference is probably not 
significant) but significantly lowered the concentration of total 
feed grain program benefits • 
As analysis of this sort is available and, if the direct pay-
ments are published each year in the astonishing detail in which 
they were this year, the pressure for shaping a conscious policy 
on equity and for limiting payments will grow more intense .g; 
lQ/ I had hoped that the Food Marketing Commission's report would 
generate more research, but I am not aware of any burst of new 
activity. 
11/ Sonnen, James T. The Distribution of Benefits from Cotton Price 
Supports. Problems in Public Expenditure Analysis. The Brookings 
Institution. Washington, D. C. 1967, and James T. Sonnen. 
The Distribution of Benefits from Selected U.S. Farm Programs. 
Rural Poverty in the United States: Technical Papers of the 
National Advisory Commission on Rural Poverty. Washington, D.C. 
1968 0 
W U. S. Congress, Senate Subcommittee of the Committee on Appro-
priations. Hearings, Department of Agriculture Appropriations for 
1968. Part 3. p. 5-1283. 
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Another area of evolving new policy is for the small non-
commercial farmer. This is not the right focus. Most of the efforts 
to date have been dominated by the irrationalities of rural funda-
mentalism which lead to the kind of program ideas that are at best 
confused 1 and at worst are cruel social hoaxes that trap people in 
a grinding rural poverty. The USDA's "small farmer" package 
recently presented at county level "grass roots" meetings is a 
case in point _13 / While we should do what is "rational" in farm 
policy to aid small farmers 1 major improvements in their welfare 
are not likely to arise from farming. Rather they are much more 
likely to be rooted in improved employment opportunities in the 
local or nearby community 1 in additional training or education 1 and 
in other community-based nonfarm activities. In any case 1 my 
impression is that the problem of the small farmer is not really a 
matter of serious commitment in Washington 1 D. C. 1 or in the 
states I so the final solution remains what it has been--escape 
from farming and migration. 
No Manpower Policy 
Increasingly one gets the feeling that in farming and in rural 
life we are losing our options as we go on from year to year with 
no conscious manpower policy for either farming or rural society. 
This has been too controversial a topic for policy action 1 involving 
a great potential for impairing (as they see it) the interests of farm-
ers 1 other rural employers and most importantly rural politicians. 
So we drift while the vitality drains out of rural life and the human 
costs of adjustment to technological and organizational change 
are borne by those least capable of bearing such burdens. Des-
pite our default the void is being filled. The manpower rules 
developed for urban industrial employment are being imposed step 
by step {by urban legislators) upon farming and other rural employ-
ment not previously covered. While many of these innovations 
are socially desirable I this process does not assure either an 
appropriate or comprehensive manpower policy 1 and our options in 
designing such policy shrink with each passing year. 
The primary focus of any coherent political basis of support 
for the reconstruction of rural (non-metropolitan) society must lie 
elsewhere than in the institutions and organized power of farmers 
and the food and fiber sector. At this juncture it is difficult to 
J1l Some specific items make sense but it is indefensible as a whole. 
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perceive the appropriate approach, but it seems to me that it 
must, in any case, be done in the context of a general reordering 
of community life, metropolitan as well as non-metropolitan. 
Thus, the political representatives and institutionallead~rship of 
smaller non-metropolitan communities must search through all the 
elements of modern urban society to find allies if they are to be 
successful in revitalizing the old rural community and reintegrating 
it with the mainstream of American life. 
Farmers face the political necessity of allying themselves 
with the other industries of the food and fiber sector. This is 
imperative if farmer political action is to be effective in any 
constructive manner. Farm producer organization brawling with 
the other interests of the food and fiber sector presently disorders 
public decision making. As a consequence potential farmer 
political power is not effectively organized or exercised, and 
farmers become their own worst enemy. 
SOME PROPOSITIONS ABOUT THE NATURE OF PUBLIC POLICY 
Thomas T. Stout* 
The thesis of this brief paper is that much of the current debate 
in agriculture is part of a larger controversy in which the issues, while 
not clearly identified, are much more fundamental than the variety of 
specific difficulties on which they may focus. The problems of the 
agricultural community in this broader framework are not unlike the 
focal point of heat and light that appears when a lens held in the hand 
of a child brings the sun's rays to bear on something interesting. And, 
as his attention is absorbed by that smoldering spot of light and di-
verted from the sun and the lens, so do our preoccupations with agri-
culture distract our attention from bigger things perhaps more deserving 
of our consideration, particularly if we seek explanations for things 
we observe. 
This paper contains no explanations. It offers only a series of 
propositions for consideration by those in search of answers and re-
minded of the sun and the lens. These propositions have much to do 
with people and less to do with agriculture and thus are not observations 
of authority so much as they are the remarks of an observer talking out 
of turn. Exposed to either acceptance or rejection, these propositions 
are protected only by the precaution that hasty judgments on their 
merits may permit graver errors in the conclusions than were found in 
the propositions. Consider the following proposition as both an example 
and an introduction: 
While economic activity is a necessary part of a functioning state 
or nation, it is a responsibility of our social system to judge, guide 
and direct the course of economic affairs. The reasonableness of this 
distinction between the social system and the economic system rests in 
the observation that the primary concerns of society are the rights of 
men, while the primary concerns of the economy are the creation of use-
ful goods and services, or wealth, which is more a matter of the rights 
* Professor, Department of Agricultural Economics and Rural Sociology, 
The Ohio State University. The author is indebted for review and 
comments on portions of this paper to Professors Paul Olscamp, De-
partment of Philosophy, and Bruce Marion, Department of Agricultural 
Economics and Rural Sociology, The Ohio State University. Also re-
visions and amendments have been made in response to some general 
remarks solicited from Professor Harold Breimyer, Department of 
Agricultural Economics, University of Missouri. 
-184-
of property. The distinction having been made 1 this is not to suggest 
that these two aspects of a functioning state can be separated; it is 
to observe instead that two sets of interests are interrelated and that 
however conflicting or incompatible they should become 1 they cannot 
be separated. If a common ground of compromise cannot be found then 
one must yield to the other. Which one will be obliged to yield in 
these events is a fundamental ingredient in the definition of the state 
itself. If that definition maintains that the rights of men are paramount 1 
then it is a responsibility of society to counsel the course of economic 
affairs. 
In fulfilling this responsibility 1 society seeks to apply social 
principles of right behavior which have emerged as satisfactory codes 
of conduct in defining the rights of men. Application of these principles 
causes problems if the growing economy 1 encompassing new knowledge 
and technology in the production process 1 fails to function well or is 
too confined by time-honored social principles. It then becomes apparent 
that realization of the full promise of abundant wealth requires the com-
promise of social principles. 
It is characteristic of people and of their states that such com-
promises of principle constantly are made. The current debate surround-
ing agriculture is an example of this continuing process. Like the sun's 
rays 1 the characteristics of people shine through the lens of their 
state 1 converging at focal points of debate and controversy, bathing 
the spot with light and 1 at times 1 with heat. 
Burden to Decide 
The propositions that follow will offer little more than has been 
suggested already. They merely examine these introductory remarks a 
bit further 1 as one might thump some melons -- more as a matter of 
curiosity about their possibilities than with any real expectation of 
getting conclusive answers • .!./ Some of the possibilities that emerge 
will seem offensive and ugly 1 and it will be part of the reader's burden 
to decide whether they may be dismissed as offensive cynicism or 
whether they should be acknowledged as ugly realism. 
l/ Some textbook jargon appears in spots 1 but this should be no problem 
to any reader who keeps in mind a few notions expressed in economic 
theory. Those aspects of theory which are used in the propositions 
have been outlined briefly in the appendix. 
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Principles and institutions 
Satisfaction is desire fulfilled. Men exercise their individual 
capacities in expectations of their fulfillment. It is partly because 
of their expectation of satisfaction in this regard that men develop 
states and nations, submitting to social order and suffering restraint 
on some of their capacities in trade for greater freedom to exercise 
other capacities, the fulfillment of which they expect to satisfy 
them more. 
Codes of conduct agreed upon to this end, being the arrangements 
that improve the opportunities for fundamental satisfactions, come to 
be called good or right. They acquire the status of principles and 
enjoy such names as ethics or equity. Institutions emerge as guardians 
of these principles, encouraging their support as matters of honor or 
morality, or enforcing it as a matter of law. For example, religion and 
the church encourage certain social principles on moral grounds and ad-
vise their support at maximum or optimum levels of conduct. Also, 
minimum levels of conduct in supporting some of these same principles 
are prescribed and enforced by the law. 
That men will adjust their institutions or amend their principles 
to enhance the satisfaction of their changing desires is fundamental; 
it is the source of changes in the social order. Principles and institu-
tions are essential for achieving satisfaction of the collective desires 
of men. But it is the· satisfactions that are paramount, not the prin-
ciples or institutions. 
The worth of social order is measured not by its institutions but 
by the range of satisfactions it enables men to achieve and by the uni-
formity with which the opportunities and protections of the state apply 
to all its members. 
If social principles and institutions conflict with the quest for 
satisfaction, men are confronted with choice between satisfaction and 
principles. Principles and institutions will yield to collective satis-
faction. The determination of social principles follows after the fact 
of men • s desires. What it is that satisfies desires is determined partly 
by the state of the arts for, as knowledge enlightens men, desires 
change. Technology, a product of knowledge, therefore threatens the 
passive acceptance of established principles and institutions. Tech-
nological development redefines desire, and satisfaction in time is 
hampered by principles and constrained by institutions that were es-
tablished in simpler days by less enlightened men with a different 
range of desires. 
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As principles and institutions are amended and redefined, the 
essential character of the state itself may similarly be amended and 
redefined. This being rather an evolutionary change, it is not by 
nature an easily reversible process; amendments and redefinitions, 
once finalized to the satisfaction of men, are seldom abandoned in 
favor of the original interpretation. Error may be unfortunately 
irretrievable. As the growing complexity of the state increases the 
opportunity for and the consequent cost of error, so does it increase 
the need for thoughtful consideration in resolving conflicts and amending 
principles and institutions. 
Society and economy 
As states grow in complexity, and opportunities for satisfaction 
of men are enhanced through exchange of specialized services, codes 
of conduct are extended to deal more comprehensively with the crea-
tion and distribution of wealth. For example, if men are free to 
exercise their individual capacities in ways not harmful to the col-
lective interests of others, then they should be free to engage in 
economic activity in ways not harmful to the interests affected by 
that activity. In the exchange of things, whether it be labor or capi-
tal employed in production, or the sale of products in response to 
demand, the payment made should be in proportion to the value received. 
As new technology is applied to economic activities, the productive 
capacity of the economy is greatly increased, and the promise of a-
bundant goods and services imposes severe demand for recognition of 
the needs and requirements of economic affairs. These requirements 
may not be compatible with old notions such as unlimited opportunity 
to engage in economic activity. Requirements for capital and technical 
skills are too demanding, and mere right or desire does not provide the 
necessary qualifications. Moreover, such demands may become so 
extreme that barely a few participants possess the necessary qualifica-
tions, as in the present manufacture of automobiles, steel, or petro-
leum products. In such circumstances it is not inconceivable that 
other old notions, such as the equality of price and values, are also 
threatened. But if the goods are abundant and price accords with their 
value in use, concern for old principles brings either their abandon-
ment or a new interpretation and application. For example, concern for 
the existence of pure profit is replaced by a more realistic concern for 
the redistribution of pure profit. 
It is apparent that the interests and needs of the social system in-
fluence the course of economic affairs, but not without regard to the 
interests and needs of the economy itself. What is less apparent is 
that the most urg.ent needs are likely to rest with that part of the state 
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which is growing or changing most rapidly. If it is the economy that 
displays the most rapid rate of change 1 it is the needs of economy 
that are likely to press most urgently for solution. 
To the extent that these needs can be equated with social interests 1 
judgments may be reached which are compatible with economic interests 
but conflict with established definitions of social need. For example 1 
social need may require increased production to overcome scarcity 1 and 
social interest may desire more goods and services. Economic needs for 
production methods not wholly compatible with established principles of 
equitable performance may be justified by the social need to overcome 
scarcity. But when scarcity is overcome and replaced by abundance 1 
economic performance can still find acceptance in social interests such 
as the continuing desire for goods and services 1 although scarcity no 
longer provides a justifjpption 1 and abundance conflicts with the de-
finition of social need )1 
It is reasonable that society 1 concerned primarily with the rights 
of men (which 1 as a matter of defining the state 1 are said to be para-
mount) 1 should counsel and direct the course of economic affairs 1 which 
dwell in somewhat greater proportion on the rights of property. And 
it is reasonable that society in giving its counsel 1 should take into 
account the needs of economy. What is less reasonable is that the in-
terests of society should be captivated by the needs of economy 1 per-
mitting the needs of society to be defined by the interests of economy. 
For this to be reasonable 1 some redefinition of the state would seem 
to be required. But this is merely a matter of principle and 1 therefore 1 
subject to change in a manner suitable to men's pursuit of satisfaction. 
Access to wealth 
A rather uniform distribution of wealth 1 or access thereto 1 appears 
to be conducive to social stability. To the extent that acquisitive 
desires of men are more evenly satisfied by this arrangement 1 their 
attitudes are more evenly in accord with principles concerning property 
rights. 
As long as access to wealth and its possession are not denied the 
multitude 1 property rights tend to be considered in terms of possession. 
But if access to wealth becomes restricted relative to the collective 
YThis and related considerations are examined in the book by Galbraith I 
J .K. 1 The New Industrial State. Houghton Mifflin. 1967. 
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desire for it, property rights may be seen to accord more nearly with 
access to wealth rather than with its possession by a fortunate but 
limited minority. 
The occurrence of this process by which private wealth becomes 
public property is seen in the creation of museums to house cherished 
artifacts and specimens, and in galleries for the display of artistic 
achievement. The rightness of public property as opposed to private 
wealth is proclaimed in the exercise of eminent domain for purposes 
such as the construction of highways convenient to the public need, 
or the creation of national parks permitting public access to real 
estate particularly attractive to the public eye. 
It is apparent that in a few years the land in farms in the United 
States will be owned by perhaps one or two percent of the population, 
a restless population confined in large part to urban concentration. 
Perhaps a brisk and continuing market for farmland lies in this growing 
concentration of urban affluence and urban attitudes. Perhaps the 
attitudes, rather than the affluence, may be the more accurate indica-
tor of the market's dimensions. 
History reminds us that revolution, land reform, and emergence of 
a social system occurred in America during a period when classical 
economic doctrine grew to flourish and when the mark of educated men 
was accomplished study in the liberal arts. These influences were re-
flected in architecture, in government, in public policy, and in public 
attitudes. 
A land-holding rural majority, beneficiaries of these influences 
and finding them compatible with their interests and conducive to 
their fulfillment, found cause for concern in the industrial growth 
which shared the times and threatened changes in the social order. 
As industrial methods outpaced agricultural devices for creation of 
wealth, the growing industrial giant sought first opportunity and then 
protection in principles of liberal and classical origin, invoking support 
for laissez-faire. Agrarian majorities declared that equity, also defined 
in social scripture, was paramount, and laissez-faire was discarded as 
ill-considered doctrine for modern times. Legend credits agriculture 
with preserving social order in trying times. It is more accurate to say 
that the pursuit of agrarian satisfactions was threatened, and that those 
interests were. protected as a matter of majority will. Principles were 
amended and institutions were adjusted. Social order was redefined 
more to the satisfaction of the dominant element, and arrangements in 
the name of equity were developed to sanctify agrarian desires and 
-189-
inhibit the growth of antagonistic forces. The majority, being con-
tained in the agrarian culture, held this to be right and good. 
Emerging urban majorities in succeeding years, their material 
welfare more closely aligned with industrial growth, and no longer 
absorbed by rural concerns, find themselves confined by the ancient 
rural fundamentalism and question its interpretation of right and good. 
What is right and good remains the pursuit of satisfaction, but the 
dimensions of desire are altered. 
Pure or perfect 
The doctrine of equity in exchange is articulated in the conditions 
of perfect competition, which assures normal profit in continuous equil-
ibrium. The existence of pure profit is, by definition, beyond the bounds 
of equity. But risk and uncertainty are necessarily denied and therefore 
uncompensated by normal profit, and the search for pure profit in an un-
certain environment is an essential ingredient of economic activity. 
The necessity and opportunity for pure profit, as well as the need 
for laws and policies which define the conditions of the quest for pure 
profit and its subsequent redistribution, are apparent in the contrast 
between the hypothetical world of perfect competition and the real world 
of economic action. The principle demands compromise. Pure competi-
tion, while not perfect, is a concession to reality. 
Policies to foster the growth and vigor of pure competition emphasize 
widespread recognition of product characteristics and market conditions 
in order that prices may be readily determined. Impartial application of 
grade standards and third party dissemination of market news exemplify 
such policies. Prices, values and alternatives are well-known by many 
sellers and buyers. The net effect is a price structure largely immune 
to manipulation by individual buyers or sellers. By such devices, agri-
culture, a vulnerable economic power but a dominant social power, won 
protection from price-depressing abilities of powerful buyers. 
But such policies prove in time to be self-defeating. Given chang-
ing technology, they will, in time and through the following sequence 
of events, assure the destruction of that state of economic affairs they 
were intended to protect. Price resists upward pressure as well as 
downward pressure. Products are reduced to commodity status, the 
opportunity for product differentiation is subverted, and the search for 
pure profit is obliged to focus on cost reductions. Economies of scale 
are quickly identified, and the systematic destruction of other strategic 
conditions of pure competition is begun. The process is abetted by 
technological achievement and encouraged by policies once employed 
as a protective device by an agricultural majority, but subsequently 
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employed by an urban majority which found them equally suited to en-
couragement of production of abundant food and fiber. The atomistic 
structure crumbles as participants d.ecline in number and freedom of 
entry and exit yields to the demandfng requirements 0f capital, tech-
nology and skill. 
The emerging structure of agriculture is at once admired and feared 
for its incompatibility with the cultural environment. The emerging de-
mands are ill-fitted to an environment ascribing virtue to oral contract, 
cash payment, proprietorship, physical labor, family sovereignty, and 
a certain acknowledged "right to participate," all embraced by cultural 
unity. As contending parties within the culture prepare themselves for 
inevitable choice and acceptance of one or the other incompatible alter-
native, the legendary unity of cultural brotherhood is shown to be 
illusory. Diverging interests are reflected in the fragmentation of the 
"agricultural establishment" as a cohesive social force and coherent 
political voice. 3/ 
Erasing the Identity of Agriculture 
The emerging order in agriculture resembles a sterile monopolistic 
competition devoid of product differentiation and the power of differ-
ential pricing, elements that are denied by principles long established 
and policies well entrenched. Though the free-market prices they en-
gender no longer protect the culture, they impose unacceptable barriers 
to those who desire further economic evolution. 
As the blind sense a presence in the room, alert men grope for the 
opportunity vaguely perceived in the new order of things, and steps are 
taken to circumvent and subvert the market pricing mechanism. 
Integration occurs, to the satisfaction of contracting parties who 
find themselves thus insulated from unpredictable prices that reflect 
the whimsies of the world. With great investment and massive volume 
committed in specialized endeavors, both parties enjoy the reduced risk 
and lengthened planning horizons permitted by their genius. Success 
soothes ancient fears in agriculture of price-depressing powers employed 
by product buyers . 
11 This change and its implications are explored in several papers by 
Bonnen, James T., particularly in Present and Prospective Policy 
Problems of U.S. Agriculture: As Viewed by An Economist. Journal 
of Farm Economics, Vol. 47, No. 5. December, 1965. pp. 1116-1129. 
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A more direct approach occurs to visionary men who propose that 
upward price pres sure results from successful bargaining by producers 
and that, as surviving cultural adherents, their efforts might be made 
in the name of cultural preservation. But being astute as well as 
visionary, they perceive a problem in supply-control and submit for 
men's consideration their proposals for public aid in this regard. Aid 
is granted, but extended as a paliative, and without the customary 
caution applied to drugs with unknown side-effects. The potent quality 
of the aid lies not in the bargaining rights for which it is prescribed, 
but in the public acknowledgment of monopolistic competition as a 
satisfactory and acceptable emerging character for agriculture. By this 
change in public attitude, old principles are abrogated, and their 
guardian institutions are abruptly obliged to adjust and serve new prin-
ciples or dissolve and disappear, having outlived their usefulness. 
Policies of protection or public aid for agriculture become less viable 
when the reasons for such policies, reasons such as those to be found 
in the economic character of agriculture, are automatically abrogated 
by recognition that the economic basis no longer exists. 
A third ingenious possibility stirs in fertile minds provoked to 
thought by these developments. Complete emergence of monopolistic 
competition from the unattractive cocoon of pure competition requires 
product differentiation. Once achieved, disequilibriums are most 
readily attained and pure profit more easily acquired. But more im-
portant, the further evolution to oligopoly, with glowing rewards of 
pure profit in equilibrium, might quickly be achieved by the obvious 
expedient of magnifying the demands of capital, technology and 
management. And these tools are already at hand, awaiting only 
their vigorous application. The solution is perceived not to require 
the differentiation of raw products, but only their integration with 
products already differentiated by manufacturers and processors and 
related providers of services in the marketing system. The solution 
is not to change the identity of agriculture, but to erase it. These 
thoughts occur to men who are obliged by massive enterprise commit-
ments to minimize management error-- men who are thus uniform 
in their distaste for unmanaged market prices, diligent in their pursuit 
of pure profit, burdened by the demands of investable funds, and 
constrained in their actions by anti-trust barriers erected by an 
earlier agrarian majority. · 
Something more for something less 
Alternatives for agriculture, alternatives emerged from policies of 
power imposed, will be accepted by an urban majority in proportion to 
their promise of abundance, and with small regard for their impact on 
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social and cultural structure. 4/ We may reasonably imagine that the 
precepts of agrarian culture are neither understood, nor appreciated, 
nor desired, nor accepted by an urban public whose pursuit of satis-
faction is impeded by what seem to it to be the quaint beliefs of un-
enlightened rustics. 
The industrialization of agriculture offers attractive opportunities 
that are unlikely to be ignored. Greater abundance at lower cost is 
offered in exchange for permission already granted in existing anti-
trust doctrine, to employ capital, technology, and management already 
at hand in proportions and with a diligence extraordinary for agri-
culture but not uncommon in industry. The cost to the cultural heritage 
will not be seriously considered by men whose preoccupations are 
acutely receptive to the promise of something more for something less. 
Bargaining will not be accepted so willingly. It threatens some-
thing less for something more. Bargaining will be tolerated to the 
extent that the threat does not materialize. Should the threat material-
ize, worshipers of abundance themselves will find themselves obliged 
to re-examine the basis for this unseemly display of agrarian greed. 
The equity of urban interests will be clarified by men who seek new 
indulgences for sated appetites. 
Thus may the examination focus attention on concentrated land 
holdings, seen to be a power base for what may be regarded as mis-
guided attempts to bargain with the rights of men. It will be recalled 
that an even distribution of property was once wisely regarded as an 
aid to social order. The mis-use of real estate arising from the con-
centrated holdings of self-seeking proprietors will offend Machiavellian 
civic spirit. Social order will demand a wiser administration of the 
public resource. The indulgence of public appetites by access to an 
expanded public domain would serve as incentive to redefine the social 
structure. 
Social and Economic Compromise 
Historically, agriculture has been regarded both as the embodiment 
of some traditional and prized social institutions and as an economic 
machine, the performance of which was judged mostly by its ability to 
iiThe nature of the social and cultural environment and implications of its 
changing structure are explored by Breimyer, H. F. Individual Freedom 
and the Economic Organization of Agriculture. University of Illinois 
Pre s s • 1 9 6 5 . 
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produce an abundance of food and fiber. Agricultural policy has 
attempted to foster the goals of each of these parts of agriculture, 
although they are fundamentally conflicting characteristics. But 
as both the society and the economy of the nation become more com-
plex, it becomes more difficult to achieve a compromise between the 
two, and each threatens to advance only at the expense of the other. 
Increased agricultural productivity strains the institutional frame-
work and undermines its foundations. Preservation of cherished 
traditions impairs agricultural productivity. 
It seems that agriculture, always changing, has arrived at a 
threshold of revolutionary change that demands fundamental re-apprais-
als of what agriculture is and what it is supposed to accomplish. But 
agriculture has not arrived at this position alone; the nation at large 
finds itself confronted with similar sets of choices in issues that ex-
tend beyond the bounds of agriculture. Agriculture is just one of the 
hinges on which swings a ponderous door of basic issues. Decisions 
that are made concerning agriculture may provide a measure of the 
temper of the times 1 the nature of men's desires and the character of 
the public will in achieving the satisfaction of those desires. 
The debate in agriculture, being a part of the larger controversy, 
remains one of continuing the difficult search for compromise between 
social and economic requirements and interests that become increasingly 
complex and contradictory. But if compromise cannot be achieved and 
choice between economic and social performance becomes necessary 1 
it is the further burden of the debaters to choose wisely in contributing 
to the subtle changes in principles and institutions which define the 
evolution of the state. 
Appendix 
l. Normal profit is considered to be a normal cost of production 1 
and is regarded as a reward or wage to management which is the skill 
that organizes and employs labor 1 capital and land for productive pur-
poses. This is sensible for 1 barring a normal profit 1 producers of a 
product would soon lose interest in its production. A normal profit, 
in a very competitive situation in which all competitors could readily 
shift among jobs fitting to their skills 1 would be equivalent to that 
income which might also come from such opportunities. But pure profit 
is additional income beyond all production costs 1 including normal pro-
fit. Pure profit might be realized from exceptional skill 1 from power 
to prevent competitors from duplicating the successful methods or 
products of an enterprise 1 or from unexpected good fortune. On a 
very ethical basis 1 society might expect that pure profit should be 
equitably distributed among the multitudes in order that all might share 
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in the skill employed, the luck of the fortunate, or the power which 
generated pure profit for a few at the expense of many. 
Pure profit stands on shaky ethical ground. But the search and 
quest for pure profit enjoys a solid economic footing because it is 
the hope of pure profit that encourages producers to undertake un-
certain ventures and to accept the risks that accompany them. At 
the very least, some level of pure profit would seem to be required 
if for nothing more than to meet the costs of risk and uncertainty. 
2. Any form of economic action which would permit pure profit to 
occur is imperfect competition, so-called because of the ethical con-
siderations surrounding pure profit. All forms of economic activity 
occur of course under some form of imperfect competition, but different 
degrees of imperfect competition are identified or given names in terms 
of the hardship or ease with which pure profit may be gained. Pure corn-
petition is the least imperfect; it provides the least opportunity for 
pure profit. Pure profits arise generally through competitive cost-
cutting among many producers of a product. Certain types of agri-
cultural production frequently serve as classroom examples. Monopo-
listic competition, also engaged in by many competitive participants, 
provides added opportunities for pure profit through limited opportunities 
to affect selling prices, largely through insistence by each producer 
that his offering is in some way unique and not the same as anything 
offered by his many competitors. Advertising and brand names attempt 
to accomplish this. 
Both pure competition and monopolistic competition share common 
characteristics such as the presence of many competitive participants 
who enjoy reasonable freedom to enter and leave the competitive arena 
as they please, and also the emergence of pure profit as a reward to 
competitive intelligence or skill displayed in this or that tactical 
victory. Pure profit is thus an illusory thing which is by no means 
guaranteed, but something which can be gained or lost according to the 
comparative skills of the many individual competitors. Power, generally, 
does not figure prominently among the techniques employed by competitors 
in their struggle for pure profit. 
3. More malignant forms of imperfect competition exist in oligopoly, 
which is sharing of productive effort by a few dominant producers, and 
monopoly, wherein a surviving producer or collusive element controls 
production of a product for which there is no satisfactory substitute. 
Oligopoly and monopoly share common ground in that pure profit is 
guaranteed, and that power figures prominently in assuring this outcome. 
The power itself need not be arbitrarily exercised, as in clumsy collusion 
or discrimination; the power may reside in the rewards and demands of the 
production process itself. The automobile industry frequently serves as 
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an example of oligopoly. The rewards of this industry lie in its in-
comparable capacity to produce excellent automobiles which 1 con-
sidering their complexity 1 precision 1 performance 1 etc. 1 are made 
available to consumers at very low prices resulting from massive 
production complexes producing great numbers of cars. But the 
demands of this process in terms of capital requirements 1 technolo-
gical mastery 1 specialized labor 1 etc. 1 are so formidable that only 
a few competitors possess the necessary qualifications. The power 
to assure continued pure profit exists in the necessity of a compli-
cated production process dominated by powerful producers who create 
products for which there is no satisfactory substitute. While they 
do not receive a pure profit 1 they also provide a desirable product 
at a lower price than could be realized by some other alternative. 
Pure profit may be incompatible with some ethical considerations. 
But pure profit may be very compatible with great economic efficiency. 
Thus 1 some ethical considerations may be incompatible with economic 
efficiency. 

SUMMARY OF ALTERNATIVES IN FARM POLICY 
FOR THE IMMEDIATE PERIOD AHEAD 
Earl 0. Heady and Leo V. Mayer 
This seminar has brought together important information and gen-
eral agreement on the outlook for agriculture over the immediate years 
ahead. It has indicated that the industry is faced with further rapid 
technical change and structural adjustments over the next decade. 
Furthermore 1 with current technological trends and innovations in sight 1 
U.S. agriculture has substantial overcapacity in terms of recent price 
levels and export demand. Without farm programs relating to price and 
production 1 potential levels of crop output will depress crop prices, 
result in greater livestock production and depress farm income in the 
years immediately ahead. 
These prospects are indicated in the several papers and the discus-
sions of the seminar. They also are suggested by the production levels 
achieved by U.S. farmers in 19 67. Further, the papers on long-run 
capacity suggest that supply potential over the next 20 years will remain 
large enough to depress prices, in the absence of unexpected large in-
creases in foreign demand. Exports far exceeding those of recent years 
will be necessary to absorb the nation's food producing capacity at 
prices higher than those of the present. To absorb our prospective pro-
ducing capacity over the next 15 years, exports would have to triple 
over recent levels. Wheat exports would have to increase to two billion 
bushels and feed grains to 70 million tons by 1980. Such large increases 
are not likely, except in the case of some large and entirely new develop-
ments in international trade, food aid, or war. 
It is possible that, at some time in the future, population growth and 
economic development over the world may cause demand for U.S. farm 
products to rise to levels absorbing our full supply capacity and putting 
an upward pressure on prices. But whether this is three or 20 years away 
is of the greatest importance for agricultural policies in the immediate 
years. If it were only three years away, we should begin taking transitory 
steps from our present policy format to that posed by great demands on 
our capacity. However, if it is 20 years away, the policy needs over 
the next few years are quite different, and the information presented and 
discussed at this seminar indicates that the latter is the outlook. ·Capacity 
will remain large in relation to domestic and export demand over the next 
two decades. 
We are thus left with the reality that, in the short run, the agricul-
tural industry has. no self-balancing mechanism other than sharply lower 
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prices to equalize aggregate supply with effective demand levels. Al-
ternatively, to keep output in balance with demand and maintain prices 
at existing or higher levels, will require continued legislation, or some 
type of majority or group action by farmers. A wide variety of programs 
are available, ranging from those representing group action by farmers 
to those representing government actions to modify commodity supply, 
price, storage and other market forces. Most of these alternatives have 
been proposed at previous times or are under discussion and examination 
at the present. The nature and implications of several major alternatives 
are discussed below. The outlook provided in the papers of this seminar 
should provide farm groups with a basis for appraisal of the current situa-
tion and the manner in which the various alternatives mesh with supply-
demand prospects in the immediate period ahead. 
Bargaining Power 
Bargaining power is one alternative which evidently appeals to some 
farm groups as a means for improving prices and incomes. Most other 
major industries and economic sectors possess sufficient power in the 
market to "have a say" in the level of prices that prevail. So, why not 
farmers? In the minds of some farmers, sufficient bargaining power 
would give them the ability to gain control over prices paid and received --
but especially prices received. Others believe that self-managed market 
power would allow the removal of government involvement in agricultural 
policy. Both or either of the alternatives would appeal to even more 
farmers if they could be convinced that a mechanism exists which would 
actually attain production, price and income goals for millions of producers. 
What, then, are the conditions necessary to bring farmers the bar-
gaining power which has eluded them in the past? 
Condition 1: Effective control over the supply of the commodity 
must be exercised. Farmers would necessarily have to control the 
totar production of the crop or livestock commodities of concern and 
the commodities which readily substitute for them. 
Condition 2: Some g~oup or organization must be given, have 
inherent power, or a store of money and a bureaucracy to exercise 
disciplinary control over producers and the total amount of product 
which can be produced. When an excess of the commodity is pro-
duced this group must also have the ability and power to allocate 
to each producer his share of the available market. 
Condition 3: Buyers of farm commodities must become convinced 
that the farm association or group controlling supply can cause incon-
venience anc~/or loss unless bargaining over price takes place. 
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Condition 4: Members of the association or group must 
be able and willing to withstand the financial loss of with-
holding their products from the market until such time as py.y-
ers agree to offer acceptable terms of trade to suppliers • .!! 
In past decades farmers acting alone have not been able to meet the 
conditions necessary to achieve bargaining power because they lacked 
control over total output produced and sold. To partially remedy this 
market-power weakness 1 the government 1 evidently with the majority 
consent of farmers 1 has used production control and storage programs 
to reduce the quantity of grain coming to the market. With a smaller 
quantity of grain available 1 grain prices could be supported at levels 
above market clearing prices. These support prices were made effec-
tive through non -recourse loans and storaqe programs. 
If farmers are to establish self-imposed bargaining power in the 
future 1 they will need to attain control over the aggregate supply or 
actual production of farm commodities. Only thus can farmer repre-
sentatives convince buyers that they have sufficient market power to 
cut off the supply and ca1.1se loss to buyers. And the cut off in supply 
must exist in the long term 1 not just over a few days or weeks. Last-
ing effects can be attained only with a reduction in the total supply of 
the commodity produced over a relevant time period (crop year 1 produc-
tion period for livestock 1 etc.) -- not simply a temporary withholding 
from current marketings of a supply already produced. 
There are some basic reasons why temporary withholding does not 
raise prices in agriculture. In the case of storable commodities such 
as grain 1 withholding quantities already produced simply extends mar-
keting of the same amount to a later time. In the case of meat animals 
such as hogs 1 withholding market-ready animals actually increases the 
supply in a later period because hogs grow to a greater weight until 
they are finally marketed. If the price increases during the withholding 
period 1 the low price elasticity of demand for farm products almost cer-
tainly guarantees lower prices and incomes in the later period when the 
market supply is increased as the same hogs are sold at greater weights. 
Without destroying some part of the supply already produced or perma-
nent removal of it from the market in some manner 1 the market situation 
is not changed at all for an extended time • 
.l/ For further discussion of these requirements I see George Ladd 1 
Agricultural Bargaining Power. Iowa State University Press. 19 64. 
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The prospects for effective farm controlled bargaining power, as 
reflected through market demand and supply potential, is not signifi-
cantly greater today than in previous decades. In fact, the increasing 
ability of farmers to overflow effective markets with grain commodities 
may cause supply control to become more costly and difficult than ever 
before. In the absence of effective control over production, only the 
ability of farmers to purchase and withhold permanently -- store, ex-
port, or destroy several billion dollars 1 worth of grains -- would main-
tain farm prices at levels higher than decreed by market demand and 
the "supply already produced." Currently, no private group has the 
large funds necessary for these purposes. Hence, it appears at least 
in the near future that the farmers' best mechanism is the federal govern-
mental machinery to bring about effective control over market supply 
of major grain commodities. 
However, some possibility does exist that, under a government 
umbrella of supply control, farmers may be encouraged to form some 
type of bargaining associations and engage in price negotiations. 
Such associations could provide farmers with an opportunity to parti-
cipate more directly in bargaining over commodity prices. But farmers 1 
ability to produce over the next few years will almost certainly require 
their use of government-operated programs to manage grain supplies. 
Otherwise supplies will "overflow" present and near-term market de-
mands and result in short-run price depression. While it is conceivable 
that "unanimously consenting farmers" could get together and voluntarily 
re~uce production, this task is yet to be accomplished or experienced. 
And it is difficult to foresee how the several hundred thousand pro-
ducers of feed grains, wheat, hogs and cattle, geographically separated 
and increasingly competitive as they are, will be able to do so. Cer-
tainly a large reduction in their numbers would be required before they 
can be organized into the required state of "unanimous consent." 
With the decline in farm numbers that is underway, and with the 
growing interest of different farm groups, it is possible that the condi-
tions for self-imposed bargaining power may some day be achieved. 
Farmers could, if they selected this goal, drop all government programs 
and attempt to attain supply management and price increases through 
their own organization and bargaining power. But it would take some 
time and probably quite low prices to convince all individual farmers to 
participate voluntarily over an extended period. During the period in 
which effective bargaining machines and sufficief!.t participation are be-
ing attained, output would likely increase while prices decline. Yet 
this is one choice farmers have -- to drop other programs and rely on 
their own bargaining power. Only thus would anyone know exactly how 
well supply can be controlled voluntarily and the exact magnitude of 
price changes. 
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Alternative Supply Control Policies 
The other major alternative in supply control, demand expansion 
and price improvement is for farmers to use government programs they 
design for these purposes. The range of programs which can be used 
to control total farm output and support or increase prices is rather 
large~ The mechanisms used over the last three decades have included 
acreage quotas, marketing quotas, processing taxes with tax warrents 
for cooperators, loan-storage programs, foreign disposal, food aid-
economic development programs, land retirement programs, voluntary 
participation programs, direct government payments, and several com-
binations of these. We discuss only a few. 
Another choice which exists is the possibility of no government 
program, a policy of unrestricted production and marketings. This al-
ternative is currently favored by some groups and farmers. Such a 
policy would have the following short-run implications for agriculture. 
Free markets 
Removing all government programs which currently affect production, 
marketing and prices of agricultural products would have several effects 
on the farm economy. Prices received by farmers would tend to decline 
in the short-run when most of the 50 million excess acres of cropland, 
withheld from production by farmers cooperating in government programs, 
were returned to production. There is considerable indication that a 
fairly large proportion of these acres approach the productivity of the land 
already in production. In 19 6 7, for example, wheat acreage expanded 
18.3 percent over 1966. While yields were somewhat less favorable, 
total wheat production increased by 16. 2 percent. Corn acreage increased 
by 6. 1 percent while production increased by 14. 7 percent over 19 66. 
The four combined feed grains (corn, oats, barley, grain sorghum) show 
a similar response with a 2. 9 percent increase in acreage and an 11. 1 
percent increase in production. Soybean production was somewhat less 
responsive, an 8. 7 percent increase in acreage resulting in a 4. 8 per-
cent increase in production. For these grain crops in total, an 8. 2 per-
cent increase in acreage resulted in an 11. 2 percent increase in tonnage 
produced.Y 
Y Data are from Crop Production 19 6 7 Annual Summary. U.S. Department 
of Agriculture, Statistical Reporting Service. Released December 19, 
1967. Washington, D.C. 
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There is indication that the present retired acreage of cropland 
could, if returned to production, increase total acreage of these 
major crops by approximately 20 percent (from 200 to 250 million acres) 
and output by as much as 15 percent. Such a large increase in pro-
duction would cause substc.ntially lower prices over the short-run fn 
the absence of government storage programs or larger foreign disposal. 
After several crop years, of course, these low price levels would drive 
some marginal acres and farms from crop production to more extensive 
types of farming. The response would be some eventual improvement 
in market prices, but if prices soon returned to present levels, the 
marginal acres would likely return to crop production. Thus the period 
of adjustment, even to return prices to present real levels, could be 
quite extended. 
All research results suggest that farms and lands driven out of 
grain production by a free market policy would be heavily concentrated 
in certain regions of the United States. The Southeast would suffer 
a large share of the reduction in intensive crop production, as would 
marginal grain areas of the Plains. The cropland released would, through 
a succession of crop years, move to a more extensive use such as 
pasture or tree production. Farm families would move out even faster 
than at present as their economic base declined and as a premium was 
placed on higher managerial ability to use efficiently large supplies 
of capital. 
The repercussions of a free market would not be wholly on the 
farms in marginal regions, however. Towns, schools, churches and 
other local institutions would also bear the costs associated with the 
shift or return to a more extensive agriculture. Political leaders would 
see their constitutent base slowly erode away. Community spirit, 
already weak from the changes of the last decade, would degenerate 
further as asset values declined in small towns. The adjustment im-
plications for rural America would be immense for a sudden return to 
a completely free market. 
But the losses which rural America might suffer under a free market 
would not be shared by all persons in the U. S. economy. Most notable 
among those who would gain would be taxpayers and consumers. To 
some extent, these groups are the same, but not all consumers are tax-
payers, of course. Taxpayers would gain as a reduction in governmental 
appropriations reduced the level of public expenditures on agriculture. 
This reduction would not be as large as generally supposed, however, 
since only some $2. 0 billion of the approximately $6. 5 billion agricultural 
appropriation is spent on production control, storage and foreign dis-
posal. Expenditure on welfare programs operated through the agricultural 
department, as well as research and, perhaps, some storage and foreign 
development programs, would likely continue. These latter programs 
-----------
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account for a large portion of federal expenditures on agriculture and 
consequently reduce the "savings" which might result from eliminating 
programs of supply control and price--supportin9 storage. 
Consumers would gain from lower food prices which a free market 
might bring. While there are no recent figures on this possible savings, 
some estimates in 1963 indicated it at approximately 6 percent if free 
markets were to be substituted for programs then in use. At that time, 
the total consumer retail food bill for 1967 was estimated at $63.5 
billion with continued programs and $59.7 billion with a shift to a free 
market, a 6 percent decline. This $3.8 billion savings in food costs, 
plus the $2.0 billion savings in government expenditures, would total 
a $5. 8 billion reduction. This reduction would nearly equal the estimated 
$ 5. 3 billion reduction in /et farm income which would occur with the 
return to a free market .l 
Thus free markets for agriculture would provide some gain to cer-
tain segments of the economy. But agriculture would in general suffer 
substantial losses. Rural areas which depend upon agriculture also 
would see sudden economic recession. These changes would bring both 
economic and social losses to a segment of the nation's economy which 
historically has made large contributions to the economic growth and 
development of the United States. 
These are the issues which provide the major basis for commercial 
farm policies. We must be concerned with the distribution of gains and 
losses among the various groups of society under various government 
policies and market organizations. Some can bring gains to consumers 
and taxpayers generally, but losses to farmers and the rural community; 
some can bring gains to the rural sector but large costs to taxpayers; 
others can bring gains to some farm and age groups, but income reductions 
to others. The task is to find policies which have the greatest positive 
prospect. If we can find policies which have positive benefits to all 
major groups concerned, we can be certain that the outcome over all 
groups is positive. But if the policy or market result brings gain to some 
but loss to others, we cannot be certain that adding the positive and the 
negative will provide a net-sum effect that is positive. 
Current acreage diversion programs 
Few major industries in the United States typically operate at full 
capacity. The steel industry, for example, rarely operates at more than 
31 Tweeten, Luther G. , Earl 0. Heady and Leo V. Mayer. Farm Program 
Alternatives, CAED Report 18. Iowa State University, 19 63. 
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75 percent of capacity. Likewise, the auto industry does not operate 
at full capacity when demand is slack for cars. Labor also uses 
policies which either restrict or gently persuade employers to hold 
working hours to prescribed levels such as 40 hours per week. Before 
enlargements of the Vietnam War there was considerable discussion 
about reducing the work week even more. Termination of the war is 
likely to return these discussions and considerations. 
But agriculture is the one industry where a policy of less than 
capacity production is opposed by a rather large number of people. 
This seems true even though the low demand elasticity for food can 
cause modest control over output to pay substantial dividends in 
levels of prices and incomes. Given the current uncertainties in the 
world food situation, it would appear wise to have an extent of unused 
or stand-by production capacity in agriculture. This unused capacity 
for food production is as valuable to the nation 1 s security, or even the 
world 1 s welfare, as is unused capacity in the steel industry. Develop-
ing additional capacity while holding some of our agricultural produc-
tion resources in a state of semi-retirement is not inconsistent with 
our national goals of global security. 
But, if it is to be, what means should be used to hold output at 
less than capacity levels in the short-run? There are a variety of means 
which can be used with differing effects on the cost to society, farm 
production efficiency, and gains and losses to farmers as well as to 
rural communities. 
Acceptance of this goal, to develop capacity in agricultural produc-
tion but hold the excess in reserve, requires a clear concept of the 
purpose. To develop the capacity for future contingencies but to un-
leash its full power in current production causes the farm and rural 
publics to pay a major cost -- in the form of lower prices and incomes --
for the future gain of national or world society. Hence, we could con-
sider that government supply control programs, just as those which might 
be attained under farmer bargaining power, are part of an over-all economic 
or social policy to (a) develop improved technology which lowers the real 
price and improves the quality of food for domestic consumers, (b) 
develop large capacity in order that future world food contingencies can 
be met, and (c) restrain this production capacity to an extent that 
the short-run effects and costs of its existence do not impose a burden 
on farm and rural sectors. Several policy alternatives exist which can 
allow this gain to consumers, provide a margin of safety for world food 
markets, and compensate farmers for their contribution to it. 
One obvious set of programs for maintaining a measure of control 
over production capacity are present types of voluntary short-term land 
retirement programs. These programs for wheat, feed grains and cotton 
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retire from production part of the cropland on each farm that participates 
in the program. At the end of a one-year contract, under: which part 
of the farm's cropland remains out of production, the retired acres 
again become available for crop production. Since the programs are 
established so that many farms and all producing regions find it near-
ly equally profitable to participate, land of all qualities is placed in 
the program. At year's end, the land is returned to production or left 
in the program for another year. No incentive exists under these cir-
cumstances for any sizable quantity of cropland to transfer permanently 
from crop production into more extensive uses. Thus the programs con-
tinue from year to year with annual costs of near'$ 2 billion and with 
little long-run opportunity or incentive for permanent shifts of crop-
land. 
An alternative before agriculture is to continue cropland diversion 
programs of the recent pattern to control output in the few years ahead. 
When the programs were first initiated, they seemed to have wide 
acceptance. The acceptance stemmed from the then widely recognized 
need to lessen domestic carryover stocks of grains. The diversion 
program lessened production by paying farmers who wished to partici-
pate voluntarily and resulted in some price improvement. Between the 
new program and a step up in foreign disposal, stocks were reduced. 
Programs in effect now are generally the same as those of two or three 
years back. The main difference is that some more acreage was re-
leased last year which combined with good yields, increased output 
and lowered prices. Hence, the important questions for the future are: 
Should current programs be continued into the next few years when pro-
duction capacity will loom large relative to demand? If so, how large 
should production be allowed to grow and at what level should prices 
be stabilized? 
The question of price level is crucial, just as it would be with 
farmer self-imposed bargaining power programs, because it influences 
(a) the acceptance to farmers, (b) the cost of the program, and (c) 
the foreign commercial demand for our products. Our grain prices are 
currently near world market levels, thus encouraging export demand 
growth for these commodities. There is a fairly wide sentiment for 
keeping them at world levels so that we can continue a ra_pid growth 
in foreign export demand. Also, if we push prices to higher support 
levels, production control programs become more costly. At higher 
price levels the payments to farmers for participation must be greater, 
if a sufficient number are to accept' participation as profitable. Hence, 
the questions of magnitude of production control and level of prices are 
crucial concerns to be determined. 
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Other diversion programs of voluntary nature 
Numerous analysts have suggested that we can devise more effec-
tive means for controlling our excess production capacity -- a produc-
tive ability which allows the nation both to rest free of future food 
worries and to further our national goals in helping to alleviate world 
food problems and promote economic development. 
A program which could improve the efficiency of land retirement 
would be one of a longer term than the present system, with acreage 
reduction concentrated more by regions. A 'Program which concentrated 
on taking land out in large chunks or areas of the nation, rather than 
as a few acres on each farm, as well as taking it out for periods of at 
least five and preferrably 10 years, has greater promise for a long-ter:m 
transfer of cropland to noncrop uses. At the end of a 10-year contract 
period, land will have shifted to profitable production of grass, trees 
or other extensive crops. Furthermore, if the land so retired represents 
acreage marginal for grain crops in each county or region, the continu-
ing movement toward greater efficiency in agriculture, with the conse-
quent narrowing of profit margins, would almost certainly guarantee that 
much or most land of low productivity would remain in more extensive 
uses at the end of the retirement contract. 
One way to guarantee that this land would remain out of crop pro-
duction is this: the government could "buy up" the rights of land 
owners and operators to produce grain crops. They could use the land 
for any· other purpose. The government could continue to hold these 
"crop producing rights" until that time in the future when world demand 
requires return of the land to food production. They could then be 
given or sold back to farmers. Payments for the shift would be made 
over a 1 0-year period, then terminated at that time. Under this proce-
dure, a time would arrive when payments are not capitalized into land 
values. 
This type of land retirement program has already been used to a 
limited extent in the United States. The current Croplands Adjustment 
Program is one of this nature, but on a small scale. The Conservation 
Reserve programs of 1957-1960 were larger and removed 28.7 million 
acres from production under long-term retirement contracts. Approxi-
mately 9. 5 million acres remain under these contracts in 19 68, but are 
slated to be released by 1971. The major problem which arose with 
this program was not one of the farm. Farmers seemed to find the pro-
gram an acceptable means for transferring land, reducing their opera-
tion or moving to nonfarm activities. But many rural communities, 
particularly the business and service firms located in regions where 
a majority of the cropland went out of production, were hard hit by 
reduced business transactions. These groups quickly pressured Congress 
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into terminating the program. A close look at Figure 1 indicates that 
the heaviest concentration in land retirement under the Conservation 
Reserve Program took place in the Southeast, the Northern Plains, 
eastern Colorado, New Mexico and Texas. This outcome is consistent 
with our recent research results which indicate that a land retirement 
program based on relative interregional advantages would cause these 
particular regions to suffer heavy consequences. Figure 2 shows the 
areas of the United States, determined by a research model, which 
would shift a majority of land from crop production, if a program of 
removing some SO million acres on a least-cost basis (and also one 
which uses land on the basis of its comparative advantages) were 
instituted. These are the regions that modern farming technologies 
and demand levels have caused to become marginal for intensive crop 
production at recent price levels. Once transferred from crop produc-
tion, the land so represented would be likely to remain in extensive 
agriculture. But a program is unlikely to be acceptable unless the 
previously mentioned pressures on local business and institutions 
could be reduced or other means of economic compensation provided. 
One way to reduce the pressure on rural communities would be 
to place an upper limit in each county on the proportion of cropland 
which can be removed in any one year. A second method that might 
find favor would be to provide indemnification payments to rural 
businesses and groups desiring to leave communities that become 
no longer self sustaining. These are but two ways of reducing econom-
ic pressures on local communities that would result from lower cost 
and more efficient land retirement programs. These or other compensation 
programs would be necessary if nonfarm but rural groups were to find 
programs of this type, or even a free market policy, to be acceptable. 
Marketing quota programs 
Another major alternative in controlling total output is use of some 
type of mandatory output or marketing quota. Mandatory quota programs 
could be one of two major types: One would be quotas on acreages 
planted and harvested of major crops; a second would be quotas on the 
amount sold in the market place. The latter would work in the case 
of crops which move through the market for processing or other purposes. 
Wheat for food, soybeans and cotton would lend themselves to market-
ing quotas. Feed grains do not move primarily to the market place and 
consequently probably would require acreage quotas if output is to be 
effectively controlled. 
Acreage quotas have been used for a number of different crops in 
the United States. Beginning in 1933, acreage allotments were used 
almost continuously during periods of supply control, until programs 
-210-
of voluntary participation began in 19 61. Acreage allotment programs 
tend to be somewhat inefficient when they are based on historical 
patterns of production. Also 1 when they remove only a few acres on 
each farm 1 they tend to bring about inefficient combinations of land, 
labor and capital. However, these programs do have the potential for 
raising and sustaining market prices above levels which would result 
under full use of our production capacity. Also, the cost of holding 
some land out of production is transferred from government to farmers, 
with remuneration coming from the market place in the form of higher 
prices on the remaining levels of output. Over time 1 of course, these 
higher prices and returns will lead to an increase in land values which 
will raise the cost of entering farming for a new g,eneration of farmers. 
This consequence also results under the type of land retirement program 
which maintains prices above free market levels and provides payments 
for participation. 
Marketing quotas have not had wide usage in the United States, 
although Canada has employed this type of restriction on wheat output 
for a number of years. In Canada's case 1 the national wheat marketing 
board determines the total quantity of wheat to be marketed over some 
subsequent period. This quantity is apportioned among farmers and 
marketing certificates are issued allowing each farmer to sell his allotted 
quantity. Any remainder of the crop must be stored for a subsequent 
marketing year. Farmers are allowed to grow whatever acreage they 
determine to be most useful to their operation. However, since they 
can market only their allotted quota 1 they are well aware of the storage 
costs involved in over-production. If a sudden demand for wheat 
develops, and additional bushels can be sold, farmers tend to reap gains 
from any carryover above their ususal marketing quota. Thus farmers are 
encouraged to store some grain in expectation of some future gain. 
The result is that the largest portion of storage costs for holding sur-
pluses remains in private hands. This program also brings higher re-
turns to wheat producers. A program of this type might hold some prom-
ise for U.S. farmers in the case of crops which move only through the 
market. It would provide a means for shifting the public out of the loan 
and storage business, although the government might find it necessary 
or desirable to hold a strategic reserve for defense or world food-aid 
purposes . 
Market quotas are already used, through acceptance by the majority 
vote of farmers under market orders provided by public legislation 1 in 
the case of certain perishable fruits and vegetables grown in rather small 
and homogeneous areas. Marketing orders also are used in major milk 
sheds to limit the amount each producer can market. But they would be 
hard to enforce for feed grains and livestock which are grown over wide 
expanses of the nation and frequently move directly among farms. 
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Other Policy Considerations 
These several types of programs provide the major alternatives open 
to farmers in their attempt to attain higher prices and an improved economic 
standing. A wide variation of these policies and programs is also in the 
r9alm of "the possible." If farmers desire greater "freedom to produce" 
they can return to a free market for agriculture. By contrast 1 if as a 
group they desire maximum "freedom to gain" they can adopt some form 
of mandatory marketing and acreage quotas or effective self-imposed 
supply control under their own bargaining power -- once they can make 
it work on a sufficiently large scale. Major programs of the recent past 
have represented a middle road or compromise between strict or mandatory 
production control and all production under the free market. The results 
have been programs which have been workable but not completely satisfying 
to all parties -- farmers 1 the government or taxpayers. 
Future policy and programs 1 if they are to exist 1 will likely require 
that farmers show some greater amount of internal agreement than has pre-
vailed in the past. The political facts of life may preclude continuation 
of current program types and the in-fighting among agricultural groups. 
As the farm vote declines in numbers and farm programs become increas-
ingly dependent on urban legislators 1 the need for one voice to speak 
for agriculture may increase rapidly. A continued multiplicity of farm 
voices or the proposal of only radical alternatives 1 might push urban 
congressmen into more extreme alternatives for the farming industry. 
In any case 1 certain things are clear: Production ability is great 
enough 1 and mammoth increases in foreign demand to fully absorb 
capacity are so distant 1 that prices will be lower in the immediate future 
unless some type of program prevails. Current legislation expires in 1969 
and the farm public needs to consider programs which are workable and 
which can most effectively mesh the interests of food producers 1 consumers 
and taxpayers over the next few years. 
